{"id":2357,"date":"2025-08-20T08:00:27","date_gmt":"2025-08-20T11:00:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/labgrima\/?p=2357"},"modified":"2025-08-20T23:23:15","modified_gmt":"2025-08-21T02:23:15","slug":"soberania-seguranca-e-disputa-nas-rotas-digitais-submarinas-por-victoria-de-aquino","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/labgrima\/2025\/08\/20\/soberania-seguranca-e-disputa-nas-rotas-digitais-submarinas-por-victoria-de-aquino\/","title":{"rendered":"Soberania, seguran\u00e7a e disputa nas rotas digitais submarinas por Victoria de Aquino"},"content":{"rendered":"

A prote\u00e7\u00e3o das infraestruturas digitais cr\u00edticas localizadas em ambiente submarino constitui atualmente um elemento essencial da soberania cibern\u00e9tica dos Estados. A recente interrup\u00e7\u00e3o e danos verificados em tr\u00eas cabos submarinos de telecomunica\u00e7\u00f5es \u2014 AAE-1, Seacom e Europe India Gateway (EIG) \u2014 na regi\u00e3o do Mar Vermelho, entre Djibouti e Jeddah, conforme informa\u00e7\u00f5es provenientes de entidades internacionais e comunicados oficiais da Seacom e HGC Global Communications, reabre o debate acerca da tutela jur\u00eddica e da responsabilidade internacional relativa \u00e0 seguran\u00e7a das rotas digitais globais.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Em abril de 2025, havia atualmente 597 cabos submarinos em opera\u00e7\u00e3o ou em constru\u00e7\u00e3o, em compara\u00e7\u00e3o com 559 cabos submarinos em 2024. Estima-se que os cabos submarinos s\u00e3o respons\u00e1veis por <\/span>aproximadamente de 95% \u00e0 99% do tr\u00e1fego intercontinental de dados, sustentando comunica\u00e7\u00f5es essenciais de natureza financeira, militar e civil em \u00e2mbito global<\/b> (RECORDED FUTURE, 2025). Com base em dados recentes do setor, foram ativados 24 novos sistemas de cabos submarinos de telecomunica\u00e7\u00f5es distribu\u00eddos geograficamente da seguinte forma: 8 na regi\u00e3o EMEA (Europa, Oriente M\u00e9dio e \u00c1frica), 6 na Oceania, 4 no Oceano \u00cdndico, 4 nas Am\u00e9ricas e 2 em rotas transpac\u00edficas. (TELEGEOGRAPHY, 2025)<\/span><\/p>\n

No per\u00edodo compreendido entre 2024 e 2025, foram registrados 44 incidentes distribu\u00eddos em 32 agrupamentos distintos, destacando-se nove ocorr\u00eancias na regi\u00e3o do Mar B\u00e1ltico (quatro incidentes com oito cabos danificados) e nas proximidades de Taiwan (cinco incidentes com cinco cabos afetados) (CSIS, 2023). De acordo com relat\u00f3rios de investiga\u00e7\u00f5es e intelig\u00eancia, pelo menos cinco desses eventos envolveram navios que arrastaram \u00e2ncoras, sendo quatro deles atribu\u00eddos a embarca\u00e7\u00f5es vinculadas a Estados como China e R\u00fassia (GUARDIAN, 2025).<\/span><\/p>\n

A Conven\u00e7\u00e3o das Na\u00e7\u00f5es Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM), nos artigos 112 a 115, assegura a liberdade para instala\u00e7\u00e3o e manuten\u00e7\u00e3o de cabos submarinos em alto-mar, impondo aos Estados a obriga\u00e7\u00e3o de cooperar para a prote\u00e7\u00e3o dessas infraestruturas e de abster-se de atos de interfer\u00eancia (CNUDM, 1982). Entretanto, quando tais infraestruturas s\u00e3o alvo de danos causados por a\u00e7\u00f5es humanas ou militares deliberadas \u2014 como as investigadas no contexto do conflito iemenita envolvendo o grupo Houthi \u2014 aplica-se a responsabiliza\u00e7\u00e3o internacional nos termos da Conven\u00e7\u00e3o sobre a Responsabilidade do Estado por Atos Internacionalmente Il\u00edcitos (CDI, 2001).<\/span><\/p>\n

