

André Nascimento Pontes Ludovic Soutif Matheus Valente (Editors)

Book of Abstracts VII Brazilian Society for Analytic Philosophy Conference





VII BRAZILIAN SOCIETY FOR ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Série Dissertatio Filosofia

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Rua Alberto Rosa, 154 - CEP 96010-770 - Pelotas/RS

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Primeira publicação em 2023 por NEPFil online e Editora da UFPel.

Dados Internacionais de Catalogação

N123 VII Brazilian Society for Analytic Philosophy Conference: Book of Abstracts. [recurso eletrônico] Organizadores: André Nascimento Pontes, Ludovic Soutif, Matheus Valente – Pelotas: NEPFIL Online, 2023.

127 p. - (Série Dissertatio Filosofia).

Modo de acesso: Internet <wp.ufpel.edu.br/nepfil> ISBN: 978-65-998645-3-7

1. Filosofia. 2. Analítica I. Pontes, André Nascimento. II. Soutif, Ludovic. III. Valente, Matheus.

COD 100











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Foreword

This volume gathers the abstracts either sent by invited speakers or accepted for presentation at the VII Brazilian Society for Analytic Philosophy (SBFA) Conference. Organized by the Society every other year since 2008, the SBFA Conferences are Brazil's most significant analytic philosophy event. The seventh edition took place at PUC-Rio on October 25-28, 2022, with the financial support of FAPERJ (*Fundação Carlos Chagos Filho de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*, Brazil, #E-26/210.539/2021), CNPq (*Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico*, Brazil, Research Productivity Grant #3054/2020-1), CAPES (*Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior*, Brazil, #001), and PUC-Rio's Philosophy Department. The presentations covered a wide range of topics from virtually all areas of philosophy and related areas such as logic, linguistics, neuroscience, economics, or law. Brazilian as well as foreign researchers helped make the VII SBFA Conference a huge success. We are grateful to them, just as we are grateful to the team of PUC-Rio's volunteer students that helped us organize the Conference.

The UFPel Editions also deserve special thanks for hosting this volume as part of the *Dissertatio Filosofia* series.

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On Keynote Speakers

Catarina Dutilh Novaes is a full professor and University Research Chair at the Department of Philosophy of the VU Amsterdam, as well as a Professorial Fellow at Arché in St. Andrews (2019-24). Prof. Dutilh Novaes is currently running the ERC Consolidator project 'The Social Epistemology of Argumentation' (2018-23). Her current research centers on the history and philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, and social epistemology. Her most recent monograph *The Dialogical Roots of Deduction* (Cambridge University Press) won the 2022 Lakatos Award.

Elia Zardini is a Ramón y Cajal Research Fellow at the Complutense University of Madrid. He has been a postdoctoral fellow at several centers (LanCog/University of Lisbon, Arché/St. Andrews, NIP/University of Aberdeen, National Autonomous University of Mexico) and has published numerous papers in scientific journals on topics such as the apriori, logical paradoxes, skepticism, or perceptual justification. Prof. Zardini's recent collection, *Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori*, co-edited with Prof. Dylan Dodd, is forthcoming at Oxford University Press.

Guido Imaguire is Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), CNPq Research Productivity and FAPERJ Grantee. Prof. Imaguire obtained his PhD in philosophy from the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (2000) and was a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Oxford (2014-5). His research focuses on topics from analytic metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic and mathematics, and the history of early analytic philosophy. He is the author and (co-)editor of books and of numerous articles published in academic journals.

Jennifer Lackey is Wayne and Elizabeth Jones Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University. Prof. Lackey specializes in epistemology, with stress on issues in social epistemology. She has recently published numerous articles and books on topics such as false confessions, the criminal justice system, the duty to object, norms of credibility, the epistemic status of punishment, the epistemology of groups, expertise, and the distribution of epistemic goods. Her latest book, *The Epistemology of Groups*, was released in 2020 by Oxford University Press. So will be her upcoming monograph *Criminal Testimonial Injustice* (to appear in 2023).

Philippe Schlenker is a senior researcher at CNRS (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris) and a Global Distinguished Professor at New York University. His early interests included semantics, pragmatics, the philosophy of language, and philosophical logic. He has conducted research on indexicals and indirect discourse, intensional semantics, anaphora, presuppositions, as well as semantic paradoxes. In recent work, Prof. Schlenker has advocated a program of 'Super Semantics' that seeks to expand the traditional frontiers of the field. He has investigated the semantics of sign languages, with special attention both to their logical structure and to the rich iconic means that interact with it. His most recent findings feature in his recent monograph, *What It All Means: Semantics for (Almost) Everything*, released in 2022 by the MIT Press.

Sofia Stein is a professor at UNISINOS. She obtained her PhD in Philosophy of Science from the University of São Paulo (2002) and was a postdoctoral researcher at University of Pittsburgh (2011). Her main research interest lies in studies of the mind and intentionality from a naturalized perspective, including issues related to linguistic acquisition, linguistic comprehension, theories of perception, as well as the interrelations between perceptual content, innate capacities, and social learning.

Sven Rosenkranz is an ICREA Research Professor at the University of Barcelona (LOGOS). He has spearheaded several wide-ranging projects and research networks; currently, he is the PI of 'Methods: Epistemology Beyond Belief' (2022-25). His main research interests are in metaphysics and epistemology, with stress on topics such as realism, objectivity, fallibility, the logic of justification, epistemic paradoxes, the limits of thought and knowledge, and the philosophy of time and existence. Prof. Rosenkranz's latest book, *Justification as Ignorance*, released in 2021 by Oxford University Press, concerns the nature and logic of epistemic justification.

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KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

Can Arguments Change Minds?

Catarina Dutilh Novaes

VU Amsterdam, Netherlands; Univ. of Saint Andrews, UK

Can arguments change minds? Philosophers like to think that they can: by engaging in the (presumably rational) process of carefully considering reasons in favor or against a given position or view, we should update our beliefs accordingly. However, a wealth of empirical evidence seems to suggest that arguments are in fact not very efficient tools to change minds. What to make of these radically different appreciations of the mind-changing potential of arguments? To address this issue, it seems that we need to look beyond the content of arguments alone: we must also take into account the broader contexts in which they occur, in particular the propagation of messages across attention networks, and the choices that epistemic agents must make between alternative potential sources of content and information. These choices are very much influenced by perceptions of reliability and trustworthiness, which means that the source of the argument may be even more decisive than its content when it comes to how persuasive it will be for a given person. In a nutshell: arguments may well be able to change minds, but only under conducive, favorable socio-epistemic conditions. In this presentation, I turn to a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange that I've been developing over the past years (Dutilh Novaes, 2020b) to (hopefully) shed light on the mechanisms involved in these processes and the conditions under which arguments can change minds.

The Bearers of Logical Consequence

Elia Zardini

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain

What are the primary bearers of the relation of logical consequence? It is first argued against propositions, on the three grounds that propositions do not have enough structure as is required by logical consequence, that it is not at all clear just which propositions should count as standing in the relation of logical consequence and that

there are many cases of logical consequence where no propositions are plausibly in the offing. It is then argued against utterances (qua particular speech acts) on the three grounds that utterances seem at the same time too many and too few with respect to the intended field of the relation of logical consequence, that it is not at all clear just which utterances should count as standing in the relation of logical consequence and that some sentences corresponding to logical truths can be uttered falsely. Jointly, these considerations provide enough materials for an argument by elimination to the conclusion that the primary logical-consequence bearers are sentences (qua interpreted syntactic structures), which is then supplemented by two methodological considerations to the effect that it is doubtful that all the results acquired by logic in a sentence-based framework can be translated into other frameworks and that it is undesirable to impute to logicians substantial mistake about the objects constituting the field of the relation they study. Finally, two objections against sentences as primary logical-consequence bearers are addressed, concerning, respectively, the logical evaluation of non-linguistic beings and the fact that some logically valid sentences are not by themselves true.

How to Individuate Facts: A Fine-grained Conception

Guido Imaguire UFRJ, CNPq, Brazil

On the so-called "constitution conception of facts" a fact is individuated in terms of its constituents and the manner these are structured. In my talk I will develop a finegrained version of this conception. For this, I will firstly analyse and discard Lowe's (1998) argument against the possibility of individuating facts by means of their constituents. Then, I will propose intensional--but not conceptual--entities, 'kooky' objects and properties, as the very constituents of fine-grained worldly facts. On this basis, a criterion of identity for facts will be offered and defended. At the end, I will apply the conception to solve some apparent puzzles and discuss some possible objections to my proposal.

Epistemic Reparations

Jennifer Lackey

Northwestern Univ., USA

In this talk, I provide the first extended discussion in the philosophical literature of the epistemic significance of the phenomenon of "being known" and the relationship it has to reparations that I argue are distinctively epistemic. Drawing on a framework provided by the United Nations of the "right to know," I argue that victims of gross violations and injustices not only have the right to know what happened, but also the right *to be known* — to be a giver of knowledge to others about their own experiences. I show how such victims can suffer epistemic wrongs by being rendered invisible, vilified or demonized, or systematically distorted, and that these ways of not being known demand epistemic reparations. While there are traditional reparations that are epistemic in nature, such as memorialization and education, I argue that there is a prior and arguably more important epistemic reparation — knowing victims of gross violations and injustices in the sense of bearing witness. I conclude by sketching an epistemological picture to underwrite this notion of epistemic reparations, one that significantly expands the traditional picture by including epistemic duties that are imperfect in nature and concern actions in addition to beliefs.

The Dual Face of Linguistic Meaning: Combining Logic and Iconicity in Sign Language Semantics

Philippe Schlenker

Institut Jean Nicod, France; New York Univ., USA

It has long been accepted that sign language (i) employs the same logical structures as spoken language (occasionally making its abstract components overt), and simultaneously (ii) makes extensive use of iconicity. But the articulation between these two modules has only been discussed piecemeal. Based on new data from American Sign Language (ASL), we argue that natural language semantics must be extended with a pictorial component, one that makes crucial use of the semantics of

pictures recently developed by Gabriel Greenberg and Dorit Abusch. The result, which we call 'iconological semantics', offers a new integration between logical and iconic semantics, as well as a new perspective on the foundations of meaning in natural language.

A key argument for iconological semantics lies in some constructions, called classifier predicates, which are lexically specified as having a pictorial semantics. Just like for a picture, their truth-conditional contribution is evaluated with respect to a viewpoint. In ASL, the viewpoint is determined by a viewpoint variable, which may be left free or existentially quantified, in which case it yields a remarkable interaction with logical operators. We also show that the pictorial semantics of classifier predicates has consequences for their syntax. Classifier predicates often override the basic SVO order of ASL, yielding preverbal objects instead, but crucially this is only true to the extent that the denoted object is typically visible before the action (e. g. *x* ate up *y*). This is in essence because the classifier predicate creates a visual animation of the denoted scene. When the object is visible only *after* the action (e. g. *x* spit out *y*), an SVO order is regained. In sum, the proposed framework accounts both for the syntax and semantics of classifier predicates, as well as for their integration within larger Logical Forms.

Social Neuropragmatics: For a Philosophical Therapy of Mentalistic Terminology

Sofia Stein Unisinos, CNPq, Brazil

The development of what I call *social neuropragmatics*, that is, the joining of the pragmatic view with the field of social neurosciences, allows for a better intelligibility of the methods and vocabularies used in current neurosciences. *Social neuropragmatics* is primarily a meta-scientific thought, which assumes neuroscientific language as governed by pragmatic criteria, rules and goals. Neuroscientific explanations and descriptions contain terms whose meanings depend on references to objects belonging to the nervous system and a mentalistic terminology, such as "remembering that", "thinking", "intending to do", "deciding to

do", and "feeling something", "reflecting on", "mentalizing something", "paying attention to something" and the like, which does not have well-defined references. The localizationist ideal of establishing the exact link between these mentalistic terms and specific activated neural networks was not feasible as expected. While it is possible, of course, to correlate mentalistic terms with patterns of activation of similar neural networks in subjects in similar circumstances and activities, these patterns overlap with other neural patterns - that is, they are not specific to some brain regions -, and they vary when new variables are added to the test context. Neuropragmatics analyzes the dependence that rules for the use of mentalistic terminology have of the practical goals of the investigated subjects. Claiming, for example, that a subject is concerned about his financial situation requires reflecting on the circumstances in which the subject should be authorized to claim that he is concerned about it. This requirement is valid for the subject who self-describes his mental state and for those who investigate it. The characterization of neuropragmatics as social is related to the fact that not only the neurological activations, but their mentalistic descriptions depend on considerations of the practical purposes of the investigated subjects. I will present what I understand by social neuropragmatics, displaying two of its main features: the systemic explanation of neuroscientific tests and the understanding of mentalist terminology as having a distributed reference.

Methods: Epistemology Beyond Belief

Sven Rosenkranz LOGOS, Univ. de Barcelona, Spain

Epistemic methods for telling if p holds may yield p as output upon being applied, while one refuses to believe p on their basis. One's doxastic uptake may be more selective – where this may be due to purely psychological factors. This opens up the possibility that one's beliefs, based on such methods, are accurate without fail, although the methods in question are highly unreliable, or that those beliefs are inaccurate without fail, although the methods are highly reliable. The epistemic appraisal of one's beliefs should nonetheless follow the epistemic appraisal of the

methods used: the selective doxastic uptake itself is of no independent epistemological relevance. This is not the only context in which epistemic methods would seem to take pride of place. Modal accounts of knowledge and epistemic logic provide others. The safety of beliefs is naturally seen to require the safety of the methods used, and if these methods are safe, the safety of the beliefs is thereby settled: similar beliefs are beliefs formed by similar methods. A corresponding case can be made for sensitivity. Most principles of epistemic logic require idealizations in order to be insulated from easy refutation by failures to form the requisite beliefs. Such principles are naturally seen to track the affordances of methods for telling if a given p holds whose outputs depend on those of a suitable set of methods for telling if some appropriately related q, ... hold – such that, if the latter methods are safe, so are the former. The idealized subjects are assumed to form beliefs using the former kind of methods, whenever they form beliefs using the latter kind of methods. However, the dependencies themselves make no demands on the subjects' doxastic lives: once the methods and their dependencies have been identified, the idealizations are secondary. All this suggests that much of traditional epistemology can be recast, without significant loss, as a systematic study of epistemic methods, their epistemically relevant features and interrelations. The talk will make some headway in laying the foundations for such an epistemology beyond belief.



TALKS

Emotions, Preferences and The Normative Semantics of The Moral Utterance

Adriano Naves de Brito

At least in one sense, expressivists and cognitivists can agree about moral utterances referring to facts and being false or true. In the same way that one could lie about their beliefs in descriptive judgments, there can be sincere and insincere approvals or disapprovals. One can utter over objects as having beliefs that do not befit their actual perceptions. Likewise, because moral utterances can befit or not subject's actual emotions and preferences, they can be false or true. Emotions and preferences are the elements one must be sincere about ---or convincingly pretend to be- if one wants their evaluation to rule over others. It follows that sincere moral utterances must refer to a given evaluative emotion and preference toward a given fact. From the point of view of a factual reference, sincere moral judgments must tell us that it is a fact that the subject has the correspondent feelings to the evaluation they claims to have. Although moral utterances might have reference to facts, namely: actual emotions and preferences, even if that reference condition is satisfied, the relevant normative problem to moral utterances persists since an actual reference to a sincere emotion or preference toward a given fact is not, says the dominant view, objective enough to compel others. The point of depart to analysing utterance's normative semantics is usually the role public objects, facts, and events play in descriptive utterances. Let me call this model - cognitivist at its core - the objective reference-based normativity model. After that model, the caveat to normativity concerning references to subjective reactions is that, although actual, an approval or reproval does not suffice to demand others to have the same belief and, therefore, the same attitude toward a given fact. At least not in the same way objective references do the job for descriptive utterances. For that matter, emotions and preferences are, allegedly, too subjective. A sincere approval, although a fact, is not, prima facie - states that model - a sufficient condition to the normativity of a moral utterance as the fact behind a description given in good faith is expected to be to the corresponding utterance.

Expressivists are non-cognitivists to whom moral utterances are neither false nor true since they do not refer to beliefs but attitudes, positive or negative, toward facts. They agree that moral predicates are not about objective properties but subjective attitudes. In this sense, there are no moral facts but emotionally loaded reactions to

facts considered under moral scrutiny. By denying references to moral utterances, expressivists have difficulty explaining their legitimacy toward others, i. e. their normative force.

If expressivists are right about denying moral facts to anchor any relevant knowledge that would be enough to grant moral normativity, are they condemned to blunt relativism? That is an exciting question expressivists must pay attention to and which will concern me in this paper, given that I follow them on their non-realistic assumption. It is a question of the semantics of moral judgments. I want to address it by questioning the standard objective reference-based normativity model but suggesting an analysis of moral preferences that grants them enough objectivity to anchor intersubjective normative claims.

A Goal-oriented Proof System for Epistemic Modal Logic

Alba Cuenca

Epistemic logic enables us to have a logical approach to information, particularly the type of information that is meaningful for an agent as a whole: their knowledge. It compasses a family of well-developed and well-understood systems. However, its proof theoretic presentation usually is axiomatic. This approach creates obstacles when we try to integrate it into rich theories of human reasoning and automated reasoning systems. This talk develops new proof systems for Epistemic Logic based on the goal-oriented systems of [1]. By integrating Epistemic Logic with a goal-based proof, we can allow for new human and automated reasoning applications.

Goal-oriented proof systems seek to conciliate two paradigms of proof systems: human-oriented and machine-oriented; they intend to be both understandable and efficiently implemented. The deduction process involves a structured collection of formulas, a database, and a goal formula. Formally, we want to discern if A follows or not from our database \wp in a given logic. A query "does A follows from \wp ?" is represented in the language by $\wp \vdash$? A. The goal is A, and its form always determines the process; we decompose the goal until we arrive at its atomic components. Once we have the atomic components, a query succeeds if they are in the database. In order to implement this goal-oriented process in a variety of logics, we work with implicational languages. We match the atomic goal with the head of a formula $G \rightarrow q$; to ask for the goal q will mean to ask for the body of the formula, G.

This work aims to extend this presentation of modal logic to epistemic logic. I will present the language and the rules fitted to a multi-agent epistemic approach. The case with a single agent is straightforward: the rules of our system that allows us to access other states would always take us to those accessible. In the multi-agent case, we need to make transformations to the system to be able to express the different accessibility relations.

The database will now be sensitive to agents, and the queries must be reinterpreted to be agent sensitive; the question for the epistemic cases will now be "does a certain agent know *A* from $g_{\mathcal{O}}$?". The set of links available for a particular query will now be a subset subject to the epistemic accessibility of these agents. The system will now contain a set of agents $\beta = \{b_1, ..., b_m\}$, and the set of links will now be a set of ordered triples: it incorporates the reference to an agent. This will modify how we present the accessibility relations as well. Since we are dealing with strict implications, atomic goals will be matched with formulas of type *x*: $A \Rightarrow {}^{b}q$, and asking if an agent *b* knows *q* will lead us to ask if the agent *b* knows *A* in a specific state *x*.

The motivation for this work comes from the view that epistemic logic and its study of human reasoning should be about how humans actually reason (following [3]). Studies show that, in the actual deductive process, the procedure is not only from premises to conclusion, but backward procedures are also involved, where we have the goal of a particular conclusion (see [2]). The system I present incorporates this bottom-to-top aspect into epistemic modal logic. Finally, this approach also has the advantage of being developed to be applied to programming languages like PROLOG, which opens the doors to computer science and AI applications.

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O Problema de Júlio César e os Valores de Verdade como Objetos

Alessandro Bandeira Duarte

Em 1884 Gottlob Frege publicou sua obra-prima Os fundamentos da aritmética, no qual ele buscava definir o conceito de número cardinal (Anzahl) com intuito de executar o programa logicista estabelecido em 1879 com a publicação da Conceitografia. De acordo com a literatura secundária, Frege apresentou e rejeitou o Princípio de Hume como uma possível definição do conceito de número cardinal devido ao Problema de Júlio César, segundo o gual tal princípio é incapaz de decidir sentencas de identidade do tipo NxFx = q, em que q não é apresentado na forma Nx...x... Ainda, de acordo com a literatura secundária, o Problema de Júlio César é superado por meio da definição explícita do operador cardinalidade Nx...x.. em termos de extensões de conceitos. O objetivo da palestra é mostrar que Frege não poderia ter gualquer solução ao Problema de Júlio César em 1884, uma vez que ele admitia nessa época como termo bem-formado expressões tais como "a = (a = a)". Tal identidade é similar às identidades que Frege considera no §10 das Leis Básicas da Aritmética (1893). Contudo, nas Leis Básicas, essas identidades são "tratáveis", uma vez que Frege reduz a referência dos termos sentenciais aos valores de verdade V ou F. Com isso, as estipulações em §10 das Leis básicas são possíveis. Todavia, em 1884, termos sentenciais expressavam conteúdos judicáveis, que são possivelmente infinitos em número. Portanto, nenhuma estipulação do tipo está aberta a Frege nos Fundamentos. Disso, portanto, pode-se concluir que a introdução dos valores de verdade como objetos têm um papel central na solução ao Problema de Júlio César

Some Remarks on The Similarities Between a Timeless Eternalism and a Timeless Eternity

Ana Maria Corrêa

In the Metaphysics of Time, Presentism, Eternalism, and Growing-Blockism are theories about what exists unrestrictedly or *simpliciter*. Roughly speaking, Eternalists maintain that past, present and future moments exist, Presentists affirm that only the present moment exists, and Growing-Blockists state that past and present moments exist, but not future ones.

According to Baron & Miller (2013), there are different versions of Eternalism based on ontic components that appeal to times (with or without the qualification as past, present and future) or to space-time points, under the presupposition that in eternalist worlds, there is temporality. This assumption, however, may be false, it being an open question whether a timeless world can be eternalist. For this reason, besides its ontological commitments, Eternalism can be defined more precisely through its commitments to the B- series, which is a series of times ordered by the unchangeable relations of *earlier than, later than and simultaneous with*.

