Public-Private Partnership Contractual Design: A Computational Model of the Moral Hazard with Lotteries

Novo artigo publicado na Public Organization Review, de autoria dos professores Rodrigo N. Fernandez e André Carraro do PPGOM-UFPel e co-autores. Trata-se do: Public-Private Partnership Contractual Design: A Computational Model of the Moral Hazard with Lotteries.

Eis o resumo do artigo:

Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a new model of public management which consists of the contractual relationship between public and private entities. In particular, PPPs enable risk share between public and private sectors making the asymmetric information problem in a contractual arrangement more evident. The aim of this paper was to study a moral hazard problem applied to PPP contracts. To achieve this objective, a PPP computational contractual model including the moral hazard with lotteries was developed to assess how contractual changes could affect the optimum behavior of arrangement members. Simulations indicate that projects with higher economic value should attract more qualified firms, which may be why the companies expend more effort. To deal with possible contractual contingencies and try to minimize the moral hazard problem, the government could draw up more flexible contracts in order to include possible necessary changes and punish unwanted or improper consortium behavior.

Minimizar problemas de risco moral (moral hazard) em arranjos contratuais deste tipo é um dos pontos que merece ser melhor estudado.