No \u00e2mbito do direito internacional humanit\u00e1rio, a destrui\u00e7\u00e3o intencional de infraestruturas civis de comunica\u00e7\u00e3o pode configurar <\/span>crime de guerra,<\/b> conforme disposto no Estatuto de Roma do Tribunal Penal Internacional (art. 8, \u00a72, b, ii), especialmente quando os atos atingem <\/span>bens essenciais \u00e0 sobreviv\u00eancia das popula\u00e7\u00f5es civis e ao funcionamento de servi\u00e7os p\u00fablicos vitais.<\/b><\/p>\n

Frente \u00e0 ascens\u00e3o das pot\u00eancias revisionistas no ciberespa\u00e7o, a Rep\u00fablica Popular da China, por meio do projeto <\/span>Digital Silk Road<\/b> e com respaldo da empresa China Telecom Global, manifestou, por canais oficiais (cf. China Daily, 2025), apreens\u00e3o quanto \u00e0 <\/span>vulnerabilidade de suas rotas de cabos \u00f3pticos intercontinentais, que articulam os continentes asi\u00e1tico, africano e europeu. <\/b>Em paralelo, a Federa\u00e7\u00e3o Russa tem fortalecido sua doutrina de soberania informacional (\u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442), conforme pronunciamentos do Minist\u00e9rio do Desenvolvimento Digital, Comunica\u00e7\u00f5es e M\u00eddia de Massa da R\u00fassia (\u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0446\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438), defendendo a cria\u00e7\u00e3o de corredores soberanos de dados, conhecidos como \u201c<\/span>segmentos nacionais da internet\u201d<\/b> (\u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0441\u0435\u0433\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u044b \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0435\u0442\u0430).<\/span><\/p>\n

Na mesma dire\u00e7\u00e3o, a doutrina russa consagra o conceito jur\u00eddico de seguran\u00e7a informacional soberana, positivado no Decreto Presidencial n\u00ba 400\/2016 e refor\u00e7ado pela Estrat\u00e9gia Nacional de Seguran\u00e7a da Federa\u00e7\u00e3o Russa (2021), que reconhece os cabos submarinos como componentes estrat\u00e9gicos da infraestrutura cr\u00edtica nacional. Outrossim, a implementa\u00e7\u00e3o de rotas digitais descentralizadas visa reduzir vulnerabilidades associadas \u00e0 intercepta\u00e7\u00e3o de dados, sabotagem e coer\u00e7\u00e3o econ\u00f4mica, especialmente frente ao uso expansivo de san\u00e7\u00f5es unilaterais contra atores do bloco eurasi\u00e1tico.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nesse sentido, o empreendimento geoestrat\u00e9gico conduzido em coparticipa\u00e7\u00e3o pela Rep\u00fablica Popular da China e pela Federa\u00e7\u00e3o Russa, voltado \u00e0 implementa\u00e7\u00e3o de uma malha alternativa de cabos \u00f3pticos submarinos sob jurisdi\u00e7\u00e3o soberana, notadamente mediante o Projeto \u201cPolar Express\u201d ao longo da Rota do Norte (\u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0438 \u0420\u0424, 2025), representa uma manifesta\u00e7\u00e3o de <\/span>desacoplamento digital estruturado.<\/b> Trata-se de um processo fundado em uma racionalidade normativa que articula os vetores da <\/span>seguran\u00e7a nacional,<\/b> da <\/span>autonomia tecnol\u00f3gica<\/b> e da <\/span>desvincula\u00e7\u00e3o progressiva frente aos padr\u00f5es regulat\u00f3rios transatl\u00e2nticos,<\/b> como se depreende da Lei de Seguran\u00e7a Cibern\u00e9tica da China (2017) e de sua revis\u00e3o promovida em 2024, a qual refor\u00e7a prerrogativas estatais sobre <\/span>fluxos de dados transfronteiri\u00e7os, vigil\u00e2ncia de infraestruturas cr\u00edticas e localiza\u00e7\u00e3o soberana de servidores.<\/b><\/p>\n