In its atemporalist version, Eternalism is consistent with a world composed of a single time-slice, in which only a single moment exists, and past, present and future moments do not exist. Such a world, however, is not a presentist world, since which moment exists does not change. It is better, therefore, to think of the eternalist's claim about the existence of the past, present and future as conditional claims: if a world has a temporal dimension, then past, present and future exist; if a world does not have a temporal dimension, then past, present and future do not exist.

The aim of this paper is to compare the atemporalist version of Eternalism with the conception of a timeless Eternity, as envisaged by Brian Leftow (1991). In order to defend the atemporality of God, and based on some medieval conceptions of time and eternity, Leftow constructs a theory of eternity as the date of God's existence, and in which there is only an eternal present. In the eternal frame of reference, all events happen at once, without being simultaneous in their respective temporal frames of reference.

I intend to analyze to what extent similarities can be found between the single moment that constitutes timeless eternalist worlds and the single moment that constitutes timeless eternity. In both cases, time is absent, and what exists is a static, durationless instant, a timeless now.

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Considerações Filosófica Sobre a Noção de Bolha Econômica

André Nascimento Pontes

O objetivo do presente trabalho é oferecer uma análise filosófica da nocão de *bolha* econômica ao discorrer sobre alguns problemas conceituais associados à noção em guestão. Nele, argumento em favor da existência de uma tensão entre a nocão de valor econômico enguanto uma propriedade ontologicamente е epistemologicamente subjetiva de bens e serviços, e as tradicionais definições de "bolha econômica" que assumem explícita ou implicitamente uma nocão de valor intrínseco como uma suposta propriedade objetiva dos bens e serviços negociados em um dado mercado. Nesse caso, o valor intrínseco seria uma propriedade que refletiria os fundamentos econômicos de bens e servicos e que determinaria, independentemente de preferências pessoais, o preço justo destes. Se meu argumento estiver correto, a distinção preco/valor da teoria econômica e algumas das definições de bolha econômica recorrentemente propostas pelos economistas não podem ser sustentadas conjuntamente de forma consistente. Defendo também que essa tensão ou incompatibilidade entre tais definições guarda relações - e implicações - com tópicos mais amplos de filosofia da economia, tais como o da distinção entre economia positiva e economia normativa e com a Hipótese dos Mercados Eficientes.

Modal Semantics for Causal Explanations

Andrés Soria-Ruiz

In causal explanations, an explanatory operator (*explain*, *because*) establishes a causal relation between 2 propositions: an *explanans* (ϕ) and an *explanandum* (ψ), denoting specific events [1,2]:

(1)

- a. The fact Jones had untreated syphilis explains why he had paresis. [φ explains ψ]
- b. Jones had paresis because he had untreated syphilis. [ψ because ϕ]

My objective is to propose a semantic denotation for this operator. I present key properties of causal explanations, I reject a "naïve" causal account, and I argue that causal explanations are *causal statements embedded under probability modals*, with additional content required to represent their contrastive character. I focus on three key semantic properties of causal explanations. First, explanations are *factive* in both clauses: Explanations presuppose the truth of their *explanans* & *explanandum*. Secondly, explanations are *contrastive*: An explanation may be true relative to some alternatives to ψ but not others [3,4,5]. Thirdly, causal explanations symmetrically entail *causal ascriptions*. This is shown by the oddness (marked with #) of asserting an explanation while denying the corresponding causal ascription, and vice versa:

(2)

- a. # Jones' syphilis explains his paresis but didn't cause it.
- b. # Jones' syphilis caused his paresis but doesn't explain it.

Given these observations, a "naïve" account of causal explanation would say that explanations (i) presuppose their arguments and (ii) assert that the *explanans* caused

the *explanandum*. But this account is insufficient, since, on closer inspection, there are cases in which the symmetry between causal explanation and ascription breaks down. First, a sentence like (2a) improves by inserting an epistemic modal above *caused*:

(3) Jones' syphilis explains his paresis but it might not have caused it.

Secondly, (2b) can be made acceptable relative to certain contrasts classes. For example, it can be acceptable in contexts in which we are aiming to explain why Jones had paresis and someone else (e. g., Doe) didn't, but where Doe also had syphilis:

(4) Jones' syphilis caused his paresis, but that doesn't explain why HE (vs. Doe) had paresis.

These observations suggest that causal explanations are in a sense weaker, and in another sense stronger, than causal ascriptions. The fact that (2a) improves when we insert a modal, as in (3), suggests that causal explanations are logically weaker than causal ascriptions: a true explanation leaves open the possibility that the relevant causal link may be missing. On the other hand, (4) suggests that explanations involve an additional contrastive structure that is absent from causal ascription.

In my proposal, the weakness of causal explanations is cashed out by analyzing causal explanations as causal ascriptions embedded under an epistemic modal. Roughly, φ explains ψ amounts to *Probably*, φ caused ψ . And to incorporate contrastivity, I enrich the presuppositional and assertive content of explanations as follows: in addition to requiring the presence of a (probable) causal link between φ and ψ , 'explains' (i) presupposes that a certain alternative φ ' to φ is false [6], and (ii) asserts that the corresponding alternative ψ ' to ψ is false as well.

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Are Logics Underdetermined by Finitely Many (Meta)Inferential Levels?

Bogdan Dicher

The familiar criteria for identifying logics appear to be subject to a certain kind of underdetermination. For instance, logics are not unequivocally identified by their valid formulae (theorems): classical logic (CL) and the logic of paradox (LP) have the same theorems. Yet CL and LP are distinguishable with regards to their consequence relations or, equivalently, their valid inferences. Nonethelees, this criterion too seems suboptimal. CL and the *strict-tolerant* logic (ST) defended by Cobreros et al. (2013) have exactly the same inferences, while differing at the level of *meta*inferences: they validate different inferences between inferences. Thus, CL sanctions the principle of inference chaining expressed by the rule Cut:

However, Cut is not valid in ST Barrio et al. (2015); Dicher and Paoli (2019). Are then a logic's valid metainferences enough to characterise it univocally?

Among those that answer this question positively there is disagreement as to how many metainferential levels are required for univocally charcaterising logics. In particular, Barrio et al. (2019) have argued that first-level metainferences, i. e., inferences between inferences do not suffice. Specifically, Barrio et al. have constructed a transifinite hierarchy of metainferential logics such that for every level $n \ge 1$ in it, all n-level metainferences are classically valid but the level n+1 is subclassical, i.e., it lacks some classically valid n + 1-level metainference. Classical logic, they argue, is fully recovered only by stepping into the transfinite. The only way to validate every classical metainference of every level is to consider the the union up to ω of all the levels in the hierarchy. In other words, classical logic can be identified only by considering ω -metainferential levels. I will argue against this proposal and defend the thesis that the first metainferential level suffices for identifying a logic. I will show that there is a deep equivocation in the construction of the hierarchy, to the effect that the metainferences of level n+1 express inferential connections between items distinct than the metainferences of level n+1 and, consequently, the hierarchy does not determine any logic whatsoever. This argument is powered by an interpretation of metainferences of level 0 (=inferences) as inferential networks, clusters of formulae expressing proto-logical properties of the formulae of which they are constituted.

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Deductive Information from a Dialogical Perspective

Bruno Ramos Mendonça

In a series of papers, D'Agostino and his collaborators have argued that a demonstration is informative only if it makes use of virtual information. In other words, in an informative demonstration, some of its steps demand the consideration of dischargeable hypotheses, assumptions which go beyond the proof's original set of premises. Although D'Agostino's concept of virtual information captures an important set of cases of informative demonstrations, he does not provide an appropriate philosophical explanation of this notion. Following a Kantian inspiration, he claims that inferences based on virtual information are informative because it adds a synthetic feature to our demonstrations. However, the appeal to Kantianism in this context is misleading: Kant's explanation of the syntheticity of mathematical judgements in terms of the construction of concepts in pure intuition does not fit well as an account of the informativeness of inferences using dischargeable hypotheses. So, we need to provide an alternative interpretation of virtual information. In this talk, exploring dialogical accounts of logic. I suggest that virtual information might be seen as the result of a particular dynamics between the proponent of a proof and her audience: when a reasoner takes into account a dischargeable hypothesis P, she puts herself in the shoes of potential interlocutors who commit to P. In this sense. virtual information denotes the information contained in the assumptions of a potential audience of a demonstration. This process of departing from one's original premises to embrace the suppositions of other people is informative, but it is not synthetic: in this procedure, the reasoner does not entertain intuitions but only needs to reason by means of other people's premises.

Grasping Explanations

Bruno Tenorio Coelho

In this paper, I argue that understanding is the grasping of correct explanations. To detail this view. I specify the interventionist theory of explanation. This theory characterizes causal relationships in terms of interventions used for manipulation and control. A particular group of relationships we can access through interventions is invariances. According to one definition, invariances are relationships that remain the same and operate across various changes. For example, changes in the background conditions. After describing the interventionist theory, I discuss the concept of grasping in more detail. In the debate about the nature of understanding, it is argued that grasping is the subjective transparency present when we understand a phenomenon. However, there are reasons to guestion this condition. In particular, the unreliability of introspection and the fact that transparency can result from cognitive biases. In other words, subjective transparency is not an indication of good explanations. However, there is evidence from common sense and scientific investigations that causal reasoning is crucial to understanding the world. After describing this view of understanding, I assess the question in the last part of the paper: does understanding require truth? I argue that we can have understanding from models and theories that are false. However, through counterfactual explanations, we access the modal structure of reality.

Quotation for Dummies

Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini

Since Donald Davidson first drew attention to sentences like:

(1) Quine said that quotation '...has a certain anomalous feature,' (Davidson 1979, 81)

a growing body of work in the philosophy of language has focused on varieties of quotation which do not fit comfortably into the traditional trichotomy of *pure quotation*, as in (2), *direct quotation*, as in (3), and *indirect quotation*, as in (4).

- (2) 'Absquatulate' has twelve letters.
- (3) Arabella said, 'My favorite word has twelve letters.'
- (4) Arabella said that her favorite word has twelve letters.

This work has led to the recognition of two additional categories of quotation: *mixed quotation* and *scare quotation*.

Mixed quotation, as in (1), is quotation in which quoted expressions are both mentioned (as in pure and direct quotation) and used, contributing their semantic values to some dimension of semantic composition. Scare quotation, as in (5) below, is a more contested phenomenon. Some argue that, as in mixed quotation, scare quoted expressions contribute their normal semantic values to composition. Others argue instead that a scare-quoted expression contributes to composition something like the property of *resembling* the referent of the unquoted expression.

(5) The 'debate' resulted in three cracked heads and two broken noses. (Predelli 2003, 3)

Still, certain examples of quotation resist assimilation to any of the five categories just described. Consider:

- (6) 'Human foot' in Gateshead field turns out to be potato.1
- (7) National greed has disguised itself in mandates to govern 'inferior' races. (Predelli 2003, 3)

Since they are clearly not instances of pure, direct, or indirect quotation, examples like (6) and (7) have been classified as cases of either mixed quotation or scare quotation. Yet (6) and (7) do not appear to be examples of mixed quotation. For example, the editors who chose (6) as the headline of their news story did not commit themselves to the proposition that a human foot was found in a Gateshead field, as

¹ BBC News story, 8 January 2021.

they would have if the quoted expression semantically contributed the meaning of 'human foot.'

Nor do (6) and (7) seem to be examples of scare quotation. (6) does not semantically entail that there was a human foot in a Gateshead field, as it would if the normal meaning of 'human foot' were contributed to composition; (7) does not imply that the races in question instantiate a property resembling inferiority.

Intuitively, what is going on in (6) and (7) is that the quoted expressions contribute nothing to the meaning of the sentence as a whole other than that some salient individual has uttered them verbatim. Thus (6) appears to express the proposition that something in a Gateshead field to which someone has referred using 'human foot' is a potato.

In other words, the quoted expressions in (6) and (7) apparently contribute to composition *semantic dummies* — meanings which are of the right type to permit semantic composition, but which encode only the minimal truth-conditional content that the quoted expressions have been literally uttered in characterizing whatever entities are under discussion. I argue that examples like (6) and (7) demand the recognition of a distinct species of quotation — *dummy quotation* — and present a formal semantic theory which captures its behavior.

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Belief Change and Social Change

Carolina Flores

Individual attitudes—in particular, individual beliefs—can push back against structural change. Individuals' beliefs can lead them to find workarounds to keep up

the *status quo* in the face of structural change. In other cases, structural measures lead to individual complacency and moral licensing, with individuals assuming that a few measures mean that fairness has been achieved (Dover et al., 2014; Kaiser *et al.*, 2013). Even worse, we sometimes encounter aggressive individual backlash to structural measures, as has sometimes happened with affirmative action (Hughey 2014).

Given that individual beliefs push back against structural change, achieving social change requires changing beliefs (Madva, 2016). This is a notoriously difficult task. As Charles Mills vividly put it about white ignorance, many such beliefs are ones that "resist, fight back...[are] militant, aggressive, not to be intimidated, active, dynamic, refuse to go quietly" (Mills 2007, p. 13). As a result, even if agents receive counter evidence to such beliefs, they are not likely to abandon them.

Achieving social change, then, requires us to contend with the problem of resistant social beliefs: beliefs that (a) pose obstacles to the success of structural reforms, and (b) actively resist counter-evidence. Such beliefs generate practical difficulties in achieving social change. In particular, they pose obstacles for structuralist proposals: it is not easy to see how a focus on structural reform can succeed in the face of resistant social beliefs.

In this paper, I will argue that the structuralist has resources to address the problem of resistant social beliefs, and propose a family of interventions that might help us address the problem in practice. Specifically, I will argue that social network change—in the form of making room for dispersed social networks and promoting strong social movements—is a powerful structuralist resource for getting agents to abandon resistant social beliefs.

This provides a novel defense of the power of structural interventions: they can address even resistant social beliefs. Importantly, this defense of structural interventions is methodologically individualist, in that it will involve detailed consideration of psychological mechanisms involved in belief maintenance and revision. In this way, this paper pushes back against the tendency to view individualism and structuralism as all-encompassing frames, where one must pick a side and stick to it both in methodology and practical recommendations.

Recommending structural interventions is usually accompanied by hostility towards attending to the nuts and bolts of human psychology (E. Anderson, 2010; Frye; 1983; Dixon et al., 2012; Haslanger, 2015; Haslanger, 2022a; T´a´ıw`o, 2017). Conversely, addressing the contribution of psychological phenomena to social

problems is typically taken to require individualist interventions—interventions that directly target individual attitudes, instead of the context in which those attitudes are produced and maintained (Garcia, 1996; Stanley, 2015). My argument suggests that such polarization between individualism and structuralism is misguided, opening new avenues for exploring and achieving social change. Practical structuralists should abandon their hostility to methodological individualism, and methodological individualists should broaden their sights to consider structural interventions.

Davidson on Speaking the Truth

Daniel Arvage Nagase

In his recent published John Locke Lectures, *The Structure of Truth* (1970/2020), Davidson defends a conventionalist thesis about linguistic meaning. That is, he defends the thesis, first, that a semantic theory for a language should issue in truth conditions for every sentence of the language, and, second, that these truth conditions track the linguistic conventions of a given community. In order to defend this thesis, Davidson argues that speaking the truth is a peculiar speech act, in that it is supposedly the only speech act which one can tell whether or not one has performed it by relying exclusively on linguistic knowledge. In turn, Davidson argues for this claim by saying that speaking the truth is "essentially disengaged: it is not done for its own sake, not, typically, for the sake of any other end; we often do not know it has been done, and do not care" (p. 23).

In this talk, I aim to reconstruct Davidson's reasoning and to challenge him about this crucial last point. In particular, I show how Davidson attempts to deflate the obvious normative role of truth in our discourse by arguing against Dummett's claim that truth is the *point* of our practice of assertion, and how this attempt misfires, since, contrary to what Davidson claims, speaking the truth *is* an end in itself. More specifically, I argue that even though speaking the truth may not be an end of a particular speech act, it is nevertheless an end of our *discursive practice as a whole*. Hence, to determine whether or not one has spoken the truth is to assess whether one has *succeeded at this goal*, and is therefore a *normative* matter.
I close by considering how this affects Davidson's overall program. Since whether or not one has spoken the truth is a normative matter, I argue that one must rely on more than linguistic knowledge to determine whether or not one has spoken the truth, and that, therefore, there can be no purely linguistic conventions for speaking the truth. This is, in effect, the position Davidson himself arrived later, especially in "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" (1986), according to which one needs to *interpret* another person to determine whether or nor this person spoke the truth. Only Davidson did not take this realization to its conclusion: there can be no systematic theory of truth conditions for sentences.

Moral Worth and Skillful Action

David Horst

A person acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit or praise for doing the morally right thing. Famously, these things can come apart: you can do the right thing without deserving moral credit for so doing. Kant's (1997: 11) shopkeeper provides a well-known example: the shopkeeper charges his customers a fair price but does so only because it's good for business. He does the morally right thing he charges a fair price — but he doesn't deserve moral credit or praise for so acting. The central question in the debate about moral worth is thus: beyond doing the morally right thing, what else is needed for moral creditworthiness? A recently popular view seeks to answer this question by drawing an analogy with creditworthiness in other domains of human action such as playing soccer, piano, or chess (Lord 2017, 2018, Howard 2021, Cunningham 2021). On this view, morally creditworthy action is just a special case of a more general phenomenon, other instances of which are creditworthy performances in sports, games, or arts. Thus, for example, it's one thing to make the right chess-move, it's another to deserve credit for making the right move -after all, some right chess-moves are merely lucky. So here a parallel question arises: beyond making the right move, what else is needed for creditworthiness in chess? A plausible answer invokes the notion of skill (or competence, or know how): you deserve credit for making the right move when and because you do so as a manifestation of your skillfulness at chess. Proponents of what I call the skill view of moral worth claim that this answer can serve as a model for understanding moral creditworthiness: you deserve credit for doing the morally right thing when and because you do so as a manifestation of your moral skillfulness. The main aim of my talk is to raise doubts about the skill view's underlying analogy between moral creditworthiness and creditworthiness in sports, games, and arts. As I shall argue, there is a structural difference between morally creditworthy action and creditworthy performance in soccer, chess, or music, so that, as long as we use the latter as a model for the former, we are bound to misconstrue central aspects of moral normativity. In particular, I shall argue that using skillful performance as a model for understanding moral worth delivers incorrect verdicts as to when doing the morally right thing is no accident. The upshot is that a proper understanding of moral worth requires a more finegrained picture of creditworthiness across different domains of human action.

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O Ser e o Não-Ser como Valores de Variáveis: fundamentos e aplicações da semântica meinonguiana

Deir da Silva Machado Junior

No presente trabalho serão expostos, sob uma perspectiva lógica, alguns dos fundamentos e aplicações da semântica intensional contida nos trabalhos maduros de Alexius Meinong, tendo como objetivo central o exame de sua eficiência como uma alternativa à lógica tradicional e extensional adotada por Willard van Orman Quine. A relevância desse contraste é considerável, pois, além de fornecer ferramentas que asseguram um critério de Compromisso Ontológico, a semântica meinonguiana – diferentemente da semântica extensional quineana – permite uma predicação genuína de sujeitos lógicos que não possuem qualquer tipo de extensão, mas sem lhes imputar qualquer tipo de *status* ôntico, o que parece romper de maneira menos abrupta com o discurso ordinário, uma vez que este é permeado, em sua esmagadora maioria, por conteúdos estritamente intensionais.

Equilíbrio Reflexivo e Prudência: um processo de deliberação moral

Denis Coitinho

O equilíbrio reflexivo (ER), assim como o proposto por John Rawls em sua teoria da justiça (1971, p. 17-22, 46-53), se tornou o procedimento por excelência tanto na ética normativa como na ética aplicada, bem como na filosofia social e política, exercendo influência até na área do direito. E isto porque propôs deixar de lado as questões controversas sobre o significado e verdade dos conceitos e juízos morais, bem como sobre a existência de propriedades éticas, identificando a objetividade moral de forma inferencial. O ponto básico do método é defender que a justificação moral não dependerá de um fundamento último, mas, sim, da coerência entre as crenças morais, os princípios éticos e as crenças científicas que são relevantes para um certo tema, sendo o ponto final de um processo deliberativo em que refletimos sobre e revisamos nossas crenças (DePAUL, 2006, p. 618).

Mas, a despeito de sua grande influência, muitos questionam sua eficácia. A crítica central ao ER sempre ressaltou o fato de que o resultado a que se chega depende exclusivamente do ponto de partida, a saber, os juízos ponderados. Autores como Brandt, Hare, Lyons e Singer, por exemplo, argumentaram logo após a publicação de *A Theory of Justice* que se não existir razões independentes para se confiar no ponto de partida, não se deve esperar muito do resultado além da coerência interna. Esse seria o problema da credibilidade inicial das crenças morais. Como as crenças seriam selecionadas apenas por serem confiáveis, essa confiança poderia revelar certos preconceitos ou vieses, o que implicaria em conservadorismo. Também, como as pessoas podem chegar a sistemas coerentes de crenças bastante diversos, muitos filósofos viram nisso um convite ao subjetivismo (BRANDT, 1979, HARE, 1973, LYONS, 1975, SINGER, 1974).

A partir disto, quero investigar em que medida se poderia resolver essa fraqueza epistemológica do método com a inclusão de uma epistemologia das virtudes, tendo por foco a razão prática ou prudência. A ideia geral é poder contar com a disposição e habilidade do agente prudente para identificar os meios mais adequados para realizar um fim bom, isto é, para bem deliberar, o que pode significar chegar a crenças morais razoáveis. Assim, se teria um ganho em poder contar com a expertise de um agente prudente no ER, de forma que nossas crenças morais iniciais se tornariam mais razoáveis e a qualidade de nossa reflexão ética se sofisticaria.