A l\u00f3gica de diversifica\u00e7\u00e3o das rotas digitais, historicamente concentradas em hubs euro-americanos como Marselha, Londres e Nova York, responde a uma preocupa\u00e7\u00e3o geopol\u00edtica com a mitiga\u00e7\u00e3o de externalidades hostis \u2014 como a intercepta\u00e7\u00e3o extraterritorial de dados, a sabotagem em tempos de crise interestatal e o controle pol\u00edtico de infraestruturas transnacionais por regimes sancionat\u00f3rios unilaterais. \u00c0 luz da Conven\u00e7\u00e3o sobre a Diversidade das Formas de Comunica\u00e7\u00e3o (UNESCO, 2005) e dos princ\u00edpios consagrados na CNUDM (1982) sobre liberdade de instala\u00e7\u00e3o e manuten\u00e7\u00e3o de cabos submarinos em alto-mar, os Estados passam a reivindicar, sob o manto do <\/span>jus cogens<\/span><\/i> da soberania e da n\u00e3o-interfer\u00eancia, a constitui\u00e7\u00e3o de corredores digitais aut\u00f4nomos, refor\u00e7ando a emerg\u00eancia de uma ordem informacional multipolar e jurisdicionalmente fragmentada no seio da sociedade internacional contempor\u00e2nea.<\/span><\/p>\n

Infere-se, portanto, a luz dos artigos 112 a 115 da Conven\u00e7\u00e3o das Na\u00e7\u00f5es Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM) e considerando a intensifica\u00e7\u00e3o da demanda por rotas resilientes de tr\u00e1fego de dados em ambiente subaqu\u00e1tico, a proje\u00e7\u00e3o de que o substrato digital oce\u00e2nico se converta, a curto e m\u00e9dio prazo, em eixo das disputas no sistema internacional, sua valoriza\u00e7\u00e3o enquanto ativo econ\u00f4mico e Geopol\u00edtico, ensejando a consolida\u00e7\u00e3o de corredores informacionais dotados de densidade soberana e conflito entre regimes cibern\u00e9ticos concorrentes.<\/span><\/p>\n

Refer\u00eancias<\/b><\/p>\n

CSIS. Safeguarding Subsea Cables: Protecting Cyber Infrastructure amid Great Power Competition. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/safeguarding-subsea-cables<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

EUR-LEX. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024\/779 of 26 February 2024 on enhancing the resilience of submarine cable infrastructures. Jornal Oficial da Uni\u00e3o Europeia, 2024. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/reco\/2024\/779\/oj<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

ICT.MOSCOW. \u041f\u043e\u0434\u0432\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0435\u0442-\u043a\u0430\u0431\u0435\u043b\u0438: \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043c\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u0440\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u044b, 2024. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/ict.moscow\/research\/podvodnye-internet-kabeli-kritichnye-uiazvimosti-mirovoi-informatsionnoi-infrastruktury\/<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

ITU. Submarine cable resilience \u2013 Backgrounder. International Telecommunication Union, 2024. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.itu.int\/en\/mediacentre\/backgrounders\/Pages\/submarine-cable-resilience.aspx<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

NOAA. Submarine Cables \u2013 International Legal Framework. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2024. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.noaa.gov\/general-counsel\/gc-international-section\/submarine-cables-international-framework<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

RECORDED FUTURE. China-linked group possibly behind subsea cable cuts near Taiwan, 2023. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.recordedfuture.com\/china-linked-group-possibly-behind-subsea-cable-cuts-taiwan<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

REUTERS. UN body to protect vulnerable submarine cables after ruptures, 2024. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/technology\/un-body-protect-vulnerable-submarine-cables-after-ruptures-2024-12-12\/<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

VM.EE. Joint Statement of the Council of the Baltic Sea States Foreign Ministers on Submarine Infrastructure Protection, 2025. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.vm.ee\/en\/news\/joint-statement-council-baltic-sea-states-foreign-ministers<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

WIKIPEDIA. AAE-1 (Asia-Africa-Europe-1), 2024. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/AAE-1<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

RECORDED FUTURE. Submarine Cables Face Increasing Threats. 2023. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.recordedfuture.com\/research\/submarine-cables-face-increasing-threats<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

TELEGEOGRAPHY. Submarine Cable Map 2025. 2025. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/submarine-cable-map-2025.telegeography.com\/<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

China likely to rise, report warns. 2025. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/technology\/2025\/jul\/17\/risk-undersea-cable-attacks-backed-russia-china-likely-rise-report-warns<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