Para tal, inicio investigando as características centrais do ER e suas falhas principais, tendo por foco a recente crítica de Thomas e McGrath (2010), que defendem que mesmo impecavelmente executado, o método pode levar o agente a assegurar crenças não razoáveis, o que implicaria na conclusão de inadequação do ER. Posteriormente, abordo as características da prudência como uma disposição para bem deliberar. O próximo passo será aplicar as características da prudência no ER, constituindo um ER prudente (ERP).

Assim, o ERP contará com a expertise do agente com sabedoria prática para bem deliberar, isto é, para deliberar adequadamente sobre os meios necessários para alcançar um fim bom, o que pode ser visto como chegar a crenças razoáveis. E isto será importante para responder a crítica de Kelly e McGrath (2010), que dizem que mesmo sendo impecavelmente executado, o método pode levar o agente a assegurar crenças não razoáveis, o que conduziria a uma conclusão inadequada. E após o estabelecimento das crenças

razoáveis pelo prudente, o próximo passo será justificar estas crenças por sua consistência com os princípios éticos fornecidos pelas principais teorias morais aceitas no debate contemporâneo e por sua coerência com certas crenças factuais que são afirmadas por teorias científicas relevantes no caso investigado. O ganho dessa proposta, penso, será compreender o fim desse processo deliberativo como conhecimento moral, tomando o conhecimento não como crenças verdadeira e justificada, mas como expressão de certas virtudes do agente, fazendo uso de uma epistemologia das virtudes.

Episodic Remembering and The Sense of Presence

Denis Lucien Perrin

The common view about the relationship between perceptual experience and the experience of episodic remembering has it that their similarity is restricted to features of mental imagery, in particular the sensory content and its perspectival character, while the sense of presence involved in perceptual experience would be lost in remembering. In this talk I challenge the common view. First, I argue that the sense of presence in perceptual experience is wider than the objective presence usually talked about by the philosophy of perception and includes a subjective component. Second, I argue that episodic remembering can involve such a subjective sense of presence, just as other so-called immersive non-perceptual states. I conclude then that the common view is false and that the 're-living' metaphor often used to describe the experience of remembering must be taken seriously.

Entre Percepção e Conceitualização: considerações sobre uma abordagem enativista da metáfora

Diogo de França Gurgel

Em dois publicados artigos recentemente, Shaun Gallagher e colaboradores delinearam uma abordagem enativista da metáfora. Tal abordagem, longe depretender abarcar tudo aquilo que podemos chamar de "metáfora". procura antes examinar uma operação cognitiva muito peculiar no âmbito da percepção situada e da lida habilidosa (skillful coping), a saber, o ver-como (seeing-as). Mantendo-se coerente com as posições assumidas em obras anteriores, como Enactivist Interventions, Gallagher defende uma concepção segundo a qual metáforas enativas não envolvem representações mentais, e sim o exercício de habilidades perceptuais e motoras mais básicas. De acordo com o framework adotado, é um certo tipo de know-how habitual que permite a metaforização. No presente trabalho, procuro avaliar a relevância da contribuição dessa abordagem enativista não apenas para uma teoria contemporânea da metáfora, mas também para a elucidação dos aspectos cognitivos da lida habilidosa. Com esse intuito, empenho-me em mostrar que tal posicionamento parece não dar conta de situações em que a excelência da ação exige habilidades de ajuste e de alternância on-line entre modos de percepção do ambiente. Buscando uma via alternativa para a compreensão do papel das metáforas na lida habilidosa, recorro às concepções corporificadas (embodied) de conceitualização desenvolvidas por Alva Noë e Lawrence Barsalou.

No Trickle Down Consequentialism

Diogo Santos

Consequentialists hold that the moral quality of an action, policy or rule is fully determined by its consequences. Some consequentialist versions restrict which consequences have moral import, e. g. only those which are foreseeable from the agent's situation, only those which are intended by the agent. . . on a pure consequentialist framework consequences include "the immediate, or short term,

results (...) long term results, side effects, indirect consequences" of an action. (Kagan, 1998, p. 26) All these consequences matter and are subject to equal consideration when it comes to moral evaluation. Regardless their differences, consequentialists, of a pure or impure variety, agree on what morality's main goal is: to promote the best overall outcome. The infamous epistemic objection (or *argument from cluelessness*) against consequentialist theories undermines the efficacy of those theories in achieving that goal. The upshot of the objection is that agents have no grounds to believe that consequentialist action-guiding principles will improve their standing when it comes to generating the best overall consequences. This is because any action may have massive causal ramifications and, thus, agents are clueless about the consequences of their actions (when deciding whether to perform them). Assuming—as I am assuming—that satisfactory moral theories ought to provide agents with adequate action-guiding principles, then consequentialist theories are seriously debilitated by the objection. (Cf. Lenman, 2000)

I will propose a principle which, if endorsed, rehabilitates consequentialism from the clutches of the argument from cluelessness. I call this principle the *No Trickle Down Principle* (NTP). The principle states that for every causal chain of action θ whose actions are not intentionally connected (in the appropriate sense) and whose set of morally relevant consequences is Σ , the morally relevant consequences of the action which initiates θ are not elements of Σ .

Here is how NTP is supposed to rehabilitate consequentialism. Causal chains of actions to which NTP applies also involve actions which are not intentionally connected (in the appropriate sense). Virtually every action with massive causal ramifications generate causal chains which are not intentionally connected (in the appropriate sense) — I show why this is the case. Hence, NTP applies to causal chains of actions with massive causal ramifications. Thus, those causal ramifications will not matter for the moral evaluation of the action the agent is considering whether to perform, because those consequences are not morally relevant consequences of the action under consideration, given NTP. This improves agents' standing when it comes to assessing the consequences of actions from the standpoint of deciding whether to perform them—for it denies that agents are clueless when it comes to assessing the consequences of actions with massive causal ramifications when it comes to approximate the perform.

I conclude by exploring other potential applications of NTP.

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The Pragmatic Part of Quine's Theory of Ontological Commitment

Dirk Greimann

Quine's criterion of ontological commitment is the core of his theory of ontological commitment. It reads:

(C) A theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true. (Quine 1948, p. 13-14)

The extensive literature on Quine's criterion overlooks that (C) contains two criteria of ontological commitment: one for semantic ontological commitment, and one for pragmatic ontological commitment. The semantic criterion explains the ontological truth conditions of sentences. They are semantic relations between sentences and the world. Thus, the truth of 'There are prime numbers' presupposes the existence of at least one prime number.

However, in order to explain the ontological commitments of a theory, it does not suffice to explain the ontological truth conditions of its sentences. We must also specify which speech acts in science commit us to share the ontological commitments of the sentences we utter. Although, for instance, the language of arithmetic contains the sentence 'The largest natural number is odd', arithmetic is not committed to accept the existence of the largest natural number. The reason is that this sentence 'There is a prime number between 5 and 11'. By making this assertion, we commit ourselves to the truth of this sentence. Since the existence of a prime number between 5 and 11 is a condition of its truth, we commit ourselves also to

recognize the existence of such a number. Ontological commitments in this pragmatic sense are relations between acts: doing x commits a person to do or not to do y. Their primary bearers are speakers, and not sentences. These distinctions allow us to separate two different criteria of ontological commitment in Quine's criterion (C):

 $(C_{\rm S})$ The truth of a sentence presupposes the existence of those and only those entities that must be assigned to the bound variables if the sentence is to be true.

(A) A theory is committed to the truth of a given sentence if and only if this sentence is affirmed in the theory.

 (C_P) A theory is committed to the entities presupposed by the truth of a sentence if and only if this sentence is affirmed in the theory.

 (C_S) is Quine's criterion for semantic ontological commitment and (C_P) his criterion for pragmatic ontological commitment. The criterion (A) is needed to apply (C_S) to theories. It is tacitly assumed by Quine. The present paper aims to show that (A) is in conflict with his behaviorist approach in linguistics, which suggests that the affirmation of a sentence commits us only to the empirical adequacy of this sentence, and not also to its truth in the sense of (C_S) .

Conhecimento Inseguro a partir de Falsidade

Eduardo Alves

Warfield (2005), Bufford & Cloos (2018) e Luzzi (2019) sugerem que os supostos casos de conhecimento a partir de falsidade podem ser explicados por meio da ideia de que o caminho evidencial da crença falsa até a crença-alvo é estável. Uma das maneiras de iluminar essa noção de estabilidade é por meio da condição de segurança, conforme indicam Bufford & Cloos (2019) e Luzzi (2019). O objetivo deste artigo é analisar se a explicação da segurança para o suposto conhecimento a partir de falsidade é satisfatória. Para isso, explicarei, na primeira parte, a hipótese do conhecimento a partir de falsidade e a condição de segurança. Na segunda parte,

explicarei como a condição da segurança acomoda o nosso conhecimento de verdades necessárias e, seguindo Bin Zhao (2022), argumentarei que, em função dessa explicação, o teórico da segurança enfrenta um dilema: ou a hipótese do conhecimento a partir de falsidade é explicada ou o nosso conhecimento de verdades necessárias é explicado, e não ambos. Na terceira e última seção, argumentarei que, caso o teórico da segurança escolha a hipótese do conhecimento a partir de falsidade, a explicação será insatisfatória porque há casos de conhecimento via falsidade no qual a crença-alvo é insegura. Haveria, portanto, conhecimento inseguro a partir de falsidade.

Epistemic Fallibility and The Knowledge Argument

Eduardo Estevão Quirino

In this talk, I hope to develop a criticism of Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. My counter argument will be structured in two steps. First, I identify a core hidden premise, the Principle of Epistemic Reduction (PER) = X is reducible to Y iff full knowledge of Y includes full knowledge of X. I argue that this principle is fundamental for the argument to land its conclusion, sometimes even explicitly endorsed.

The second step aims at debunking the principle. I start considering that knowledge must be knowledge of someone or something, in this case, Mary. Then I consider Mary's cognitive prowess to determine how much must she know to validate the principle. I divide the analysis into three cases: normal human cognition, superhuman cognition and All-Mighty Mary. I contend that the first is not sufficient to satisfy the principle. Full human knowledge would not be sufficient to determine whether ontological reduction occurs, for normal humans are fallible and grossly limited.

I take that superhuman cognition, being defined as infallible and illimited but timedependent, is not sufficient because some physical facts are best described by nonlinear functions such that only full knowledge of the function's infinite arguments allows for full knowledge of its images, and thus full knowledge *simpliciter*. However, because Mary couldn't possibly know infinitely many things in a finite time, it's still the case that full superhuman knowledge wouldn't entail ontological reduction. Further supporting considerations are also given.

Finally, All-Mighty Mary is unlimited by time as well. I grant, in this case, that the principle would hold. Yet, crucially, assuming that All-Mighty Mary couldn't derive phenomenal facts from physical ones is very much the same as assuming that dualism is true, for on what basis could we judge what a god-like creature couldn't learn, if not by stipulating an ontological gap that would prevent such learning? I further add that the Mary scenario is effective because it's based on our intuitions about humans. Still, limitations on All-Mighty Mary far surpassed all we could unproblematically assume on intuitive grounds. I also consider some further arguments for this point.

Therefore I conclude that the argument cannot both satisfy all its premises and secure its justificational grounds. It either fails PER or begs the question. Thus, the argument altogether fails.

Where Do Intuitions Come From?

Elan Moises Marinho

Contemporary analytic philosophers seem to appeal strongly to intuitions. This seems to be the case with the Gödel Case made famous by Kripke (1980) in Philosophy of Language, Gettier's Gettier Cases (1963) in Epistemology, Nozick's Experience Machine (1974) in Ethics, and Jackson's Mary's Room. (1986) in Philosophy of Mind. Taking a step back, recent philosophers such as Erlenbaugh & Molineaux (2009) have begun to question what the connection is between intuitions and the world itself — what I call the "Connection Problem". One of the attempts to face this problem is through the etiological approach. In this approach, philosophers try to explain the origin of intuitions and their functioning. A successful etiological approach would be able to explain the relationship between intuitions and the world itself. In this symposium, I analyze Jenkins' (2014) etiological approach based on Rolla (2021), Weinberg & Alexander (2014), De Cruz (2015), and Nagel (2012). I argue that a great etiological approach to the Problem of Connection does not only

clarify how the connection can take place in theory, but rather how it takes place in practice.

Does Time Have a Direction?

Emiliano Boccardi

By and large, the intuitive notion that time passes, and that it does so in one direction, has been associated with a realist understanding of the gliding present (A-theories of time). It has been often argued that this notion is incoherent, and that it is either suspiciously absent from or incompatible with a scientific understanding of physical reality. Deniers of the objective distinction between past, present and future (B-theorists) have thereby often subscribed to the view that the passage of time is illusory. Many philosophers and physicists attempted to mitigate this apparently absurd conclusion by referring to observed asymmetries of processes *in* time, which provide us with a structural distinction between the past-to-future and the future-to-past directions. The aim of this talk is to argue that all of the above is misguided and to propose an alterative account of passage.

I shall begin by proposing a Cartesian argument in favour of the objective reality of passage (and of its direction). I shall then argue that standard attempts to reduce the apparent directionality of time to structural asymmetries of processes *in* time (e.g. the entropic asymmetry) are misguided. I further argue that this realist view of passage does not entail a realist view of A-determination. In particular, I argue that standard A-theories of time are just as incapable of accounting for the direction of time as standard B-theories are. Finally, I make some remarks about why the direction of time has been so recalcitrant to mathematical representation, and as to how this problem might be overcome.

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The Mental, The Scientific, The Intuitive, and The Real

Esteban Céspedes

In order to tackle the issue of reconciling realism and model-dependent representationalism, this work explores the connections between mental and scientific representations, as well as between mental and scientific realism. After distinguishing these notions carefully, it will be considered in which sense our definitions about the mental depend on how we conceive scientific or theoretical representations. For example, attributions of representational content to cognitive structures, cognitive systems or neural networks are based on particular theoretical models of the brain and its relation with the environment. Furthermore, we may as well search for the foundations of our views about theoretical representations and their reliability by investigating our concepts about the mind. For instance, the concept of empirical observation and the assessment of evidence should be explained in perceptual and cognitive terms at some point.

It is here argued that, in order to resolve the apparent vicious circularities that may arise regarding the conceptual interdependence just pointed out, two kinds of intuitions are crucial: rational and phenomenological intuitions. On the one hand, rational intuitions are needed in order to provide for non-psychologist and non-naïve naturalist conceptions of explanation, justification and prediction. On the other hand, phenomenological intuitions are needed for securing non-reductionist and non-naïve notions of observation and fact. Now, a further well-known problem arises when we try to account for the relation between explanation and understanding. In a fundamental sense, explanations are not only successful because of the rational intuitions that support them (e. g. related to logical principles and rules of inference), but also because of the new cognitive insights they make available. So, arguably, the role of understanding in explanation has a phenomenological character, which, as such, has its roots in phenomenological intuitions and can therefore be accounted for by cognitive phenomenology. But, in general, phenomenological intuitions alone cannot gain the stability that is needed for understanding, unless they are embedded in some inferential system that exhibits their conceptualization, coherence and thus the consistency of their representations. In sum, the present work defends a Kantian

view on the blindness of pure, independent intuitions, but at the same time adopts the Humean perspective on the functional character of representations and explanations. To clarify this compatibility is still one of the main tasks in philosophy and its achievement is very likely going to provide the grounds for future conceptions of the mind and of science in general.

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Interest and Curiosity as the Affective Springs of Inquiry: the *chiaroscuro* epistemic emotions

Federico Lauria

As the saying goes, interest and curiosity drive exploration, information-gathering, and inquiry, hereby contributing to epistemic success and virtue. What does it mean that interest and curiosity motivate inquiry? How are we to understand interest and curiosity's epistemic role? This is the *Spring of Inquiry Puzzle*.

This article offers an affective approach to the *Spring of Inquiry Puzzle* with the help of the toolbox of the appraisal theory of emotion. We argue that interest and curiosity are experiences of anticipated epistemic value/reward or, if one prefers, experiences of potential cognitive improvement (the "*chiaroscuro*" view). This view solves the *Spring of Inquiry Puzzle* as follows: interest and curiosity motivate inquiry because they are experiences of anticipated epistemic rewards. We develop this account with the help of three appraisals: *Epistemic Goodness, Epistemic Gap,* and *High Cognitive Coping Potential*. In other words, curiosity and interest consist in appraising some epistemic value (*Epistemic Goodness*), that has not been attained yet (*Epistemic Gap*), but that is attainable (*High Cognitive Coping Potential*). We motivate each component with the help of both conceptual arguments and empirical studies on exploratory behavior.

The "chiaroscuro" view offers an elegant typology of epistemic emotions. On the one hand, interest and curiosity differ from epistemic emotions of "darkness", such as confusion or doubt, as the latter are experiences of cognitive obstacles, epistemic gaps, or absence of cognitive improvement (vs. anticipated epistemic value/reward). Interest and curiosity also differ from epistemic emotions of "light", like eureka moments and feelings of understanding, as the latter are experiences of actual (vs. anticipated) epistemic value or of actual (vs. potential) cognitive improvement. Between epistemic darkness and epistemic light, interest and curiosity are the chiaroscuro epistemic emotions.

We delineate our account in both metacognitive and first-order terms, which helps to address recent qualms concerning the metacognitive nature of epistemic emotions raised by Peter Carruthers. Indeed, philosophers have rarely scrutinized the epistemic role of interest and curiosity in detail, and have mostly focused on the question of whether curiosity's content is metacognitive. This article goes beyond this controversy, as our view allows both a first-order and a metacognitive reading, which reveals the heuristic value of our account.

More generally, our typology offers a new piece to regulative epistemology, as it illuminates the specific epistemic role of various kinds of epistemic emotions in regulating inquiry. It appears that interest and curiosity are vital in our quest for information and knowledge. Without them, we would lose the epistemic "oomph" that impels us to move out of darkness – into the light.

O Disjuntivismo de Hegel Acerca das Representações Sensíveis

Federico Sanguinetti

Nesta apresentação, argumentarei que Hegel pode ser considerado como um predecessor do disjuntivismo de McDowell acerca das representações sensíveis. Se esta tese for plausível, a apresentação oferece dois ganhos. Por um lado, ela oferece uma interpretação inovadora do modo em que Hegel concebe o acesso epistêmico ao mundo. Pelo outro lado, a tese de McDowell segundo a qual sua proposta teórica tem um teor hegeliano resulta corroborada por um argumento até aqui inexplorado.

Organizarei a minha apresentação em duas partes.

1) Em primeiro lugar, destacarei seis elementos teóricos constitutivos que dão corpo ao disjuntivismo de McDowell acerca da percepção. São eles:

a) O externalismo do conteúdo de representações sensíveis que justificam o conhecimento.

β) O internalismo do conteúdo de representações sensíveis que não justificam o conhecimento.

y) A acessibilidade reflexiva de ambos esses tipos de representações sensíveis.

 δ) A impossibilidade de distinguir, desde a perspectiva da primeira pessoa, representações sensíveis que não justificam o conhecimento de representações sensíveis que justificam o conhecimento.

ε) A compreensão do conceito de representação como um fator comum entre representações sensíveis que não justificam o conhecimento e representações

sensíveis que justificam o conhecimento, sem que este fator comum possua a mesma relevância epistêmica nos dois casos.

 ζ) A ideia segundo a qual a indistinguibilidade entre representações sensíveis que não justificam o conhecimento e representações sensíveis que justificam o conhecimento gera um problema apenas se não se leva em consideração a disjunção determinada pela diferença de relevância epistêmica destes dois tipos de representação – conforme a tese que McDowell chama de tese do máximo denominador comum.

2) Em segundo lugar, argumentarei que Hegel também subscreve estas ideias, embora eu procure evidenciar alguns aspectos que não permitem afirmar que há uma identidade perfeita entre a visão de McDowell e a de Hegel. Mais especificamente, esclarecerei que há alguns detalhes da visão de McDowell acerca dos quais Hegel é omisso. Contudo, isso não implica necessariamente que as visões de McDowell e Hegel são incompatíveis em algum nível.

Can an Inquiry Action Principle Explain Away Impurism?

Felipe Medeiros

Can knowledge be shifty? According to impurists yes. Impurists seem to think that due to the connection between knowledge and action we are compelled to accept the idea that whether one has knowledge (and/or whether one satisfies other epistemically relevant criteria such as justification) can depend on non epistemic factors.

Impurists seem to rely on some sort of principle that characterizes the knowledgeaction connection to get their argument through. One such example would be something like this:

Knowledge-Action Link: If S knows that *p*, then S is warranted enough to act as if *p*.

A principle such as this one when tied together with the idea that shifts in environmental (non truth related) factors can alter our judgments about whether one

is warranted to act (a fact that can usually be expressed in decision-theoretic terms) seems to be the crux of impurist argument.

The aim of this talk is to suggest that this motivating thought goes to fast. Instead of thinking about action as central item connect to action I aim to suggest that we would to well to think about how our inquiry connects to action. This thought could be captured by something like this.

Inquiry-Action Link: If S has properly settled her inquiry into whether p, then S is warranted enough to act as if p.

I then explore whether such a principle, or something like it, would help explain away the pull of impurist views and attempt to deal with some possible issues for the inquiry-action view. In particular, I attempt to respond to plausible concerns that the inquiry-action view and the knowledge-action view turn out to be equivalent, since (one could plausibly think) knowledge seems to be the good that properly settles inquiry.

O Argumento do Milagre é Mesmo um Bom Argumento em Favor do Realismo Científico? Uma discussão inicial

Félix Flores Pinheiro Bruno Malavolta e Silva

Definições de "realismo científico" apenas apontam o caminho. Tratam-se mais de uma atitude do que de uma doutrina claramente formulada. [...] Realismo e Antirrealismo Científico são [...] movimentos. Podemos entrar em suas discussões armados com definições de um parágrafo, mas uma vez dentro, encontraremos um número indefinido de posições divergentes e competidoras. (HACKING, 1983, p. 26, tradução livre)

Passados quase cinco décadas após Putnam (1975, p. 73) declarar que o realismo científico é a única filosofia que não faz do sucesso da ciência um milagre, o

"argumento do milagre" parece dispensar apresentações. Para além dessa aparência, contudo, o objetivo desta comunicação consiste em iniciar uma conversa sobre o que exatamente o famigerado argumento nos recomenda. Se realismo e antirrealismo sobre a ciência podem ser vistos como movimentos, como diz Hacking (1983), por quais razões o argumento aponta em uma direção ao invés de ambas, se é que o faz? Posta a dúvida motor deste trabalho, nossa apresentação está organizada em 2 momentos. Inicialmente, elucidamos algumas das distintas formulações e objeções correlacionadas ao famoso argumento. Em destague, na década de 1970 o argumento sem milagres atua como escudo e espada em uma discussão voltada para as atitudes instrumentalistas com relação à ciência, salvaguardando conceitos basilares da racionalidade científica. Contudo, após a publicação de The Scientific Image (van Fraassen, 1980), o alvo é aprimorado uma vez que há uma alternativa antirrealista que oferece a sua interpretação da própria racionalidade da ciência. Cumpre distinguir, então, entre uma formulação do argumento direcionada à defesa da objetividade científica (em contraste com posições relativistas), e uma formulação do argumento direcionada ao realismo científico (em contraste com interpretações antirrealistas da racionalidade científica). Em um segundo momento, enfatizamos a interpretação segundo a gual, tomada literalmente, a moral originalmente posta por Putnam recomenda uma discussão sobre a fonte do sucesso da ciência e de sua objetividade. Assim, sob égide dessa moral, pode-se questionar em quais formas de realismo ou antirrealismo podem ser oferecidas como explicações adequadas ao sucesso da ciência, motivo pelo gual propomos esta conversa.

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Dialectical Deflationism About Metaphysics

Filipe Carijó

Metaphysics deals with questions such as whether the world is purely physical, what the nature of truth is, and whether we perceive the external world directly. Of all the problems facing metaphysicians, perhaps the most pressing one concerns metaphysics itself: metaphysical disputes give every sign of being irresolvable. Philosophers on either side of a metaphysical dispute offer meticulous arguments for their view, but it seems that every such argument, no matter how impressive initially, is sooner or later met with appropriate replies. The danger looms that valid, nonquestion-begging arguments for metaphysical views are in principle impossible. Some have believed that the problem with metaphysics lies in its consisting in one form or another of linguistic confusion. Unlike semantic forms of deflationism, the view I'll defend, dialectical deflationism, locates the problem in the structure of metaphysical debates - in some of the dialectical rules that govern such debates, i. e. in some of the moves that are open to philosophers, indeed more or less explicitly made by philosophers, in responding to arguments for and against metaphysical views. More specifically, I claim that those taking part in metaphysical disputes treat the theories they are about as having a feature I call self-containment. Loosely speaking, for a theory to be self- contained is for it to make no difference to the rest of the world whether it is true or false. I argue that whenever parties disagree in such a self-contained way, a method becomes available that can be used to successfully reply to any argument for either side. The method isn't meant as new; rather it is a systematization of something philosophers already do when responding to arguments for metaphysical views. The claim is therefore that the dialectical rules actually in place in the disputes we call metaphysical entail the impossibility of successful arguments for either side. I will illustrate the method by showing how it can be explicitly employed to respond to an influential argument in the philosophy of perception: the argument from hallucination for the view that perception of the external world is mediated by sense-data.

Undooming Non-Reductionism: A rebuttal of the alien Case

Gabriel Lucas Marques Malagutti

Lackey's Alien Case (2008:169) constitutes the biggest counter-case against Non-Reductionism in testimony. The goal of this paper is to present a solution for said case, by giving a disjunction: a) either Lackey is wrong and there are defeaters, which enables the non-reductionist to reject the alien's testimony, or b) there are no defeaters, and the non-reductionist is justified in accepting the testimony. I will argue that route a) is flawed, and solutions of that sort, such as Perrine's (2014), eventually lead us to Reductionism.

Perrine's solution appeals to the knowledge and experience of testifiers regarding how testimony can go well, or the ways in which it can go awry, being inaccurate. The lack of this knowledge regarding alien's testimonial ways, constitutes a defeater. Given this solution I will argue that it falls under Faulkner's (1998) description of Reductionism. Therefore, I will favor route b). To this end, my argumentation will be to defend that: if something satisfies the requirements to be testimony, then it enjoys *prima facie* entitlement to be accepted. Note that I will not be arguing for knowledge, only justification in testimonial acceptance. The trick to solving Lackey's case, therefore, is to give clear conditions for what amounts as testimony. If the alien's utterances can satisfy such criterion, then it enjoys *prima facie* entitlement. This move doesn't fall under Reductionism because it merely polishes the definition used for testimony, it does not require any sort of additional reasons for acceptance, since it would classify as testimony, and, therefore, be a non-reductionist model. The criteria for testimony will be one of necessity for the following two points:

- 1. The speaker must be a rational epistemic agent (that's why we dismiss parrot's speech acts, for example);
- 2. The speech (or written) act must be an intentional act to share/give information with another epistemic agent (listener).

If 1. and 2. are satisfied, then it classifies as testimony and the non-reductionist response applies: we are *prima facie* justified in accepting it unless there are *relevant undefeated defeaters* in play. These two points, I argue, are sufficient to correctly classify every instance of testimony. Point 1., in particular, will be argued saying that: if a speaker is a rational epistemic agent, then it will be rational for said agent to be truthful and reliable - being guided by Game Theory - in order to maximize her testimonial acceptance. With this schema in mind, I will argue that we have enough evidence to consider the alien in Alien Case to be a rational epistemic agent, classifying its utterance as testimony, and enjoying, justifiably, *prima facie* acceptance. If my method is correct, then the non-reductionist can avoid the intended consequences of Lackey's case.

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Uma Crítica à Teoria Causal da Percepção de Grice e de Strawson

German Lourenço Mejia

O objetivo de nossa apresentação será expor razões para a rejeição das chamadas teorias causais da percepção. Após uma breve introdução à teoria causal moderna de John Locke, resumiremos a teoria contemporânea, na versão de Grice/Strawson, como propondo as três seguintes teses: (1) um sujeito *S* vê que um objeto concreto *O* é/está de certo modo apenas se *O* afeta *S* de modo causal; (2) é necessário que *O* produza, de modo causal, um estado subjetivo (conteúdo fenomenológico), em *S*, que possa ser relatado na forma de "Parece visualmente a *S* como se ele estivesse

vendo...": e (3) as duas últimas exigências são, em conjunto, uma verdade conceitual, ou seja, são exigidas pelo conceito ordinário de visão ("...vê que..."). Consideraremos um argumento proposto por Grice a favor de (2) e (3) como insuficiente, pois tudo o que o argumento estabeleceria é o truísmo de que o objeto, para ser visto por S, não pode estar fora da visão do sujeito, e.g., obstruído ou bloqueado. A seguir, investigaremos criticamente parte de (2), a saber, a ideia de Strawson de que o referido estado subjetivo, que seria acuradamente descrito por "Parece visualmente a S como se ele estivesse vendo...", seja uma experiência perceptual. Acreditamos que o fundamento da suposta plausibilidade de tal ideia resida no mau entendimento de alucinações, sonhos e ilusões. Em todo caso, esta ideia de Strawson não pode ser correta, pois não podemos ter uma experiência visual de algo que de fato não vemos. Além disso, seguindo o trabalho de John Hyman e de Paul Snowdon, proporemos que, por um lado, a aceitação da explicação disjuntivista do "parece a" (a explicação disjuntivista divide as atribuições verdadeiras de looks em duas classes, ou existe algo que parece a S ser X, ou é como se houvesse algo que parecesse $X \ge S$ é incompatível com a tese (2); e que, por outro lado, a rejeição da explicação disjuntivista pode ser entendida como um argumento em favor da rejeição de (3).

Justifying Risk Imposition as a Nonconsequentialist

Gustavo Oliva de Oliveira

Risk imposition is a widely debated topic in recent moral philosophy literature. It is not easy to choose between the most popular moral theories available: while, on the one hand, consequentialist and aggregative moral theories in general fail to make relevant moral distinctions concerning a fair distribution of risks, on the other hand, nonconsequentialist theories have numerous little difficulties concerning permissible risk impositions, insensitivity to numbers of affected people, and seemingly non-justifiable attitudes towards statistical lives. In this presentation, I will explore nonconsequentialist options for the moral justification of risk imposition and argue in favor of two such approaches: a reformed version of *ex ante* contractualism and a form of "limited aggregation". After outlining how each one makes sense of simple

cases of permissible risk imposition, I will defend them from a risk-related version of the numbers problem brought by Fried (2020), arguing that there is a rationale for the extension of the notion of relevance to probabilities. This move should solve one of the worries for the nonconsequentialist justification of risk impositions. I will also briefly suggest options for the justification of nonconsequentialist reasoning concerning the identified vs. statistical lives debate — which include biting the bullet on the identified lives bias and the inclusion of an urgency principle.

Animalism and Conjoined Twinning: The Psychological Disunity View

Hugo Ferreira Luzio

Animalism is the thesis that each of us (that is, each human person) is essentially a human organism.² This view implies that the number of human persons is the number of human organisms. The most dangerous problem for animalism is that of explaining the asymmetry that seems to occur in dicephalus (or double-brain) conjoined twinning cases. In the well-known case of Abigail and Brittany Hensel (the Hensel twins), there is a trunk with two heads and two brains that produce two mental lives experienced by two psychological subjects with distinct beliefs, values, desires, characters and personality traits, independent sensations and exclusive control of the members on their side. There is limited duplication of organs (e.g., two hearts, two stomachs, four lungs). But all organs function in an integrated way.³ In this case, there seem to be two of us, but only one human organism.

In this talk, I address this problem. First, I characterize animalism and the dicephalus objection. Then, I discuss the two main solutions that animalists have been advocating: the overlap solution⁴, according to which the Hensel twins are two overlapping (that is, partially fused) human organisms, and the indeterminacy solution⁵, according to which it is not clear that the Hensel twins are two of us, nor

² Snowdon (1990, 1995), van Inwagen (1990), Olson (1997, 2007).

³ Miller (1996).

⁴ Liao (2006: 345), Snowdon (2014: 186). Cf. van Inwagen (1990: 188-194).

⁵ Blatti (2007: 595-599).

just one human organism. Against these solutions, I argue on functionalist terms (about biological individuation) that the Hensel twins are exactly one human organism.⁶ Organic duplication occurs, here, in one and the same organism. This is an atypically large and complex organism. But its organs collaborate with each other to maintain the general structure of the biological system that is produced by their interrelated functioning. There is a single biological life. And that is the life of a single human organism.

Finally, I try to make sense of this view's direct consequence for animalism: namely, that the Hensel twins are exactly one of us – a single human person. I develop a new solution to the problem of dicephalic conjoined twinning, the psychological disunion view, according to which, in the Hensel case, there is a single human person with two psychological centers (or mental lives). First, I identity and defuse the (sort of) psychological bias that leads most people to believe otherwise. The idea that each human person has, at most, one mental life is a misleading generalization that seems to be empirically falsified by the Hensel case (and other relevantly similar cases). I conclude by showing that the psychological disunion view does not diminishes the importance (or significance) of death (contrarily to what McMahan suggests).⁷ The existence of human persons who are psychologically divided in this way is, I hold, more of an extraordinary fact about our basic metaphysical nature than an extraordinary consequence of animalism.

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Dynamics of Fiction-Making

lago Mello Batistela

According to speech act theories of fiction, in the act of writing a work of fiction, the author of that work performs a series of *sui generis* speech acts of fiction-making. Usually characterized in a Grice-inspired account, the speech act of fiction-making is construed as a two-part intention, which expresses that (i.) a certain *P* is true-infiction, and that (ii.) the speaker intends that their audience imagines that *P*. Exploring the framework employed in order to represent the essential effects of assertions proposed by Stalnaker, I present a dynamic account for fiction-making. According to Stalnaker, we can represent the context in a dynamic model that is divided in distinct regions, each responsible for mapping a certain propositional attitude overtly held by the participants of a communicative exchange. Speech acts, as the story goes, are the means we employ to interact with distinct contextual regions. For fiction-making, I propose an extension of the Stalnakerian context with a region responsible for mapping fiction-related imagination; I call this region the common imaginary. The essential effect of an act of fiction-making is to update the common imaginary with

the content of the act. The content of an act of fiction-making, I maintain, is always a speech act. That is, according to my account, works of fiction are composed by a myriad of lower-order speech acts – acts of asserting, asking, ordering, and so forth – which we imagine are actually performed by the characters of the fictional work. As result, the common imaginary, distinctly from other contextual regions, is divided in several sub-regions – such as the imaginary common ground, the imaginary QUD, and the imaginary to-do list – each responsible for representing the speech acts we imagine to be performed by the characters of a fictional work. Concluding, the common imaginary is a highly complex contextual region, that represents a vast number of point of views stemming from distinct characters that are part of the fictional world. This complexity, I intend to show, is the natural product of any dynamic model of fictional discourse, and correctly reflects the representative nature of fiction-making.

What is Intellectual Humility? A Brief Overview of The Current Debate

lan Salles Botti

This presentation is an overview of the debate on how to define intellectual humility (IH). Many analyses have been proposed in the last few decades, characterizing (IH) in various terms, such as low intellectual self-esteem [1], low concern for status [2], accurate evaluation of the epistemic status of one's own beliefs [3] and owning of one's intellectual limitations [4]. Thus, there is a broad disagreement concerning (IH) analysis. I will make a brief mapping of the main conceptions of (IH), based on two distinct ways of categorizing and evaluating them:

1. The first one, proposed by Battaly [5], conceives character traits as complex dispositional profiles that include cognitive, behavioral, motivational and affective dispositions. This model organizes the analyses by their level of complexity. The simplest analyses are those in which intellectual virtue is defined only in terms of cognitive dispositions. The most complex ones are those in which all four types of dispositions are included. Battaly considers complete conceptions as the strongest ones because they successfully manage arguments against the conceptions that

ignore some part of the dispositional profile of the trait. Conceiving (IH) simply as a cognitive disposition, for instance, has the disadvantage of conceptualizing intellectual humility as being compatible with vicious action, motivation, or emotion. Therefore, in Battaly's view, the criteria of individualization of kinds of analyses implies an evaluative hierarchy whereby the simplest ones are, *ipso facto*, weaker than the most complete ones.

2. The second way of categorizing analyses of (IH) is proposed by Tanesini [6] and by Kallenstrup and Pritchard [7]. It distinguishes between three groups of analyses, each of which conceives intellectual humility as a virtue of ignorance, or accuracy, or non-egotism, respectively. The first group contains analyses including negative elements, such as underestimating oneself intellectually, or having a low intellectual self-esteem. The second group consists of the ones focusing on the accurate evaluation of oneself as an epistemic agent, counterposing humility with vices such as intellectual arrogance. The third group contains conceptions focused on the interpersonal dimension of the trait, instead of considering some kind of epistemic self-evaluation as necessary to intellectual humility. In this categorization, the first group of theories is taken to be the weakest, for it includes an epistemic error in the analysis and also because it has difficulties to explain what it is that makes intellectual humility a virtue.

Finally, I will argue that this last categorization, by Tanesini, Kallenstrup and Pritchard, has advantages over Battaly's, since it (i) does not depend on assumptions concerning the nature of character traits; (ii) doesn't favor one of the categories; and (iii) accommodates interpersonal conceptions of intellectual humility.

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Competitive Value, Noncompetitive Value, and Meaning in Life

Iddo Landau

This paper distinguishes between the notions of competitive value (CV) and noncompetitive value (NCV), and discusses the respective advantages and disadvantages of CV and NCV for meaning in life (MIL). CV is the value of winning in a competition. It often has to do with ego gratification and increase in social status. NCV is any positive value that is not CV. The paper also distinguishes between CV and comparative value (e. g., one can note that another person knows more than one, even strongly wish to know as much as that other person, yet not feel competitive or envious). All CV is comparative value, but not vice versa. The paper explicates the differences between CV and other types of comparative value. Another distinction is between participating in a competition for the sake of CV and participating in it only for the sake of NCV (e.g., only in order to get a job one needs, without caring about being victorious over others and not minding if they, too, get the jobs they need). Self-improvement may be understood as competing against oneself but, alternatively, as a process in which one non-competitively develops. Another distinction is between non-gradational CV (one either wins or loses) and gradational CV (one is positioned along a continuum between those better and those worse than oneself).

I explore the ways in which CV and NCV relate to MIL under objectivist (e.g., Metz 2013), hybrid (e. g., Wolf, 2010), and subjectivist (e. g., Frankfurt, 1988)

interpretations of MIL. It might be argued that MIL is constituted only by NCV (e.g., moral behavior, wisdom, art, aesthetic experiences, friendship, love). But Neil Armstrong's being the *first* to walk on the moon seems to have conferred meaning on his life beyond that of the NCV of walking on the moon. The Armstrong example conflicts with Frankfurt's (1997) view that value should not be attributed to achievements because of the way they are positioned in comparison with other achievements. Some other yardsticks for evaluating CV and NCV are: motivating vs. discouraging people to be and do their best; enhancing camaraderie vs. hostility within groups and between groups; the degree of dependence on one's own actions vs. others' actions; the likelihood of increasing or reducing self-esteem, contentedness, gloating, hypocrisy, and cheating; the likelihood of leading to unreflective endorsement of social norms; the degree of relatedness to goal directedness and excitement; the likelihood of something being attained; and the degree of reliability, deservedness, and risk involved. I argue that although most people's MIL may profit from engaging with different degrees of both NCV and CV, overall NCV is more advantageous than CV for attaining or maintaining MIL, for reasons which I explicate in some detail. I also suggest that we have much to gain from thinking about this topic, and assessing how helpful the existing balance of NVC and CV in our lives is

Are Artifactual Kind Terms Directly Referential? A Simple Defence of Putnam's View

Irene Olivero

It is vastly acknowledged that natural kind terms ('water,' 'gold,' 'tiger,' etc.) are directly referential expressions, i.e., an objective, external relation between the term and the world determines these terms' reference independently of what we know about that relationship. By contrast, it seems less convincing that terms for artifacts (e.g., 'pencil,' 'chair,' etc.) are directly referential too. Artifactual kind terms seem more likely to be subject to a descriptivist view, i.e., definable in terms of conjunctions of properties that competent speakers know. There is an ongoing debate on the matter, which originated with Hilary Putnam's (1975) proposal of extending his direct

referential theory that works so well for natural kind terms (NKTs) to artifactual kind terms (AKTs). The authors engaged in the debate have stressed the similarities (or differences) between NKTs and AKTs and their referents to argue in favor of (or against) Putnam's proposal. Yet, none of these arguments was conclusive. In this talk, I aim to outline (and question) a simple way to defend Putnam's view. I will show that Putnam's main arguments can be reconstructed as *reductio ad absurdum* (RA). These RAs' purpose is to show that the traditional semantic view, i.e., descriptivism (in Putnam's reading), cannot explain natural and artifactual terms' semantics. Interpreted this way, these arguments prove Putnam's point: terms for natural substances and species and terms for artifacts are semantically on a par. Yet, showing that descriptivism fails, *per se*, may not be sufficient to show that these terms have directly referential semantics.

In Putnam's reading, the descriptivist view rests on two assumptions: a) knowing a term's meaning is knowing a set of descriptions identifying the typical properties of its referent; b) the meaning of a term determines its reference. Putnam aims to show that these assumptions cannot be conjunctively true when describing NKTs' and AKTs' semantics. He does so by outlining a few thought experiments and examples, the most famous of which is his Twin Earth thought experiment. This is how the *reductio* goes: 1. Let us suppose that descriptivism is true of NKTs. 2. If this is so, if a) Earthlings and Twin Earthlings know the same set of descriptions associated with 'water,' then b) 'water' must have the same reference on Earth and Twin Earthlings know the same set of descriptions associated with experiment and XYZ on Twin Earth. Consequently, the traditional semantic theory fails for NKTs (we cannot accept both its assumptions). Putnam's argument about the term 'pencil' can be likewise reconstructed. Read this way, Putnam's thought experiment shows that descriptivism is also false for AKTs.

Putnam's RAs aim to show that if descriptivism were true, it would be absurd that two speakers know the same set of descriptions connected to a term, and the term has two different extensions. This way, Putnam shows that descriptivism fails to explain the semantics of NKTs and AKTs. Nonetheless, this may not be sufficient to prove that AKTs (but also NKTs) are directly referential expressions.

Bidimensionalismo Semântico e o Contingente A Priori

Jeferson José dos Santos

Saul Kripke em seu Naming and Necessity (1980) propôs convincentes casos de verdades necessárias que apenas podem ser conhecidas a posteriori, bem como casos de verdades contingentes que podem ser conhecidas a priori. Nas últimas quatro décadas a plausibilidade desses exemplos tem sido contestada por filósofos que utilizam abordagens ditas bidimensionais para caracterizar o significado e a referência de uma ampla variedade de expressões linguísticas, incluindo nomes próprios e termos de espécies naturais. Dentre as principais abordagens bidimensionalistas disponíveis, destacam-se as abordagens epistêmicas de David Chalmers (2006) e Frank Jackson (2004). De acordo com esta perspectiva, proposições podem ter seus valores de verdade avaliados de duas maneiras diferentes: pode-se conceber um mundo possível considerando-o como "atual", e corresponde ao que Chalmers denomina de "intensão primária" e Jackson de "intensão-A"; ou pode-se conceber um mundo possível considerando-o como contrafactual, o que corresponde ao que Chalmers denomina de "intensão secundária" e Jackson de "intensão-C". De acordo com o Bidimensionalismo, em última análise, não há proposições que sejam simultaneamente necessárias e a posteriori bem como contingentes e a priori como pensava Kripke; necessário a posteriori e contingente a priori são proposições que se revelam necessárias guando avaliadas de um modo e contingentes quando avaliada de outro modo. Meu objetivo nesta apresentação será mostrar de maneira detalhada a estratégia e as motivações filosóficas assumidas pelo bidimensionalismo epistêmico contra os casos de Kripke bem como o de avaliar a plausibilidade de suas principais teses.