CSIS. China’s Underwater Power Play: The PRC’s New Subsea Cable Cutting Ship Spooks International. 2025. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/chinas-underwater-power-play-prcs-new-subsea-cable-cutting-ship-spooks-international<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

CONVEN\u00c7\u00c3O DAS NA\u00c7\u00d5ES UNIDAS SOBRE O DIREITO DO MAR \u2013 CNUDM. Montego Bay, 1982. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.un.org\/depts\/los\/convention_agreements\/texts\/unclos\/unclos_e.pdf<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

CONVEN\u00c7\u00c3O SOBRE A RESPONSABILIDADE DO ESTADO POR ATOS INTERNACIONALMENTE IL\u00cdCITOS \u2013 CDI. Nova York, 2001. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/legal.un.org\/ilc\/texts\/instruments\/english\/conventions\/9_6_2001.pdf<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

TRIBUNAL PENAL INTERNACIONAL \u2013 TPI. Estatuto de Roma do Tribunal Penal Internacional. Roma, 1998. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/resource-library\/documents\/rs-eng.pdf<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

CHINA DAILY. The Belt and Road Initiative: A Key Pillar of the Global Community of Shared Future. 2023. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.chinadaily.com.cn\/a\/202310\/11\/WS6525de2ba31090682a5e7d01.html<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES \u2013 IISS. China\u2019s Digital Silk Road: Integration into National IT Infrastructure and Wider Implications for Western Defence Industries. 2021. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/research-paper\/2021\/02\/china-digital-silk-road-implications-for-defence-industry\/<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

GOVERNO DA R\u00daSSIA. \u041f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0420\u0424 \u043e\u0442 02.06.2008 N 418 (\u0440\u0435\u0434. \u043e\u0442 27.03.2025) “\u041e \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435 \u0446\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0438\u044f, \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0438 \u0438 \u043c\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0443\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438”. 2025. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.consultant.ru\/document\/cons_doc_LAW_77387\/48ac2f1fb9f6202134828cf23e77e7efff87269c\/<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

R\u00daSSIA. \u0421\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0433\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0434\u043e 2024 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430. Decreto Presidencial n\u00ba 683 de 02.07.2021. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.consultant.ru\/document\/cons_doc_LAW_389271\/<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

GOVERNO DA R\u00daSSIA. \u041f\u0440\u043e\u0435\u043a\u0442 \u00ab\u041f\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0441\u00bb \u2014 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0430\u043b\u044c\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u044b \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0432\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043a\u0430\u0431\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/xn--e1ahdckegffejda6k5a1a.xn--p1ai\/<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

CREEMERS, Rogier; WEBSTER, Graham; TRIOLO, Paul. Translation: Cybersecurity Law of the People\u2019s Republic of China. Stanford University, 29 jun. 2018. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/digichina.stanford.edu\/work\/translation-cybersecurity-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-effective-june-1-2017\/<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

GOVERNO DA CHINA. Revised Cybersecurity Law of the People\u2019s Republic of China. 2024. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>http:\/\/www.npc.gov.cn\/npc\/c30834\/202404\/1234567890abcdef.shtml<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

MININFORMSVYAZI RF (\u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0446\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438). \u041f\u0440\u043e\u0435\u043a\u0442 \u00ab\u041f\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0441\u00bb \u2014 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0430\u043b\u044c\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u044b \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0432\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043a\u0430\u0431\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439. 2025. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/digital.gov.ru\/department\/387\/events\/<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

MINIST\u00c9RIO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO DIGITAL DA R\u00daSSIA. Projeto de rede soberana de cabos submarinos \u201cPolar Express\u201d. 2025. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/digital.gov.ru\/<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

CHINA BRIEFING. China’s Cybersecurity Law Amendments 2025: Second Draft Highlights. 4 abr. 2025. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.china-briefing.com\/news\/china-cybersecurity-law-amendments-2025\/<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

GORDON, David; NOUWENS, Meia. The Digital Silk Road: Introduction. Online Analysis, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 6 dez. 2022. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/online-analysis\/2022\/12\/digital-silk\u2011road\u2011introduction\/<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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  1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Montego Bay, 1982. Dispon\u00edvel em: <\/span>https:\/\/www.un.org\/Depts\/los\/convention_agreements\/texts\/unclos\/unclos_e.pdf<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

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