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Linguistic Failure in Frege

João Lucas Pinto

Several authors have either attributed to Frege or themselves defended, as part of a broadly Freqean perspective on natural language, the view that, in one way or another, language may fail. Both Michael Dummett and Cora Diamond have, for example, taken Frege to accept the possibility that a perfectly grammatical sentence of some language, such as "Chairman Mao is rare", might be meaningless, even if their diagnoses of this sort of linguistic failure - nonsense - have been at odds with each other: Dummett believed nonsense to arise, according to a Fregean theory of language, whenever expressions are combined in violation of a hierarchy of categories of expressions, whereas Diamond has held that there is no such thing as categorial clash between expressions in Frege, and that a nonsensical but grammatical sentence is always the result of some of its component expressions not having been assigned a determinate meaning in the relevant context. Gareth Evans and John McDowell have, for their part, talked about a somewhat different kind of linguistic failure to be acknowledged in a Fregean theory of language: the inability of a (perfectly grammatical) sentence to express a thought when that sentence contains an empty singular term (i.e. a referring expression with no referent) — which may produce an *illusion* of *understanding* — despite the indications in Frege's writings that we must acknowledge the occurrence, in natural language, of names and sentences that have sense while lacking reference. Evans, in particular, has explored vet another way for an illusion of understanding to arise: not in virtue of the nonexistence of the object purportedly referred to by a singular term, but in virtue of a failure, by a speaker or hearer, to identify the object in a manner appropriate to the apprehension of the kind of thought expressed by an utterance containing the singular term (paradigmatically, a failure to perform a demonstrative identification of an object denoted by a demonstrative term such as "that chair"). If we conceive of successful language use, in Fregean terms, as a path which leads from the utterance of a grammatical sentence in a language to the apprehension, by speaker and hearer, of a thought expressed by that sentence, then each of those cases of linguistic failure can be seen as an obstruction somewhere along that path. In this talk, I shall give an organized presentation of the supposed sources of each kind of linguistic failure

discussed by those authors, while briefly assessing the extent to which these sources truly stem from Frege's theses on language and thought.

Grounding Perspectivalism: Metaphysical Explanation in the Eye of the Beholder

Joaquim Giannotti

Theorists of grounding believe that this concept has an intimate connection with metaphysical explanation. So-called *unionists* identify grounding with metaphysical explanation, arguing that whenever some facts grounds others, the former metaphysically explain the latter (Fine, 2012; Raven, 2012; Litland, 2015). *Separatists* hold that grounding backs metaphysical explanations in an analogous way to how causation backs causal explanations (Schaffer, 2009; Audi, 2012; Wilson, 2018).

Separatism is preferable to unionism. The latter has unwelcome consequences. Either subjective and pragmatic features of explanation pollute grounding or metaphysical explanation turns out to implausibly be a phenomenon insensitive to mind-dependent aspects. However, separatists struggle to harmonise the mind-independent features of grounding and the context-sensitive character of metaphysical explanation. To overcome such difficulties, I argue that separatists should endorse a novel framework of metaphysical explanation that draws from perspectival realist views in the philosophy of science (Griere, 2006; Massimi, 2018; Saatsi, 2021).

According to the proposed *grounding perspectivalism*, seekers of metaphysical explanation are agents inescapably situated in perspectives. The latter have pervasive influence in our understanding of what grounds what. Perspectives are like camera frames to make sense of grounding claims about an objective metaphysical structure. As it will emerge, grounding perspectivalism implies that grounds (namely, what does the grounding) depend on us.

I identify two main intertwined roles that perspectives play in our theorizing, which I outline below: one is explanatory, and the other is normative.

The explanatory role comprises the manners a perspective determines what grounding claims of the form '*f* grounds *g*' counts as understanding-enhancing. According to the proposed approach, whether an agent judges a grounding relationship between some facts as explanatory depends on their being situated in a specific perspective. I will argue that the explanatory role of perspective accommodates the separatist insight that metaphysical explanation is a highly context-sensitive phenomenon.

The normative role contains the ways a perspective determines the values and rules to produce, revise, and abandon grounding claims. Metaphorically speaking, it is like the governing power of a perspective that is manifested when an agent scrutinizes and assesses target grounding claims.

Following a careful explanation of these roles, I turn to defend the merits of grounding perspectivalism. I will argue that this view gives us an illuminating diagnosis of important disputes about grounding, one which sheds light on the general nature of metaphysical disagreements. As a case study, I will discuss how perspectives help us make sense of the debate surrounding the alleged asymmetry of grounding and its link with metaphysical explanation.

Exploring some deeper implications of grounding perspectivalism, I conclude by stirring controversy: contrary to a popular view, metaphysical explanation is not a guide to grounding.

Equivalence Without Indispensability?

Jon Charry

It is well known that Quine's "reluctant platonism" was the result of a commitment to what is now called an *indispensability argument* (IA). Colyvan [2, 3] has authored the following standard format IAs follow. (1) We ought to be ontologically committed to all and only those entities indispensable to our best scientific theories; (2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories; (3) Therefore, we ought to be ontologically committed to mathematical entities. Colyvan has also offered the standard account of *dispensibility* operative in IAs. It states that some Xs
are dispensable from theory T if and only if there exists a (suitably attractive) theory T*, the *dispensing theory*, such that

(a) T* makes no mention of Xs and

(b) T* is empirically equivalent to the original platonist theory T.

Molinini [4] has argued, *pace* Colyvan [2], that SpecRel—an axiomatization of special relativity developed by Andréka and her collaborators [1]—provides genuinely mathematical explanations of special relativistic phenomena, yet is able to do so without invoking the *metric tensor*, a paradigmatic mathematical entity employed in more traditional, platonist presentations of special relativity theory. Molinini concludes that Colyvan is mistaken about the indispensable role of the metric tensor in explanations of special relativistic phenomena.

Molinini's dialectical move calls attention to an important motif which has gone without comment in discussions of hard-road nominalist strategies: nominalists do not take the in-equivalence of T* and T as a necessary condition for T*'s having genuinely dispensed with abstracta. In fact, Molinini goes as far as to claim that the formal results of Andréka and her collaborators imply that SpecRel is (fully) equivalent to platonist special relativity. This is a serious mistake. We should not say that T* has genuinely dispensed with abstracta if it is able to "define" or "recover" (in a precise sense) these entities. I show that this points to a way in which Colyvan's conception of dispensability must be sharpened if it is to capture any meaningful sense of dispensability of theoretical terms.

I argue first that the *in*-equivalence of T and T* must be added to clause (b) in Colyvan's definition. This added restriction can be motivated by making the notion of "full theoretical equivalence" precise with a few candidate meanings that have been offered in the literature in recent years. For each, there is a strong sense in which full, theoretical equivalence between two theories implies that each theory can explicitly or implicitly define or recover structures or pieces of ontological furniture that have been allegedly dispensed with by the other.

I argue, furthermore, that the resulting clause (b) is often impossible to satisfy. Here, I will draw on themes from John Norton's [5] work on underdetermination of scientific theories by evidence. Two upshots include both first a critical reassessment of what it means to dispense with mathematical objects, and second, a reassessment of the role of empirical equivalence in Colyvan's definition.

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Revisitando as Reduções ao Absurdo

Kherian Gracher

Um dos princípios mais conhecidos em Lógica é a chamada "Redução ao Absurdo" (RA). De modo geral, esse princípio está estritamente relacionado com o comportamento da negação do sistema que o introduz. Assim, em diferentes sistemas, com conectivos de negação que se comportam de modos diferentes, uma versão diferente da RA é adotada. Por exemplo, na Lógica Clássica (LPC) temos o postulado (RAC) ($\neg_c \alpha \rightarrow \beta$) \rightarrow (($\neg_c \alpha \rightarrow \neg_c \beta$) $\rightarrow \alpha$).

Além disso, a negação clássica se comporta como um operador de contradição, i. e., uma fórmula α e sua negação clássica, $\neg_c \alpha$, nunca têm o mesmo valor-deverdade sob uma mesma valoração.

Na Lógica Paraconsistente (C₁), por outro lado, a RA pode ser expressa pelo seguinte postulado (onde $\alpha^{\circ} \equiv_{def.} \neg_{p}(\alpha \land \neg_{p}\alpha)$): (RAP) $\beta^{\circ} \rightarrow ((\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow ((\alpha \rightarrow \neg_{p}\beta) \rightarrow \neg_{p}\alpha))$.

A negação paraconsistente (\neg_p) se comporta como um operador de subcontrariedade, i. e., uma fórmula α e sua negação paraconsistente, $\neg_p \alpha$, poder ambas ter valor designado (verdadeiro) sob uma mesma valoração, mas nunca ter ambas valor não-designado (falso).

Na Lógica Paracompleta (P₁), por outro lado, a RA pode ser expressa pelo seguinte postulado (onde $\alpha^{\bullet} \equiv_{def.} \alpha \land \neg_{q} \alpha$): (RAQ) $\alpha^{\circ} \rightarrow ((\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow ((\alpha \rightarrow \neg_{q} \beta) \rightarrow \neg_{p} \alpha))$.

A negação paracompleta (\neg_q) se comporta como um operador de contrariedade, i. e., uma fórmula α e sua negação paracompleta, $\neg_q \alpha$, poder ambas ter valor não designado sob uma mesma valoração, mas nunca ter ambas valor designado.

Nesses três sistemas obtemos três operadores de negação diferentes – tanto em seus aspectos sintáticos quanto semânticos. Em um sistema que permita tratar dessas três negações, quais são as formas de RA que podemos obter como teorema? Nesse trabalho pretendemos discutir esse problema. Faremos uma revisão geral do comportamento sintático e semântico das três negações descritas (negação clássica, paraconsistente e paracompleta); analisaremos o modo como cada um desses sistemas (LPC, C₁ e P₁) lidam com suas versões da redução ao absurdo; por fim, ofereceremos uma concepção minimal de redução ao absurdo, mostrando como tal resultado pode ser obtido como teorema em um sistema que preserve as três negações simultaneamente.

Group Deliberation, Cognitive Diversity and Intellectual Virtues

Leandro De Brasi

Group deliberation involves the interpersonal exchange and evaluation of reasons and counter-reasons, in which each party attempts to rationally persuade the others, rather than manipulating or bargaining with them. Such group deliberation is crucial for the generation of epistemic goods, such as knowledge and reasonable beliefs, given that it helps us eradicate possible errors. But it is a familiar fact that groups often perform suboptimally and indeed only under particular conditions deliberative groups can tap their epistemic potential and in turn avoid deliberative distortions, such as polarization and domination. In this talk, I argue that two necessary conditions for an epistemically fruitful deliberation are a certain kind of cognitive diversity within the deliberative group and a certain kind of intellectual character of the deliberators. Nevertheless, I will here focus mainly on the second individual condition regarding the character of the deliberators than the first structural condition given that it can be seen as a philosophically more interesting condition and probably a harder one to satisfy. This should not suggest that the personal has a certain kind of primacy over the structural and both character and structure are important ingredients to realize the epistemic potential of group deliberation. Moreover, the talk is exclusively concerned with the potential epistemic fruits of group deliberation; in particular, with the elimination of errors.

The talk proceeds as follows. After introducing the phenomenon of group deliberation, it is shown that such deliberation can help us eradicate possible errors, as the empirical research suggests it. So, in this sense, group deliberation can foster epistemically better formation and updating of beliefs. One obvious way in which interpersonal deliberation can help eradicate possible errors has to do with the dispersal of knowledge and skills. Another, less obvious, reason has to do with neutralizing certain cognitive shortcomings and it is shown that diversity of opinion is required for this. Given this, it is argued that, in order for deliberation to lead to the elimination of errors and avoid polarization, a structural condition needs to hold: namely, the deliberative group needs to instantiate some cognitive diversity concerning opinions, knowledge and skills. Moreover, it is shown that other distortions. such as domination, can occur in cognitive heterogenous groups and so the above structural specifications cannot be sufficient to counteract them. So it is argued that a further personal condition is required in order to enable the above epistemic potential: namely, the individual deliberators need to possess an intellectually humble and autonomous character. The intellectual virtues of humility and autonomy are introduced and it is shown that they foster the reciprocity required for the above deliberative potential. The talk concludes that, although it is hard to collaborate successfully (as much research on group dynamics shows), deliberating with others can anyway increase our epistemic performance by eradicating possible errors in our belief system. But only under certain conditions groups can tap the above epistemic potential and, in particular, only if the above structural and personal conditions are met.

Parcimônia: Ontológica vs. Conceitual

Luisa Luze Brum Genuncio

A parcimônia ontológica (preferência por teorias com menos postulações de entidades) e a economia teórica (preferência por teorias com termos mais simples e menor número possível de conceitos primitivos) são consideradas virtudes teóricas, e descrevem princípios que regem a escolha de teorias. O tema voltou a ser foco da metafísica devido ao desenvolvimento da teoria de Fundação na metafísica contemporânea e da proposta de substituição da Navalha de Ockham por um Laser apresentada por Jonathan Schaffer. A Navalha é acusada de ser pouco exata, enquanto o Laser é acusado de ser demasiado complexo e desnecessário.

O Laser seria quase o mesmo princípio, no entanto, apenas entidades fundamentais teriam mérito na busca por parcimônia. No caso, a economia seria aplicada a entidades fundamentais e não a todo tipo de entidades indiscriminadamente. Ao invés de julgar todo tipo de entidade como tendo o mesmo peso, o mesmo valor, ele quer priorizar as entidades fundamentais e assim distinguir entre os comprometimentos de uma teoria, e os custos de tais comprometimentos. Pela medição do Laser entidades novas e distintas sem custos para a parcimônia da teoria em questão. As entidades fundamentais, ao serem postuladas, já incluem a implicação das entidades derivadas, ou seja, o custo de entidades derivadas estaria 'incluso' no custo inicial da postulação. Usando o Laser estaríamos comprometidas com o que pode ser derivado dos fundamentais por um custo menor do que com a Navalha.

Schaffer também propõe que parcimônia ontológica está numa relação próxima com economia teórica e defende que medidas aptas de economia poderiam ser traduzidas entre as duas áreas e os dois tipos de economia seriam análogos. Ele propõe e compara a Navalha Conceitual e o Laser Conceitual, onde conceitos não devem ser invocados sem necessidade e conceitos primitivos não devem ser invocados sem necessidade, respectivamente. Para o Laser Conceitual seriam considerados apenas os custos de conceitos primitivos, e conceitos derivados daqueles não incorreriam em custos extras levando à seleção de teorias mais hierarquizadas, com bases pequenas de conceitos primitivos.

A defesa por analogia de Schaffer ignora que a parcimônia ontológica e a economia teórica não parecem ser regidas pelas mesmas regras – a ontologia descreve a realidade, enquanto teorias e conceitos a explicam. Mark Fiddaman e Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2018) consideram que a economia teórica deveria ser preferida por escolher teorias mais inteligíveis, enquanto Dean Da Vee (2019) argumenta que a economia teórica deveria ser preferida por escolher teorias mais inteligíveis, enquanto Dean Da Vee (2019) argumenta que a economia teórica deveria ser preferida por escolher teorias mais verdadeiras. O que motiva a busca por parcimônia na ontologia (menos custos e menos entidades não fundamentadas) não parece análogo ao que motiva a busca por parcimônia em conceitos e teorias (menor chance de erro e inteligibilidade). Esta analogia proposta por Schaffer têm acumulado ataques razoáveis que movimentam a discussão e explicitam as distinções entre os dois tipos de parcimônia.

Internalismo Motivacional na Lecture on Ethics de Wittgenstein

Luiz Henrique da Silva Santos

Exploraremos a discussão sobre a forca motivacional de proposições morais a partir de diferentes posições sobre a conexão entre o juízo e a motivação para o agir. A posição que defende ser o entendimento de um juízo moral necessariamente acompanhado da correspondente motivação para a ação é denominada internalismo. O externalismo, por sua vez, defende que a forca motivacional que alegadamente caracterizaria o juízo moral não está necessariamente ligada ao seu entendimento, pois é perfeitamente possível para um falante entender uma proposição moral sem possuir a motivação para agir de acordo com ela. Abordaremos estes diferentes pontos de vista teóricos a partir de um puzzle que considera o uso de proposições morais e suas possíveis relações com a motivação moral. A discussão dará centralidade, a partir de então, às diferentes abordagens internalistas. Dado esse panorama, investigaremos a posição esboçada por Wittgenstein em sua Lecture on Ethics (1929) sobre a natureza do juízo moral, baseada na distinção entre juízos de valor e juízos descritivos. Um juízo de valor relativo, de acordo com Wittgenstein, pode ainda ser reduzido a juízos descritivos, mas juízos de valor absoluto possuem uma natureza diversa. O que caracteriza um juízo de valor absoluto é a noção de dever, a qual deve acompanhar seu entendimento e que não está necessariamente vinculada a um juízo de valor relativo. O objetivo desta fala é mostrar que a posição wittgensteiniana sobre a conexão existente entre juízo e motivação moral é compatível com o internalismo antiracionalista, o qual nega que o requerimento de praticidade para o juízo moral dependa de fatos morais.

Individual Conditional Intentions in Collective Action

Luiz Paulo Da Cas Cichoski

In this talk, I intend to discuss the conditional intentions necessary for the execution of collective actions. My main target of evaluation is reductive views that endorse the methodological claim that the relevant mental entities instantiated in appropriate collective actions are best understood in terms of the properties and concepts already available in our standard theories of individual intention and action (the most popular version of this kind of proposal is advanced by Michael Bratman).

On those proposals, collective intentionality is defined as the interrelation of attitudes possessed by the individual agents engaged in the collective action. Conditional intentions seem to be the constituents of the relation, assuming the form: "I will do X given that you will do Y" instantiated for every member of the collective entity; which implies that "You will do Y given that I will do X". However, this structure has a fatal flaw. It opens up a regress that might be clarified in the following way: "I will do X given that you will do X, but you will do X given that I will do X, but I will do X given that you will do X, but you...ad infinitum." Given this regress, there is no possible rational way for an agent to deconditionalize this kind of conditional intention. In order to move forward and execute her particular contribution to the collective action, it seems necessary that one of the individual agents engaged in the joint endeavor ignores the rational constraints imposed by this kind of conditional intention and intends to X (or execute X) without the satisfaction of the condition expressed by her (conditional) intention. This is a very odd implication for the reductive

view since it means that every collective action is undertaken due to the irrational neglect of (at least) one of the individual agent's conditional intention.

Given this fundamental problem, I will try to present a proper form of conditional intention held by individual agents engaged in collective action. The appropriate conditional intention should be: "I intend to do X if we intend to A". In this form, the intention is not conditionalized on other individual members' contributions, instead, it is conditionalized on the collective intention to execute the collective action A. The collective intention is the element securing that every individual member will carry out their parts, being the appropriate reason to deconditionalize the conditional intentions involved. Therefore, this kind of conditional intention is the appropriate individual contribution to the emergence of a collective intention, guaranteeing a way back to the individual level, via deconditionalization of this intention.

Revisão da Lógica, Disputas Verbais e Negociações Metalinguísticas

Marcos Silva

O pluralismo lógico é a visão de que há mais de uma lógica correta. Uma visão particular desta tese é chamada de pluralismo lógico de domínio específico. Aqui se defende que lógica correta ou os conectivos lógicos dependem do domínio de uso, do contexto de uso, ou do pano de fundo linguístico em que o vocabulário lógico é empregado. A dificuldade filosófica, nesta visão, é a de que a comunicação significativa entre lógicos de tradições diferentes e rivais é prejudicada. Parece que toda a comunicação e discussão sobre a revisão de princípios lógicos se transforma em uma mera disputa verbal. Se dois lógicos abordam o mesmo domínio com lógicas diferentes guiando suas investigações, então devem estar usando diferentes conectivos, e, portanto, usando diferentes linguagens, e, consequentemente, falando de coisas diferentes sem perceber isto. Na discussão sobre " \leftarrow A", mas na verdade estamos usando sentidos diferentes para " \leftarrow ", de maneira que não falamos de fato sobre a mesma coisa. Se mudamos de linguagem, mudamos de assunto. E não haveria um desacordo de fato. Este problema de comunicação

parece impedir desacordos legítimos entre lógicas rivais. Mas como podemos racionalmente justificar nossos princípios lógicos se a própria possibilidade da justificação racional os pressupõem? Como nós podemos fundamentar um conjunto de princípios básicos da razão como o correto sem circularidade ou regresso ao infinito? Neste trabalho, uma possível solução para este problema é articulada, sem se perder a tese pluralista. Uma solução neopragmatista requer que adotemos uma noção de negociação metalinguística que permita pessoas comunicarem, desacordarem e justificarem suas escolhas lógicas mesmo estando em domínios diferentes e usando linguagens distintas. Minha proposta concernente ao problema da justificação e da normatividade na revisão da lógica explora a analogia entre lógica e outras disciplinas normativas, como a ética e o direito. Neste trabalho, apresentamos um método neopragmatista para se pensar a revisão da lógica e a natureza dos desacordos entre lógicos rivais ao enfatizar o caráter antirrealista do vocabulário lógico e o papel normativo que este desempenha em nossas atividades discursivas usuais, especialmente no contexto de negociações metalinguísticas.

Grounding in Aristotle: Essence, Substance, Accident and Universal

Maria Amélia Reis de Castro Rodrigues

According to Schaffer, the difference between *Categories* and *Metaphysics* is that while the former offers a flat ontology, the latter offers an ontological hierarchy. Despite being a purposely simple explanation, this end up falling into a mistake very common among the contemporary metaphysicians of grounding. These authors usually point to the notion of ontological foundation as being unique within aristotelian metaphysics. However, if we look at *Categories*, we can see that Aristotle, in this work, already exposes some hierarchy, which can be put in terms of foundation. In *Categories* 2, one can understand that the author makes a distinction between two types of ontological dependence. The first of these concerns universals, that are "said of" a particular object; the second concerns the concomitants (accidents), which "are in" a particular object. Therefore, the *ground* in both cases is the object, that Aristotle will call the "primary substance", but it cannot be said on that basis that the type of dependence in both cases is the same, since the universal-primary substance and

accident-primary substance relations are distinct. In *Metaphysics*, there is still a third type of foundation, which concerns the relation essence-substance. In this case, we can speak of a primitive foundation, given that the essence would be what would ultimately enable the existence and identity of a particular object (substance) in the world. My presentation intends to approach how the foundation can be seen in *Categories*, in comparison with the foundation proposed by *Metaphysics*, showing, in this way, that there is different uses of this notion in Aristotle's works.

Proper Names and Sortal Properties

Martin Adam Motloch

The objective of this paper is to discuss the connection between referentialism and sortal essentialism, claiming that there is usually a sortal property associated with the bearer of a proper name and that the proper name does not refer to it anymore, if it loses this property.

Saul Kripke (1972) propagated both direct reference theory and essentialism. The two theories are considered independent. At most, on the general view, the theory of direct reference makes the formulation of essentialism simpler. Intuitively, nonetheless, we have the impression that there must be a more intimate connection between the two theories. This was probably the impression for many during the first reading of *Naming and Necessity*, later repressed by the deepening in the literature. The idea, that the referent of the name could not become anything, and the proper name continue to refer to it seems to be a verry plausible idea. It is difficult to deny that there are limits to the mutability of the referent of proper names. Ccontrary to the standard view, Jubien (2009) in his book Possibility makes an explicit connection between the meanings of proper names and the essences of the bearers of these names. First, I will argue that proper names are usually used to refer to objects which possess socially relevant kinds of sortal properties. The linguistic community determines the relevant sortal property of the referent through the division of linguistic labor. Then, I will present a defense against the objections of plausible counterexamples in two steps. First, showing that in many cases the change of sortal property is only apparent. Secondly, I will describe the mechanism of metonymy,

which explains why we use homonymous names for different, however, contiguous objects. Finally, I will employ a modification of Putnam's *principle of the benefit of the doubt* to deal with the problem of radical error, i.e., cases in which the linguistic community is entirely deceived concerning the sortal property of the referent. The results cast a deeper light on the conceptual scheme underlying our ordinary language naming practices.

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(Dis)continuism and Causation

Matheus Diesel Werberich

Ever since the discovery that the supporting brain regions of episodic memory greatly overlap with those of episodic imagination, philosophers have been discussing whether these mental processes belong to the same natural kind (NK). This debate, now known as (dis)continuism, is split between discontinuists, who endorse the view that memory and imagination are distinct mental processes, and continuists, who argue that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same.

Traditionally, philosophers consider the (dis)continuism problem as ultimately depending on the causality question - i.e., whether remembering requires a causal connection to the past event. In this framework, if memory is a simulation process and does not require a causal connection, then it is sufficiently similar to imagination and, thus, continuism follows. Alternatively, if a causal connection is necessary, then there are fundamental differences between memory and imagination and, thus, discontinuism follows. Against this framework, I argue that such entanglement is due to a failure of delineating issues of *explanation* and *classification*.

Classification and explanation are related, but logically distinct. Classifications are concerned with organizing entities under a category based on relevant and common properties. Meanwhile, explanations can be roughly characterized as descriptions of interactions that are responsible for a given phenomenon. In this sense, while explanations require a reference to the causal structure of the world, classifications may not do so.

When classifications map over relevant causal differences between objects, they suit our explanations and constitute a NK. Any such classification should meet three minimal criteria:

- 1. They range over natural or empirical properties;
- 2. These properties are regular in an appropriate way;
- 3. The regularity of such properties supports explanations about members of that classification.

As such, any property that supports NKs is suited for explanations, since it meets criterion (3). However, not every explanatory property is sufficient to ground a NK, since fulfilling criterion (3) does not entail that criteria (1) and (2) are also fulfilled.

In this framework, continuism would amount to the claims that:

- The natural kind of episodic simulation ranges over the neurocognitive process of generating an episodic representation of a temporally distant event;
- 2. The properties of this neurocognitive process are regular across tokens of memory and imagination;
- 3. Such regularity supports explanations about memory and imagination.

Alternatively, discontinuism would amount to the claims that:

- 1. The natural kind of episodic memory ranges over a causal connection to the past event;
- 2. The causal connection is regular across tokens of memory, but not imagination;
- 3. The regularity of the causal connection supports explanations about memory, but not imagination.

As such, it becomes apparent that (dis)continuism does not necessarily follow from the causality question. The former is concerned with the veracity of all three claims. Meanwhile, the latter is concerned only with whether claim (3) is necessary – i. e., whether a causal connection is necessary for remembering. However, even if claim (3) is true, claims (1) and (2) do not necessarily follow - which goes against the view that (dis)continuism ultimately depends on the causality question.

Entre Deferência e Educação: como juízes devem avaliar argumentos científicos no ambiente judicial?

Michael Guedes da Rocha

A investigação dos fatos num processo judicial é um labor indispensável para a correta aplicação de uma consequência jurídica. Todavia, a formulação de uma hipótese fática está longe de ser uma tarefa fácil até mesmo para o mais comprometido dos julgadores com relação ao alcance da verdade. Isso na medida em que se adentra no desafio epistemológico de discutir o que é e como alcançar o conhecimento dos fatos no mundo e no próprio processo. Um exemplo de dificuldade está relacionado à inadmissão de certos tipos de provas (como provas ilícitas) por deferência a compromissos normativos que, às vezes, chocam-se com o epistêmico. Uma outra dificuldade, a qual pretende-se desenvolver neste trabalho, é a de avaliação de argumentos que envolvem conhecimentos científicos os guais requerem uma expertise que o juiz - cientificamente leigo - não possui, sendo este dependente epistemicamente dos responsáveis por levar conhecimento especializado ao processo - os experts (como os peritos que atuam em investigações de 1º grau). Essa dificuldade se associa a um motivo de preocupação: experts, inevitavelmente, cometem equívocos que se não identificados a tempo podem causar até mesmo a condenação de inocentes (pensando, especificamente, no contexto criminal). Os tribunais, por outro lado, pouco demonstram avanços em termos de estratégias efetivamente práticas para avaliar um conhecimento científico que, em realidade, pouco conseguem até mesmo compreender, quem dirá pontuar adequadamente quando foi acertadamente trazido pelo expert. É com esse plano de fundo que este trabalho se divide em quatro momentos distintos norteando a temática que pode ser resumida pela nomenclatura de epistemologia da expertise aplicada aos tribunais: (i) sobre os obstáculos de compatibilizar a discussão sobre confiabilidade do testemunho de um *expert* com um procedimento judicial; (ii) sobre a falibilidade da prova científica e seus riscos para inocentes; (iii) sobre as propostas clássicas já feitas para resolver o problema (modelo deferencial e modelo educacional); (iv) sobre novas propostas com respeito à avaliação do testemunho de experts.

Safety, Suspension, and the Sceptic

Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas

Safety theorists of knowledge hold that SAFETY is necessary for knowledge:

SAFETY: If S believed that p, p would be true

They often argue that one of the virtues of their view is that it enables a response to the canonical argument for Radical Scepticism:

RS:

1. If I know that p and that p entails not-H, then I know that not-H

2. I do not know not-H

/ I do not know p

They claim the response is straightforward: if we assume that SAFETY is necessary for knowledge, then premise (2) of CS is false, for the belief that not-H is safe (and fulfils the other conditions for knowledge).⁸

This paper develops a consequence so far unnoticed (to the best of my knowledge) of conceding that safety is necessary for knowledge. In a nutshell: A thinker who assumes that the safety view is correct and undertakes the project of determining whether premise 2 of RS is true or not, instead of being able to rationally conclude that the safety theorists win (as they suppose), is rationally compelled to suspend judgement.

Assuming that safety is necessary for knowledge, to obtain the result that:

(i) S knows that not-H,

the conditional "If S believed that not-H, not-H would be true", must be true; and for this conditional to be true, H-worlds must not be in the sphere of closets worlds to the actual world. For, if an H-world -call it "H1"- were among the closest worlds to the

⁸ See Sosa (1999, pp. 142-3, 147 and 2017, pp. 59-60); Greco (2012, pp. 197); Pritchard (2007, p. 80 and 2008, pp. 446-447).

actual world, there would be a relevant possible world –namely H1- where S believed that not-H and not-H would be *false*, which would falsify the conditional; then the belief that not-H would not be safe, and claim (i) would be false. Hence, to support the belief that the conditional is true, one would have to know that the actual world is as dissimilar to an H-world as necessary to make it true that no H-worlds are in the sphere of closest worlds to the actual world.

Assuming that safety is necessary for knowledge, to obtain the result that:

(ii) S doesn't know that not-H

the conditional "If S believed that not-H, not-H would be true", must be false; and for this conditional to be false H-worlds must be in the sphere of closets worlds to the actual world. For, if no H-worlds were among the closest worlds to the actual world, there would be no relevant possible world where S believed that not-H and not-H were *false*, which would verify the conditional, then the belief that not-H would be safe, and claim (ii) would be false. Hence, to support the belief that the conditional in question is false, one would have to **know** that the actual world is as similar to an H-world as necessary to make it true that at least one H-world is in the sphere of closest worlds to the actual world.

If we assume that safety is necessary for knowledge, then both the argumentative route to (i) and the argumentative route to (ii), require some knowledge of the world. But the thinker who is trying to figure out whether (i) or (ii) is true, is forbidden from appealing to any knowledge of the world by the following dialectical rule:

EDR: In the context of assessing the premises of RS, one must not assume that its conclusion is false.

Then, the knowledge of the world necessary to decide the question whether premise 2 of RS is true or not, is not available to her and she must **suspend judgement** about whether the premise is true or not. This kind of impasse, and not the victory she imagines herself obtaining over the sceptic, is the most that the safety theorist can achieve if her view that safety is necessary for knowledge is accepted.

What makes the knowledge of the world unavailable to the thinker in question is that making use of it in her reasoning would beg the question against the sceptic. Safety theorists have been aware all along that they beg the question against the sceptic exactly for the reasons I've described, but they have resisted the charge that the circularity in question is a problematic feature of their account. For example, Sosa says that the charge of unacceptable circularity "is mistaken" (1999, p. 152).⁹ This is probably why the safety theorists have not considered the conclusion about suspension of judgement. I will argue that the circularity of the safety theorist allows herself the type of question begging manoeuvre she does, then she should allow it to other thinkers; but the manoeuvre can be applied to produce arguments that are clearly unacceptable. So, the safety theorists at least owe us a principled explanation of how they can shake off that bad company.

Faced with this difficulty, the safety theorist can reply that it was never in their agenda to construct a non-question begging response to the sceptic, but that it wasn't either to construct a question begging response that was somehow acceptable. Rather, all she wanted to do was to show how we *can* know not-H *on the assumption* that we are not in an H-world. To construct this explanation, she doesn't need to appeal to any *knowledge* of what the actual world is like, so there's no risk of begging the question against the sceptic. To end the paper, I argue that this weakening of her explanatory goal yields an instance of *the conditionality problem*¹⁰, whereby one is unable to move past mere conditional assertions like: "If the actual world is very dissimilar from an H-world, then one knows that not-H", and it is hard to see what could exactly be the anti-sceptical import of such assertions.

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On The Syntactic and Semantic Distinction Between Epithets and Expressives

Nicolás Lo Guercio Andrés Saab

According to Potts (*The logic of conventional implicatures*, 2005), expressive adjectives (EAs) and epithets constitute a natural semantic class: neither kind of expression make any at-issue contribution, and both possess functional, non-at-issue expressive meanings. In addition, both compose with other meanings via the rule CI application (see Potts, 2005, p. 165), that is, they take an at-issue argument and return the same argument plus an expressive meaning in the non-at-issue dimension. Despite these similarities, EAs and epithets show a noteworthy difference, to wit, only the former exhibit what Gutzmann (*The Grammar of Expressivity*, 2019) calls *argument extension*, that is, a mismatch between syntax and semantics whereby EAs target a syntactic constituent other than the one they directly modify. Thus, the speaker of (1) can hardly be taken to hold a negative attitude towards cakes in general; the most natural reading, instead, is that she holds a negative attitude towards the towards a particular cake denoted by the DP 'the cake', or alternatively, towards the

whole situation expressed by the entire sentence. By contrast, in (2) the speaker's negative attitude clearly targets John:

- 1) The dog has eaten the damn cake.
 - a. #The 🙁 cake/ 🙁 The cake/ 🙁 The dog has eaten the cake.
- 2) That bastard John has eaten the cake.
 - a. 🙁 John

In this article, we will advance a semantico-pragmatic view of EAs that explains this contrast. More specifically, we will argue that EAs are *isolated Cls*, that is, expressions that bear no at-issue content and exhibit a propositional, non-functional non-at-issue content. The present view explains the contrast between EAs and epithets in terms of a difference in expressive content. EAs bear a propositional expressive content, hence they do not combine with other expressions in terms of functional application. Moreover, EAs' expressive content is unspecific regarding the target of the attitude attributed to the speaker. Together, these two facts leave the possibility open for the audience to make different pragmatic inferences regarding the target of the speaker's negative attitude. Argument extension results from these inferences. By contrast, epithets have functional expressive meaning and apply directly to the constituent they modify via the rule CI application, just as in Potts' view. Hence, epithets leave no room for the triggering of pragmatic inferences in the audience concerning the target of the speaker's negative attitude.

In addition, we will argue that the view has further advantages, to wit, besides accounting for some known facts concerning EAs, like their impossibility to appear in predicative position and to combine with degree modifiers, it allows explaining some facts that have not been discussed so far in the bibliography on EAs so far, namely that EAs cannot only target asserted contents but also conversational implicatures, presuppositions and even further non-communicated contents that may be mutually manifest in the context.

Real Enough: a new characterisation of the sense of reality

Ophelia Deroy

How do we determine what is real from what is not? The best place to understand how this fundamental capacity works is probably in perception: there, a sense of reality is supposed to enable us to distinguish whether the tree we see at a distance is a product of our imagination or indeed a real one. But what is this sense of reality made of, and is its function only to tell apart imagination from perception?

The start of this talk will discuss why new predictive models of the brain face two problems when it comes to explaining agents avoids being confused about whether our experience is perceptual or imagined. The first problem is an **overlap problem**: As our brains constantly use existing information to predict what will be sensed, and use new evidence only to update those predictions, every percept shares at least something with imagination, which is to be made up from internal information. The second problem is **an extension problem**: Not all confusions we feel during our waking experiences mean that we feel we may be imagining. Some experiences feel clearly perceptual but still feel not right. Examples here include perception during episodes of derealisation, stemming from tiredness, drugs or stress, but also perceptual experiences we can have in virtual reality or in art. What happens in such confused perceptions, and can we explain how the sense of reality could both clearly mark such experiences as being perceptual, while still showing some form or confusion?

Address these two problems requires, I argue, a new characterisation of our subjective sense of reality which makes it a composite of two kinds of subjective markers: a categorical marker needs to clearly identify an experience as perceptual and connecting us to reality; while other markers, for instance of coherence or fluency, bring different degrees of certainty or confusion within that first domain.

This composite account makes new predictions regarding the robustness, the non-linear development and the possible breakdowns of the sense of reality in perception.

Here I will also conclude why understanding how the sense of reality operates in sensory perception represents an important step to distinguish how digital tools and platforms can induce both **distortions** of the sense of reality (e. g. perceiving one's face modified by filters as "more real" than one's real face) and an **impoverished** sense of reality (e. g. lack of multisensory coherence and 3-dimensional perspective).

Contra a Inefabilidade das Hinge Propositions: uma leitura neopragmatista

Paloma de Souza Xavier

A obra Da Certeza (1969), em sua grande maioria, é uma reação de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 1951) a dois trabalhos de G. E. Moore: Em Defesa do Senso Comum (1925) e Prova do Mundo Externo (1936). O primeiro deles parece ter chamado mais a atenção do filósofo. Na obra *Em Defesa do senso comum*. Moore lista várias proposições sobre as quais ele diz saber, com certeza, serem verdadeiras. Algumas dessas proposições são: "eu sou um ser humano". "eu tenho um corpo" e "aqui está uma mão". A partir da discussão sobre a natureza dessas proposições, Wittgenstein (1969) apresenta importantes considerações que proporcionaram o surgimento do conceito de "proposições-dobradiça" (hinge propositions). Este pode ser considerado um conceito pouco claro em Da Certeza, mas, ainda assim, possui diversas interpretações. Moyal- Sharrock (2004) defende que as hinge propositions são inefáveis. Ela as chama de "certezas fulcrais" (hinge certainties). Para a intérprete, as hinge propositions não podem ser ditas, pois caso isso ocorresse, o jogo de linguagem se solidificaria. Se, de fato, as hinge propositions fossem indizíveis, como proceder em desacordos entre hinge propositions? A tese da inefabilidade das hinges parece ser inadequada, visto que inviabiliza possíveis correções em ambientes de conflito. Para tratar dessas questões, a partir de uma leitura neopragmatista, utilizamos o método socrático presente na filosofia da linguagem do filósofo Robert Brandom (1994, 2000). Desenvolvemos, portanto, este trabalho em duas etapas: i) etapa negativa, em que mostramos as insuficiências da tese de inefabilidade das hinges, de Moyal-Sharrock; ii) etapa positiva, na qual argumentamos que o método socrático, tal como proposto Brandom, pode ajudar a resolver o impasse desses tipos de desacordos. Esta perspectiva seria uma maneira de explicitar as hinge certainties, colocando-as no interior do jogo de dar e receber razões

Intuições Alien-free: um breve esboço

Paulo Vitor Melo Vial Domingues

Partindo de uma espécie de "atualismo intuitivo", parece razoável pensar que objetos alienígenas (possibilia), uma vez que não existem, não são o tipo de coisa que pertence a extensões de predicados. Uma forma interessante de ilustrar essa problemática é a seguinte: pensando conjuntos de maneira 'composicional' (i. e. um conjunto existe apenas se seus componentes também existem), parece que teremos alguns problemas em explicar como objetos que não existem (ou que não existem atualmente) podem pertencer a conjuntos que existem (ou que existem atualmente). Para evitar tal problema, talvez pudéssemos simplesmente dizer que apenas objetos que atualmente existem podem pertencer a conjuntos que atualmente existem; essa parece ser a intuição por trás de certas restrições feitas à semântica da lógica modal quantificada. Assim, podemos considerar que, uma vez que o Comissário Gordon não existe, ele não pode pertencer ao conjunto dos comissários no mundo atual. Portanto, por raciocínio modelo-teorético standard podemos concluir que se s é uma sequência onde o Comissário Gordon é o *i*-ésimo elemento, não é o caso que s satisfaz Cx_i , @ (onde C é o predicado "é um comissário" e @ é o mundo atual). Uma consequência estranha desse raciocínio modelo-teorético standard é que podemos concluir, de modo análogo, que s satisfaz $\neg Cx_i$, @; ou seja, no mundo atual um objeto que não existe satisfaz certas sentenças. Podemos dizer que isso nos levar a aceitar que no mundo atual o Comissário Gordon pertence ao complemento do conjunto dos comissários. Parece, assim, que não resolvemos muita coisa introduzindo nossa restrição semântica, uma vez que o Comissário Gordon continua sendo um objeto não-existente que pertence a um conjunto que existe (o complemento do conjunto dos comissários). De certo modo, parece plausível acreditar que predicados podem nos informar sobre o conteúdo de certos conjuntos (ou classes); no entanto, nosso "pensamento" modelo-teorético standard parece nos comprometer com a existência de conjuntos atuais possuindo objetos não-atuais como membros. De fato, alguns filósofos não estão tão insatisfeitos com essa situação: Kit Fine, por exemplo, famosamente defendeu que mesmo que Sócrates não tivesse existido, ele seria ainda um ser humano (apesar de sua extramundaneidade). No entanto, diferentemente de Fine, não estamos tão dispostos a aceitar aliens em nossa ontologia; por isso, vamos esboçar na presente comunicação brevemente algumas intuições semânticas que chamaremos de alienfree - rudemente, seria a proposta de impedir, no caso acima, que s satisfaca tanto Cx_i , @, quanto $\neg Cx_i$, @.

Metalinguistic Disagreement and Speaker Error

Pedro Abreu

A and B seem to express some form of disagreement:

A: Waterboarding is torture.

B: No, waterboarding is not torture.

The case is famously offered as a paradigmatic example of a *metalinguistic dispute* (Plunkett & Sundell 2013). According to their line of analysis, there is indeed some important divergence between the disputants; however, it concerns not the facts described by the utterances — we are explained that the speakers happen to agree on all the basic details of the waterboarding procedure and its effect on victims — but rather the meaning and adequate use of the central term in the exchange, 'torture'. This divergence is expressed not by explicit reference to the term or its meaning, but by the interlocutors' divergent use of the same term, each use conforming to a different prefered meaning. Speakers metalinguistically advocate some particular meaning for the term by using it in accordance to that proposed meaning.

This kind of metalinguistic analysis constitutes a promising strategy for making sense of plausibly many disputes — see the burgeoning literature (too vast to sample here) on *metalinguistic disputes* and closely related topics such as *verbal disputes* and *conceptual engineering*. However, the approach still faces important challenges. In this presentation, I consider one cluster of such challenges, *the speaker error objections*. Here we include all objections to the viability of the approach that are based on ordinary speakers' intuitive resistance to the metalinguistic analysis of the disputes in which they take part.

After briefly surveying two types of speaker error that figure prominently in the recent literature (Cappelen 2018, Plunkett & Sundell 2021a, 2021b), I center our main focus on a third type of speaker error: speakers' misattribution of contents both to others and to themselves. I argue that the analyses of disputes that incur in this type of speaker error attribution are *uncharitable* in three different ways: first, by portraying speakers as uncharitable interpreters of their interlocutors; second, by portraying speakers as uncharitable interpreters of their interlocutors; third, by portraying reluctant speakers who retract as mistaken interpreters of their own prior utterances.

I conclude that, taken together, these unfavorable consequences weight very significantly against the viability of a metalinguistic approach to cases involving speakers that resist that kind of analysis.

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Dispositional Essentialism and the Problem of Free Will

Pedro Merlussi

Dispositional essentialism is the view according to which some (maybe all) natural, fundamental properties are essentially dispositional, and it is increasingly popular in debates about the metaphysics of the laws of nature. The general goal of this talk is to explore the consequences of the dispositionalist view of the laws for the free will problem. In particular, I investigate how the dispositional account affects the soundness of the Consequence Argument (which argues for the incompatibility of free will and determinism) and the Luck Argument (which argues for the incompatibility of free will and indeterminism). It would be bad new if these arguments are sound, because it would then be difficult to see how free will is metaphysically possible. In the first part of this talk, I argue that the standard reply to the Consequence Argument is not available for dispositionalists. This problem, I argue, is only to be expected, since it is just another version of the old objection that

dispositionalism is not compatible with a possible-worlds analysis of counterfactuals. Fortunately, there is a way out of this impasse, which is already known in the dispositionalist literature. In the second part of the talk, I discuss Toby Handfield's solution to the impasse by invoking the concept of a spaceinvading property instance, which will do the same sort of work that Lewisian "counterfactual miracles" do when we evaluate counterfactuals. Then, I show that if Handfield's proposal is accept, then the Luck Argument has a false premise, a premise that has not yet been criticised.

O Problema de Júlio César na Definição Explícita de Frege do Operador Cardinalidade

Rafael de Araújo Serra

Em Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (GLA, 1884), Frege introduz os números cardinais em seu sistema lógico reduzindo os números cardinais a extensões de conceitos. A introdução dos cardinais é feita pela definição explícita do operador cardinalidade $Nx(\prod x)$ (O número do conceito \prod), em que o número de um conceito F é definido como a extensão do conceito "equinumérico ao F". A partir dessa definição, Frege constrói todos os números cardinais finitos em seu sistema, definindo os cardinais finitos como as extensões de conceitos lógicos específicos. Esses conceitos lógicos são conceitos de segunda ordem da forma "equinumérico ao conceito F". No entanto, o sistema de Frege em GLA não engloba somente conceitos de segunda ordem. O objetivo de Frege é reconstruir a aritmética a partir da lógica dentro de seu sistema, de maneira que nele encontraremos também conceitos aritméticos de primeira ordem e suas respectivas extensões. Dessa forma, se torna necessário para Frege ter à disposição um critério de identidade para extensões de conceitos que nos diga quando uma identidade entre extensões de conceitos é verdadeira. Em particular, esse critério deve apresentar as condições de verdade de uma identidade entre a extensão de um conceito de segunda ordem e a extensão de um conceito de primeira ordem. Consideraremos o axioma V de Frege e algumas variantes do axioma V, e veremos que isso não será suficiente para estabelecermos as condições de verdade de uma tal identidade. O problema então será: Frege tem de lidar com a existência de extensões de conceitos de diferentes ordens em seu sistema.

"Induction" in Geometrical Proof in Aristotle as the Method of Analysis

Rafael Cavalcanti de Souza

Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I. 18, 81a38-81b9 states that demonstrative knowledge depends on a procedure that has usually been translated by the term 'induction' (epagoge). The traditional interpretation, as defended by Barnes (1993, p. 168) and Bostock (2012, p. 479), assumed that Aristotle would be affirming all knowledge, even the mathematical knowledge, would depend on an enumerative *induction*, that is, generalization to from the observation of particular cases. On the other hand, McKirahan (1983) and Mendell (1998, p. 211-214) argued that, in the mathematical sciences, what is usually called 'induction' refers to a deductive reasoning that seeks to identify an element responsible for the universalization of the solution of a problem from a particular diagram. Aristotle does not develop in detail how such a procedure would occur, but mentions it in *Prior Analytics* II. 21, 67a21 30 to the "argument in the Meno". In defense of the interpretation advocated by McKirahan and Mendell, I present a detailed analysis of the proof procedure described in Meno 82b-85b of the analysis of the doubling the square problem. I argue that what has traditionally been called 'induction' is a procedure that seeks, from a particular diagram, to explain a geometric problem and that corresponds to the analytical method in Greek geometry (starting from a problem and seeking the set of premises that explains that problem). A 'problem' is equivalent to an explanandum and the explanation must be an explanans coextensive with the problem, but there must be an explanatory asymmetry between the explanans and the *explanandum*. The universality of the proof is guaranteed from the intensional adequacy of the terms used in the proof procedure. Such adequacy is properly satisfied when the properties used in the proof refer, in this example, to the square in general and not to the particularities of the diagram used in the proof.

Description, Topic and aim: I present a "heterodox" reading about the Aristotelian conception of one of the most traditional problems in epistemology, the problem of how to ensure the proper generalization of knowledge from particular cases, more specifically, within the scope of geometric knowledge. I present a reading of the Aristotelian text that is more sensitive to the uses of terms used in ancient Greek works on geometry. My aim at the symposium is to present, for national and

international researchers, some results of my research carried out in the master's degree and that are being deepened in my doctorate, in order to receive feedback and improve my research.

Enactive Evaluative Sentimentalism

Rafael Graebin Vogelmann

I argue for a version of evaluative sentimentalism according to which (i) our affective responses to other agents, objects or situations are best understood as appearances of value and (ii) the content of value judgments consists in assenting to or repudiating appearances of value. The starting point of my argument is Giovanna Colombetti's enactive conception of affectivity. According to the enactive approach to cognition Colombetti builds upon, all living systems are sense-making systems. Through its activity of monitoring its conditions of viability and improving its situation when needed, the sense-making organism ascribes special significance or value to certain elements in the environment. In that way, the organism sets up an Umwelt, that is, an environment that has a specific significance for it. The elements of the Umwelt affect the organism as meaningful, as something that has as specific significance and, thus, exhibits a certain range of values: food is good, a predator is dangerous, a sexual partner is attractive, and so on. If we take affectivity to refer to the capacity to be affected, to be "touched" in a meaningful way by what is affecting one (such that one is affected when something strikes one as meaningful, relevant, or salient) then every sense-making organism exhibits a primordial affectivity: a capacity to respond affectively to certain features of the environment. Now, if to be struck by an element of the *Umwelt* as meaningful is to have an affective reaction, then affective reactions present their objects as value-laden. In that sense, they can be characterized as appearances of value. Thus understood, an appearance of value cannot have conceptual content, for even the simpler organisms, that completely lack conceptual capacities, have affective responses in the relevant sense. I hold that an appearance of value is best understood as the perception of certain affordances as relevant to the organism. This view has consequences for our understanding of value judgments. The evaluative concepts we use must be relevant to us. For that to the

case they must map onto the significant distinctions an affective organism enacts through its sense-making activity. That means that the relevant evaluative concepts must capture the significance of the elements in the *Umwelt* that affect the organism. And if that is the case, then value judgments can be used to assent to or to reject appearances of value. For example, if you are afraid of a dog, the dog appears to you as threatening. The evaluative concept "threatening" is the only tool we have to conceptually describe the significance your affective response ascribes to the dog. So, that concept can be used to assent to the appearance (if you judge the dog to be indeed threatening) or reject it (if you judge the dog to be harmless). Value judgments, therefore, describe the particular significance elements of the *Umwelt* have for an organism. Since there can only be a significant environment for the affective being, the intelligibility of our value judgments rest upon our affective responses.

Quantum Ontology De-Naturalized: what we can't learn from quantum mechanics

Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

Ontology deals with existence questions. Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science by stating that the disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can read-off at least some of the existential commitments from scientific theories; on the other, advancing an ontology gives realistic content to a scientific theory, e. g., it says what the theory in question is about. The project for naturalizing ontology maintains, roughly speaking, that science should guide ontology, thus mainly confining the work of ontologists to the task of pointing to a catalog of entities that exist according to our best theories. In this paper, we present a critical analysis of this trend. Using non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM) as case study, we distinguish between two related tasks for ontology. The first would be characterized by the identification of existing entities according to several formulations of QM (e. g. wave functions, point particles, many worlds, etc.), which we call "catalog-ontology". Ontology qua catalog-ontology can be obtained from

science by philosophers of science employing traditional methods of meta-ontology, such as Quinean strategies for determining ontological commitment: one just needs to identify what are the things that need to exist according to specific formulations of QM. Catalog-ontology, thus, is in great measure sensitive to formulation. If (Everettian) many-worlds QM uses multiverses as explanatory devices, one may argue that such approach to QM is ontologically committed (gua catalog-ontology) with many worlds, for example. This is fairly standard in the metaphysics of science, albeit "ontology" and "metaphysics" are not commonly distinguished in these fronts, generating terminological tensions. Now the second role of ontology, on the other hand, is characterized by the establishment of more general ontological categories, in terms of which all of the existing entities according to the theory must be classified (e. g. "objects", "structures", "processes", ...); we call this "type-ontology". In this sense of ontology qua type-ontology, philosophers of science enter in traditional ontological debates searching for the most adequate ontological categories to understand the entities obtained by the catalog-ontology. Methodologically, we argue that only catalog-ontology is naturalizable in the sense of being informed by current science, and that type ontology is not determined or completely epistemically warranted by science. This means that the epistemic virtues one may identify in the defense of a specific type-ontology and its application in science are not in any sense obtained from scientific theories whatsoever, and do not derive any kind of direct epistemic warrant from science. Another central difference between the present approach to ontology and current approaches to the metaphysics of science, besides the distinction between two roles for ontology, is to individuate "ontology" and "metaphysics" by their subject-matter, the latter dealing with nature questions (as opposed to existence questions); so, metaphysics is a step beyond catalog-ontology and type-ontology, whereas current approaches in the metaphysics of science conflate ontology and metaphysics gua metaphysics. By disentangling ontology and metaphysics and, moreover, distinguishing between two kinds of ontology, we can better appreciate the prospects for successfully naturalizing each of them.

Partes de Pluralidades: um desafio platônico para a mereologia contemporânea

Rhamon de Oliveira Nunes

A ideia de que uma totalidade não é nada além de suas partes constituintes é conhecida como tese de composição como identidade. Na metafísica contemporânea, esta tese foi defendida explicitamente por David Lewis (1991). Donald Baxter (1988), Theodore Sider (2007) Meg Wallace (2009) e Achille Varzi (2014), entre outros. Tais autores justificam sua adoção pelo fato de ela supostamente garantir a inocência ontológica da Mereologia Extensional Clássica (MEC). Segundo a MEC, dada a existência de uma pluralidade de objetos, devemos também postular a existência de sua fusão mereológica, o que aumenta de maneira extravagante nossa ontologia. Porém se totalidades forem idênticas às suas partes constituintes, então este aumento ontológico é ilusório: não estamos comprometidos com nada a mais ou além das partes. Um problema imediato que surge de tal concepção acerca da natureza das totalidades é o de que um todo estaria sendo reduzido a uma mera pluralidade de partes. Em resumo, parece que agora não temos mais um objeto singular, mas apenas diversos objetos arranjados de tal e tal modo. Curiosamente, em seu diálogo Parmênides, Platão apresenta justamente um argumento para demonstrar que uma pluralidade de obietos não pode ter partes, sob pena de cairmos em paradoxos aparentemente insolúveis. O objetivo de Platão é tentar demonstrar que uma parte é sempre parte de alguma coisa singular. Portanto, se a leitura da tese de composição como identidade colocada acima for correta, o argumento platônico se torna um obstáculo que precisa ser levado em consideração: afinal, é possível que algo seja parte de uma pluralidade? Meu objetivo nesta comunicação é avaliar o argumento de Platão com base em algumas de suas interpretações mais recentes (e.g., Allen, 1983, Gill, 1996 e Harte, 2002) a fim de determinar se ele se configura como uma ameaca à tese de composição como identidade ou não.

Aliefs and Ramsey's Two Senses of "Belief"

Rodrigo Gouvea

In a series of papers, Tamar S. Gendler characterizes the notion of alief and argues for its inclusion in any theory of mental states that rely on folk psychology. In her words,

[a] paradigmatic alief is a mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affective and behavioral, and that is activated – consciously or non-consciously – by features of the subject's internal or ambient environment. Aliefs may be either occurrent or dispositional (Gendler, 2010 [2008a], p. 263).

According to Gendler, aliefs should be distinguished from beliefs. They are not propositional attitudes nor involve some sort of acceptance, and they also seem to perform a different kind of explanatory work. In "Facts and Propositions" (1990 [1927]), Frank P. Ramsey presents "belief" as an ambiguous term. According to one sense, beliefs are characterized simply by their role in determining behavior. Their mental factor can be described as a disposition to act or to behave in a certain way, a disposition that derives from former experiences of the agent. In this sense, Ramsey speaks of the possibility of attributing to a chicken the belief that a certain sort of caterpillar is poisonous. By attributing this belief, we would mean only that "[the chicken] abstains from eating such caterpillars on account of unpleasant experiences connected with them" (1990 [1927], p. 40).

Ramsey tells us that, according to the second sense of the word "belief", it refers to "those beliefs that are expressed in words, or possibly images or other symbols, consciously asserted or denied" (1990 [1927], p. 40). The spoken or imagined words are not the only mental factors of such beliefs. They compose beliefs only when they are connected or accompanied by feelings of belief or disbelief. Unfortunately, Ramsey does not elucidate the exact nature of these feelings. In respect to the words that act as mental factors together with a feeling of belief or disbelief, Ramsey claims that they are names corresponding to the elements of a sentence, and that they must be connected in the mind of the believer, forming a unity in an appropriate order.

One aim of the talk is to elucidate and contrast Gendler's notion of alief and Ramsey's two senses of "belief". Another aim is to evaluate Gendler's claims that aliefs are not beliefs and that a theory of mind based on beliefs, desires and intentions has to acknowledge aliefs. Gendler offers a criticism of the pragmatist accounts of beliefs, and refers nominally to some of their proponents. Ramsey, however, is not mentioned. One may wonder whether Gendler's alief falls prey to what Donald Davidson called the *Ramsey effect*, the phenomenon of discovering that an apparently original philosophical idea was already presented by Ramsey in a more elegant way.

On Type Distinctions, Blindspots and Epistemic Paradoxes

Rodrigo Sabadin Ferreira

Over the last few decades several attempts of dissolving issues related to so-called blindspots of propositional attitudes (like Fitchean cases of unknowability or Moorean cases of non-believable propositions) as well as issues related to epistemic paradoxes (like the preface paradox) were put forward (or at least considered) on the basis of type-distinctions for epistemic operators and propositions (cf., for instance, WILLIAMSON, 2000; PASEAU, 2008; LINSKY, 2009; GIARETTA, 2009; RACLAVSKY, 2018) while some have opposed the approach (cf., for instance CARRARA & FASSIO, 2011). Following an approach hinted at in Church (2009 and 1976) and developed in Paseau (2008), we consider an approach to blindspots and epistemic paradoxes based on a typed hierarchy of propositions and epistemic operators which is grounded in parallel hierarchy of Tarskian truth-predicates, that is: we consider motivating typing knowledge by assuming the plausibility of typing truth. We argue that while this approach provides solid motivations for accepting a typetheoretical dissolution of epistemic paradoxes (e.g., the preface paradox) it cannot sustain a resolution of issues related to blindspots like Fitchean cases of unknowability.

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O Problema do Especialista e a Percepção de Propriedades Estéticas

Rosi Leny Morokawa

A percepção de propriedades estéticas parece variar de acordo com a perícia artística. O crítico de arte parece perceber mais propriedades estéticas em uma obra de arte do que o leigo. Ele tenta fazer com que os outros vejam o que ele vê para sustentar e defender os seus juízos estéticos. Classicamente, Frank Sibley discutiu o que podemos chamar de "problema do especialista em arte", isto é, como é possível que o especialista em arte perceba mais que o não especialista? Abordagem do Conteúdo Rico (*Rich Content View*), proposta, entre outros, por Susanna Siegel (2006, 2010), pode nos ajudar a investigar se propriedades estéticas são parte dos conteúdos da percepção. Siegel defende que podemos representar em nossas experiências visuais, para além de cores e formas, propriedades como, por exemplo, *ser um pinheiro* ou *ser uma casa*, o que ela chama de propriedades K.

Se propriedades estéticas não são cores e formas, então, elas estão dentro do escopo das propriedades K. Assim, se a tese de Siegel estiver correta, ela pode dar uma explicação para como percebemos propriedades estéticas e fornecer uma resposta plausível ao problema do especialista em arte. Nesta comunicação, apresentarei brevemente o problema do especialista em arte. E, em seguida, analisarei se abordagem do conteúdo rico pode fornecer uma resposta ao problema.

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Against Imperfect Intentions

Samuel Asarnow Carlos Núñez

Moral philosophers, action theorists, and experimental philosophers have typically thought of intention as having an all-out or binary character. Just as it is widely held that behaviors are either intentional or not intentional, it is also often thought that either someone intends to do something or they don't. Anscombe assumed the one pumping the water either intended to poison the inhabitants, or they didn't, and Davidson assumed the one flipping the switch either intended to alert the prowler, or they didn't.¹¹ Recently, however, several authors have defended the possibility of intentions that are not all-out, but rather "partial" or "graded," on analogy with the idea of partial or graded beliefs (sometimes also called credences). These "imperfect"

¹¹ Anscombe, G.E.M. (2000) *Intention*, 2nd ed. Harvard University Press, 2000), 37, and Davidson, D. (1980). "Actions, Reasons and Causes," In *Essays on Actions and Events*. Oxford University Press, 4-5. the (all-out) intended end more or less, or being more or less confident that they will achieve the (all-out) intended end.

intentions, as we call them, have been used in at least four ways: (1) they are said to provide an intuitive account of what it is for a person to be only somewhat committed to an end, (2) they have been leveraged to defend cognitivism about intention (the idea that intention is a kind of belief)¹², (3) they have been used to motivate novel, probabilistic norms on intention, which are said to replace the familiar norms of consistency and coherence¹³, and (4) they have been used to explain puzzle cases in which agents appear to be rational despite intending believed incompatible or unattainable ends.¹⁴

Our goal is to argue against imperfect intentions, in favor of the orthodox position that intentions are necessarily all-out or binary. We begin by distinguishing two ways an intention might be imperfect, which have been conflated in the literature. First, an intention may be imperfect by being associated with a non-extremal degree that measures some feature of the intention. We call these "gradable" intentions. Second, an intention may be imperfect because it involves only a proper part of the functional/dispositional profile that is normally taken to be characteristic of intentions. We call these "properly partial" intentions.

Our argument against imperfect intentions has three parts. First, we provide a novel argument against gradable intentions, which draws on a broadly functionalist account of what it is for a mental state to be an intention.¹⁵ This argument allows us to diagnose the error in Goldstein's argument for gradable intentions and his associated probabilistic norms: it conflates the idea of an irrational intention with a gradable intention. Second, we argue that while properly partial intentions are possible in a broad sense, positing them provides no genuine insight into the puzzle cases they are introduced to explain, so there is no reason to think they are actual. Finally, we return to the intuitive motivation for imperfect intentions: modeling non-maximal commitment. We provide a novel account of how binary intentions can do

¹² Marušić, B., & Schwenkler, J. (2018). Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism. *Analytic Philosophy*, 59(3), 309-340.

¹³ Goldstein, S. D. (2016). A Preface Paradox for Intention. *Philosophers' Imprint*, 16.

¹⁴ Holton, R. (2009). *Willing, Wanting, Waiting.* Oxford University Press UK, and Holton, R. (2014). Intention as a Model for Belief. In M. Vargas & G. Yaffe (Eds.), *Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman.* Oxford University Press.

¹⁵ See Bratman, M. E. (1987). *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

this, by emphasizing that an agent can stand in various gradable relations to their intentions-for example, being more or less prepared to give up the (all-out) intention, valuing the (all-out) intended end more or less, or being more or less confident that they will achieve the (all-out) intended end.

Error Possibilities and The Social Division of Epistemic Labor

Santiago Echeverri

During her visit to the local zoo, Hannah – a normal adult human – sees a white rhinoceros in a pen and forms the belief that there is a white rhinoceros in the pen. Hannah is of a sound mind, she is fully alert, and she lacks any reasons for doubt. The rhinoceros is also plainly visible, and the illumination conditions are normal. Unexpectedly, a rather peculiar dialogue takes place:

Hannah: There it is! The first white rhinoceros I see in real life. Martin: How do you know? If we were in the Matrix, this would be a simulation. Hannah: Come on! Stop obsessing with the Matrix. We aren't in the Matrix. That's a white rhinoceros.

It is hard not to sympathize with Hannah's response. It seems *reasonable* for Hannah to disregard the Matrix alternative in the way she does. Inspired by Austin (1946), a number of philosophers have endorsed the following principle:

NO EVIDENCE. It is epistemically rational for a subject *S* to retain her belief in *p* and disregard a global skeptical error possibility, *h*, even though *S* provides no reasons that speak against *h* (Brandom, 1994; Kaplan, 2018; Lawlor, 2013; Leite, 2005; McDowell, 2014; McGinn, 1989; Pritchard, 2012; Williams, 2001).

There are three influential attempts at defending NO EVIDENCE. Conventionalism holds that Martin violated a convention of conversation, so Hannah's response is conventionally appropriate (Pritchard 2012). Deontologism
holds that any denial of NO EVIDENCE introduces an unjustified, deontological asymmetry between claimants and challengers (Brandom 1994; Williams 2014). Wittgensteinianism holds that this asymmetry leads to a universal, rational evaluation of our epistemic commitments that is fundamentally incoherent (Brandom 1994; McGinn 1989; Pritchard 2016; Williams 2001; Wittgenstein 1969).

I will argue that these three views fail as defenses of NO EVIDENCE. At the end, I will sketch an alternative.

First, these views are in tension with a plausible principle:

EVIDENTIALIST RATIONALISM. If *S* knows that p and h are incompatible propositions, then: If it is epistemically rational for *S* to believe that p and disbelieve *h*, then *S*'s reasons favor, on balance, p over *h*.

Suppose that Hannah knows that <That is a white rhinoceros> is incompatible with <That is a horse>. If it is epistemically rational for Hannah to believe that that is a white rhinoceros and disbelieve that that is a horse, it seems to follow that she has reasons that favor, on balance, the white rhinoceros proposition over the horse hypothesis. For example, Hannah has seen that the penis marked as 'white rhinoceros' and she knows that both types of animals differ in shape and color. Anyone who endorses NO EVIDENCE is compelled to introduce exceptions to this principle. However, those exceptions will immediately license "abominable conjunctions" of the following form: "I have reasons to believe that that is a white rhinoceros even though I have no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the Matrix hypothesis" (DeRose 1995; Neta 2003).

Second, these views also clash with another, intuitive principle:

TRUTH CONNECTION. If it is epistemically rational for a subject *S* to retain her belief in p and disregard an error possibility, h, *S*'s attitudes are grounded, at least in part, in factors that speak to the truth of p and the falsity of h.

TRUTH CONNECTION enables us to draw a line between epistemic and practical rationality. However, defenders of NO EVIDENCE have trouble accommodating it. If one lacks reasons that favor p over h, how can one's attitudes of belief in p and disbelief in h be connected with the truth of p and the falsity of h in a non-accidental way? Why aren't these attitudes analogues of beliefs that result from wishful thinking,

reading the tea leaves or employing fallacious forms of reasoning? Existing defenses of NO EVIDENCE lack adequate answers to these questions.

I will conclude by sketching a novel analysis that preserves the two principles and modifies NO EVIDENCE. My view has three components. First, I will argue that the following is an a priori principle: If a subject, S, rationally evaluates a domain of propositions, then S can stand in epistemically rewarding relations (ERRs) to the subject matter of those propositions. Perceptual relations to objects and their properties are a paradigmatic example of ERRs (Recanati 2012). ERRs are nonevidential factors that ground basic forms of knowledge. So, they can accommodate TRUTH CONNECTION. Second, our a priori principle is key to understanding the social division of epistemic labor. If one thinks of the pursuit of knowledge as a self correcting enterprise in which subjects help one another get true beliefs and avoid false beliefs, then only subjects who have been in ERRs to the relevant subject matter should be allowed to participate as claimants and challengers. In the absence of ERRs, the likelihood of making true claims and challenges is very low. Third, this approach preserves EVIDENTIALIST RATIONALISM. In everyday contexts, we exploit our background knowledge of the world, ourselves, and others to disregard error possibilities. In many cases, we use that background knowledge to determine whether challengers have been in ERRs to the subject matter of the target propositions and, if the answer is 'yes', to determine whether these ERRs have conferred expertise on them. In skeptical contexts, we may disregard a global skeptical hypothesis if we recognize that it severs our ERRs to the external world. Without the possibility of standing in ERRs to the external world, epistemic evaluations of external world propositions cannot take place. Hence, although Hannah's response is *reasonable*, it is neither practically rational, nor epistemically rational. Her reaction is reasonable because it reflects her recognition that a constitutive feature of epistemic rationality is not available in skeptical contexts.

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Logical Relativism and the Plurality of Logics

Sofia Abelha Meirelles

Relativism in logic seems to be an unexpected idea at first glance, since logic usually offers tools to reason objectively and strictly, while relativism is often associated with a possible trivializing and arbitrary aspect. Logic has means to safely decide what is valid, it establishes its bases formally and leaves no room for inaccuracies. On the other side, relativism hovers over the idea that something can be valid according to some artificially established factor, and therefore we could validate anything, since

there is a lack of a neutral or absolute referential. But this seems to be in conflict with the idea of consistency, so how can these notions be compatible?

This work aims to present relativism as a sound position when trying to understand the plurality of logics. The recent popularization of non-classical logics led us to the emergence of different questions about validity, since distinct logics can accept different principles and validate different sets of inferences. Thus, when logicians talk about validity using different logics are they using the same meaning for validity? And is there a way to decide which (if any) logic is better?

Most attempts to answer these questions are given by two rival perspectives: logical monism and logical pluralism. The first asserts that there is only one correct logic. The second says that there is more than one correct logic, even if they validate incompatible arguments and without the need to choose a preferred logic. In this sense, logic loses its historically attributed character of being universal and a priori, since there would not be valid laws in all domains, as well as it would not be possible to decide beforehand which laws are privileged.

Those two perspectives have their own problems and limitations, so the purpose here is to present relativism as the underlying idea that permeates various forms of both logical pluralism and logical monism. The first step is to delimit what is understood by relativism, and for that I shall borrow Martin Kusch's standard model of epistemic relativism, which includes some key characteristics, such as dependence, plurality, conversion, conflict and symmetry. Given this, my effort turns to evaluate how these characteristics are transposed to logic and why they make sense when dealing with problems aroused by the plurality of logical systems.

The "Epistemic Gap" in Algorithmic Decision-Making Medicine

Steven Sequeira Gouveia

The application of AI in Medicine (AIM) is producing health practices more reliable, accurate & efficient than traditional Medicine by assisting partly/totality the medical decision-making, such as the use of deep learning in diagnostic imagery, designing treatment plans, the use of robotics mediated surgeries or preliminary diagnosis. Yet, most of these AI systems are pure "black-boxes": the practitioner understands the

inputs & outputs of the system but cannot have access to what happens "inside" it and cannot offer an explanation, creating an opaque process that culminates in a "epistemic gap" in two levels: (a) between patients and the medical experts; (b) between the medical expert and the medical process itself. This creates a philosophical void – with impact in the practice of Medicine – on the trust that patients can have in Medicine but also the trust that medical experts can have in the medical process because there is a loss of control of the medical structure that affects the medical decision-making. This creates a "black-box medicine" since the practitioner ought to rely (epistemically) on these AI systems that are more accurate, fast & efficient than any expert or group of human experts but are not transparent (epistemically) and do not offer any kind of explanation. In this talk, we want to analyze the pros and cons of three ways of answering to the "epistemic gap".

Solution 1: We should not develop and ought to ban any technology that has a "black-box" structure. 2 problems arise: (i) ignores the massive potential that (AIM) can have in saving lives (by making quicker diagnosis & creating more efficient treatments) & saving millions of euros on more efficient public policies; (ii) ignores the fact the industry will not stop producing this technology.

Solution 2: Accept the gap and bite the bullet by claiming that more relevant than a trusty expert-patient relationship, what is relevant is that more lives can be saved since governments spend many financial resources in healthcare that could be used for other goals. Since (AIM) is more efficient than conventional Medicine, we should use the first even if it creates a "trust gap" in levels (a) & (b). 3 problems arise: (i) evidence shows that patient-centered Medicine has better health outcomes (lower costs, fewer rehospitalizations, higher satisfaction); (ii) there are normative reasons to argue that health care experts ought to respect the patients' autonomy & right to be informed; (iii) ignores the obscure concept of "data" by assuming they are concrete & clear facts about the world with context-independent value, but Big Data are highly contextual and relational and can lead to a biased technology.

Solution 3: Create "second-order" AI systems that will be applied on the "blackbox" that will explain what is happening "inside" making the process transparent again to the medical expert and to the patient, strengthening the trust process by consequence by allowing the second to reach an informed, rational & autonomous decision. The problem is the following: higher performance creates a less transparent system; higher transparent systems will be less accurate.

By analyzing the positive and negative aspects of each of the three approaches that try to offer a cogent answer the to "care gap", we will be able to diagnose and identify the main relevant aspects that should be considered between care, on the one hand, and algorithmic process in healthcare, on the other hand.

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Impartiality

Tiago Carneiro da Silva

Evolutionary debunking arguments in ethics have originally been aimed at debunking moral realism — especially non-natural moral realism. Philosophers such as Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer (2014), however, have offered a similar type of argument in order to debunk *part* (although a great part) of our moral intuitions, rather than all of them. In particular, they argue that intuitions that are not impartial face a "Darwinian challenge". This type of intuition is exactly the kind of intuition that we could expect evolution to produce, since beings that non-reflectively tend to value, say, the prioritization of one's own offspring would be more likely to pass on their genes to future generations, whether or not such prioritization would be objectively intrinsically valuable. Tendencies to make partial evaluations such as this would lead us to have normative intuitions that conform to them. Since intuitions that are products of evolution in this way are unlikely to lead us to apprehend self-evident moral truths, the contents of these intuitions are hardly self-evident, and therefore unlikely to serve as moral foundations. Impartial intuitions, on the other hand, are not the kind of intuition that we could expect to be produced by natural selection like this. As such, these intuitions are not merely the product of a non-truth-tracking mechanism that led our ancestors to survive. In fact, they argue, these intuitions are the by-product of a capacity we have that can both track a priori truths in general and lead us to have evolutionary advantages: our capacity to reason. This argument allows them to vindicate utilitarian moral intuitions, which are impartial intuitions.

There have been criticisms against Lazari-Radek and Singer's argument. FitzPatrick (2017), for example, argues that the evolutionary story could be formulated in such a way as to make *impartial* moral intuitions more likely to lead us to survive and pass on our genes. According to him, this other story is just as likely to be true as the story Lazari-Radek and Singer tell us. If this is right, we would need more evidence as to how our moral intuitions evolved. In this talk, I will discuss whether, and how well, Radek and Singer's arguments resist this and other criticisms.

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Como Atribuir Consciência aos Animais?

Victor Machado Barcellos

Nesta comunicação, buscarei apresentar uma possível resposta a dois dos problemas centrais que atualmente afligem a filosofia e a ciência da consciência animal, a saber, o problema da distribuição e o problema da mensuração da consciência. O primeiro problema diz respeito a até onde se estende a consciência fenomenal na árvore filogenética dos animais não humanos. Eis algumas das perguntas que esse problema suscita: seria a consciência um fenômeno restrito a somente os animais filogeneticamente próximos dos humanos, como os primatas e outros mamíferos? Ou os animais filogeneticamente mais distantes de nós, como os cefalópodes e os artrópodes, também poderiam realizar estados mentais conscientes? Seria a consciência um traço exclusivo dos animais que possuem uma

certa estrutura anatômica, como um neocórtex? Ou então a consciência seria um traço amplamente difundido entre os mais diversos clados?

O problema da mensuração da consciência, por sua vez, diz respeito a qual é o método correto capaz de identificar a presença da consciência em uma dada população de animais. Como pode-se notar, ambos os problemas estão conectados, uma vez que para identificarmos até onde a consciência se estende no reino animal devemos ter em mãos um método capaz de indicar a presença dela.

São três as abordagens que buscam responder esses problemas: a abordagem da percepção direta, a abordagem teórica e a abordagem epistêmica. A abordagem da percepção direta sustenta que percebemos de forma imediata os estados mentais conscientes dos animais, isto é, sem a mediação de inferências em nossa mente. A abordagem teórica, por sua vez, defende que é a aplicação prévia de uma teoria da consciência humana no caso dos animais que determinará se eles são ou não conscientes. Por fim, a abordagem epistêmica sustenta que é através dos marcadores de consciência que se justifica abdutivamente a melhor hipótese acerca da presenca da consciência nos animais. Nesta comunicação, defenderei uma resposta de orientação epistêmica, a chamada "abordagem teórica leve", originalmente formulada pelo filósofo Jonathan Birch. Grosso modo, essa abordagem sustenta que dadas as leis da natureza em nosso mundo atual, a consciência desempenharia um papel de "facilitador" da cognição na execução de um determinado conjunto de habilidades e tarefas cognitivas. Ou seja, a percepção consciente de um dado estímulo facilitaria um certo conjunto de habilidades cognitivas que se relacionam com ele. Como tentarei demonstrar, essa é uma hipótese filosófica empiricamente motivada. Ela se vale de diferentes tipos de experimentos cujo sucesso depende de o sujeito perceber conscientemente os estímulos.

On Perceptual Justification, Transmission, and Vogel-Type Cases

Vinícius Felipe Posselt

The proposed work aims to answer whether the distinction between epistemic closure and epistemic transmission proposed by Crispin Wright can account for one family of cases against epistemic closure — namely, Vogel-type cases. For that, I will (I) examine the closure principle of justification and introduce the compelling counterexample proposed by Fred Dretske in 1970; I also intend to (II) show the distinction between closure and transmission made by Wright, (III) motivate cases of reasoning involving lottery propositions, and (IV) investigate whether Wright's explanation can handle this specific family of counterexamples. Finally, I will conclude that Wright's theoretical apparatus may lead us to global skepticism when considering Vogel cases.

Zero-Ground and Causation Ex Nihilo

Yannic Kappes

This talk investigates the intelligibility of the notion of causation ex nihilo by drawing on ideas from the discussion of zero-grounding and the notion of an emptybase explanation.

The former notion refers to an edge case of metaphysical grounding: In ordinary cases, a groundee is grounded by one or more grounds, in cases of zero-ground, a groundee is grounded, but not in any grounds – it is grounded in zero grounds, so to speak.

Since Kit Fine has introduced the notion in "Guide to Ground", several authors have both defended the intelligibility of the notion and argued for its theoretical fruitfulness. Suggested applications include the question of what grounds what, grounding the existence of pure sets, negative existentials, essential/modal/logical truths and understanding the practice of explanation by status.

Elsewhere I have argued that zero-grounding affords a kind of explanation why without reasons why – an empty-base explanation – and argued that further explanatory notions such as essence, metaphysical laws, and even laws of nature might likewise afford empty-base explanations ("The Explanation of Logical Theorems" and "Explanation by Status as Empty-Base Explanation").

A particularly compelling case for the intelligibility of zero-grounding stems from grounding schemata or corresponding metaphysical laws and reflection on certain of their instances in which the plurality of grounds is empty. Thus, Fine (ibid.) extends

the grounding schema for conjunction, according to which true conjunctions are grounded in their conjuncts taken together, to conjunctions of arbitrary sets of propositions, with the result that the conjunction of the empty set of propositions is zero-grounded.

In this talk, I investigate whether similar considerations can support the intelligibility of empty-base explanation involving laws of nature and, by extension, that of causation ex nihilo. To do so, I will first argue that the form of explanatory laws (either metaphysical or laws of nature) that afford empty-base explanations is.

Here, is an operator expressing the relevant law status (e.g., that of a law of nature), is a sentential operator, and the quantification in question is sentential and plural, allowing for quantification over the empty plurality (alternatively, schemata instead of quantifications can be used).

Second, I suggest candidates for such that the corresponding propositions are conceivable as laws of nature. One issue is to capture the diachronic character of such nature (and causation). The core idea here is to consider that perform an operation (such as state addition or superposition) on a plurality of states (possibly none) and a fixed state. Thus the corresponding law can take us from the empty plurality of states to the fixed state in question, thereby providing an empty-base explanation of the latter. By furthermore considering time as a quantity upon which a corresponding operation can be performed, diachronicity might conceivably be captured.

I then describe toy-scenarios in which the candidate laws of nature would afford intuitively acceptable explanations including an empty-base edge case – thus arguing for the intelligibility of empty-base explanation by law of nature.

Finally, I discuss a recent suggestion (Hicks and Wilson, "How Chance Explains") concerning the explanatory role of chance and a possible "real science example" for empty-base explanation by law of nature.



SYMPOSIA

Expressives in Spanish

Ana Clara Polakof (UdelaR/SNI) Inés Garbarino (UdelaR) Pamela Ungerfeld Basaldúa (UdelaR) Rafael Lorieto (UdelaR)

This symposium will deal with different aspects related to expressive items in Spanish: sociocultural aspects, translating aspects, and syntactic aspects. The first talk (Some experimental notes on offensiveness) will provide an experimental approach to the differences between slurs and swearwords in Rioplatense Spanish (RpS) with regard to offensiveness. It will provide empirical evidence that shows that RpS speakers find slurs to be more offensive than swearwords in predicative and reported speech contexts, and it will defend that no semantic conclusions may be drawn from an analysis of an idiosyncratic notion such as offensiveness. The second talk (The translation of expressives from English to Spanish) will provide a descriptive analysis of different strategies that are used to translate expressives such as "damn", and mixed expressives, such as "shitty", from English to American Spanish. The strategies involve maintaining the pure expressive ("fucking" > "maldito"), or omitting it ("fucking" > \emptyset). However, translators cannot use the strategy of neutralization with pure expressives, as with slurs ("bulldaggers" > "lesbianas"), because pure expressives do not have descriptive content. Thus, this analysis shows that translators cannot use the same strategies with mixed expressives, such as "shitty", and with pure expressives, such as "damn". The third talk (A difference between slurs and thick concepts in Spanish) will show that, even though slurs have been considered to be thick terms, they do not have the same behavior with regard to the formation of complex epithets in Spanish. While all thick terms, as well as swearwords, can form complex epithets, as "el cobarde de Pedro" (the coward of Pedro), most slurs cannot form complex epithets, as "#la tortillera de María" (#the dyke of María). Thus, it will defend that further studies are needed to understand the relation between slurs, swearwords and thick terms,

Overall, the three talks presented at this symposium will show that expressive items can be studied from different perspectives, and that they involve different aspects in relation to natural languages. There are different sociocultural consequences that arise with relation to the use of slurs versus swearwords: for RpS

speakers slurs are always found to be more offensive than swearwords, while in Italian it does not seem to be the case (Cepollaro et al. 2019). There are different translating strategies that may be used with pure expressives, but none that allows us to neutralize it's meaning: this confirms that mixed expressives do not behave as pure expressives (Gutzmann, 2019). There are different syntactic-semantic behaviors with regard to thick terms versus slurs: if slurs are to be analyzed as thick concepts, these differences still need to be explained (Cepollaro, 2020). Thus, we might conclude that the analysis of expressive items needs to be made from different perspectives to really understand how they behave.

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On Marco Ruffino's "Contingent A Priori Truths

Author: Marco Ruffino (UNICAMP)

Discussants: Matheus Valente (València/Barcelona) Martin Adam Motloch (UFPI) Iago Mello Batistela (UNICAMP) Jeferson Santos (UNICAMP) Gilson Olegario (UFJF) Nathan Salmon (UCSB)

This symposium will consist of five critical notices on several aspects of Marco Ruffino's recently published book "Contingent A Priori Truths", which will then be

followed by the author's responses. Ruffino's book "offers a comprehensive study of contingent a priori truths. Provides a systematic discussion and critical review of the many theories on contingent a priori truths. It features a new approach to Kripke's cases of contingent a priori truths based on speech act theory.

What Unifies Episodic Memory?

Gabriel Zaccaro de Oliveira Freitas dos Reis Glaupy Fontana Ribas César Schirmer dos Santos James Openshaw

Episodic memory enables us to consciously 'relive' events experienced first-hand in our personal past. For example, you might episodically remember making coffee this morning and vividly recall, through sensory mental imagery, what it was like to smell the coffee grounds or to see the kettle reach a boil. The term 'episodic memory' was coined by the psychologist Endel Tulving in 1972, and research on the topic by psychologists and philosophers alike continues to be on the rise. The central question posed by our symposium is: what *unifies* this category of remembering? We often attach a great deal of personal significance to our episodic memories. But what is it about episodic remembering that is distinctive, as opposed to other ways we represent the past?

The first talk will examine the neglected distinction between episodic memory and *autobiographical* memory. The two terms are often used interchangeably. However, in the talk 'The meaning of autobiographical memories', Gabriel Zaccaro will argue that the notions of autobiographical memory and episodic memory are not equivalent, before taking some initial steps towards a clearer definition of autobiographical memory.

The second talk will examine the most common explanation given concerning how episodic memories (unlike memories of other sorts) are retained, and to which events in one's past they refer: namely, the *causal* explanations of episodic memory. In 'What is memory causation after all?, Glaupy Fontana Ribas will present three different causal accounts of episodic memory and illustrate how each uses a pre-

existing concept of causation and tries to apply this to the case of episodic memory. She will argue that the first two explanations fail, leaving room only for the third.

In the third talk, César Schirmer dos Santos will examine two prospects for causal theories of memory (CTM). On the one hand, CTM can be ameliorated by making it more compatible with empirical research on mental time travel. On the other hand, the same study opens space for the proposal to eliminate CTM. He concludes CTM is problematic as an explanation of empirical and epistemic remembering.

Finally, in 'Reference in episodic remembering: A simulationist account', James Openshaw (co-authoring with Kourken Michaelian) will elaborate on recent 'postcausalist' accounts of episodic remembering. In particular, according to *simulationist* theories, episodically remembering an event is just a matter of having a representation of it that was produced by a properly functioning episodic construction system (a system that is also responsible for producing episodic imaginings of future events) that aims to represent an event in one's personal past. He will illustrate how recent *reliabilist* theories of reference-fixing can be used to supplement such postcausalist theories so as to explain how the relevant event representations refer to particular events.

Modal Essence and Whatness Essence

Teresa Robertson Ishii (University of California at Santa Barbara) Nathan Salmon (University of California at Santa Barbara)

Topic: An investigation of different uses of 'essence' in philosophical English: as a term for modal essence (how a thing metaphysically must be) and as a term for quiddity or whatness essence (what a thing is)

Abstract for "Modal Essence and Whatness Essence I"

We refute Kit Fine's charge that modal metaphysics in the framework of Saul Kripke's pathbreaking Naming and Necessity proffers an incorrect conceptual analysis of whatness essence. Indeed, Kripkean metaphysics is not about whatness; it is about metaphysical modalilty.

Abstract for "Modal Essence and Whatness Essence II"

We argue that it is coherent to maintain that a material artifact's modal essence could have been different than it is. By contrast, the claim that such an object's whatnesss essence could have been different is of dubious coherence. We argue furthermore that the logic of metaphysical modality presents a formidable challenge to Fine's thesis that modal essence is reducible to whatness essence.



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