{"id":367,"date":"2016-08-03T23:39:00","date_gmt":"2016-08-04T02:39:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/ebarbosa\/?page_id=367"},"modified":"2021-11-01T22:58:46","modified_gmt":"2021-11-02T01:58:46","slug":"projetos-de-pesquisa-2","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/ebarbosa\/projetos-de-pesquisa-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Projects"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ongoing<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

(2020 – )<\/span>\u00a0<\/strong><\/span>PANDEMIC RELATIONS: <\/b>[Re]Forging our Moral Bonds in the Time of COVID-19.<\/b><\/p>\n

Coordinator:<\/strong> Evandro Barbosa (UFPel)<\/p>\n

Contributors: \u00a0<\/strong>Matheus de Mesquita Silveira (UCS),\u00a0Silvio Jos\u00e9 Lemos Vasconcellos (UFSM),\u00a0Heloisa Allgayer (UCS)<\/p>\n

Could the Covid-19 pandemic be creating new types of bonds in human relationships? Living in pandemic times is like having the Sword of\u00a0Damocles around his neck every day. This situation has led to significant changes in the modus operandi of our relationships,\u00a0family, professional, social and even religious, since answering the above question requires an understanding that the moral elements\u00a0of our relationships are varied. And while a wide range of philosophical discussions have mapped some moral issues related to\u00a0pandemic, one thing that seems to have been overlooked is that human relations themselves have a prominent place as an object of study.\u00a0We must be prepared to unfold what we call pandemic relationships to fully understand the implications of this\u00a0new (temporary or otherwise) social dynamics in our moral lives. Our intention with this project is to analyze how our relationships during\u00a0Pandemic times shape our moral relationships. As the title suggests, the project focuses on three main points: emotions,\u00a0rationality and character traits. The first and second points can be seen as a Janus-faced phenomenon. In the first, we explore the\u00a0pandemic relationships based on emotional contours. To begin with, we must the concepts of selfishness and altruism in order to understand\u00a0its nuances and peculiarities in the human interactions tormented by Covid-19. And finally, fear and anger will be considered as\u00a0having a negative valence in social interactions. They will be examined from the perspectives of political, psychological and\u00a0for the sole purpose of increasing our understanding of individuals’ adherence to populism in the context of COVID-19. The second\u00a0point deals with the rationality of our actions in extreme situations. The agency conditions are highlighted from the processes of taking the\u00a0rational and non-rational decisions. Moral philosophers also need to address some responses to the rational denier, whose existence is not\u00a0mere fiction in times of attacks on science. Even situations that could previously be considered common, such as washing hands before\u00a0eating lunch at a restaurant or keeping a respectful distance from others are now painted in bold colors in philosophical discussions and\u00a0morals. As this set of circumstances offers a shift in the natural dynamics of our considerations, it seems to pressure the\u00a0rationality (instrumental or not) of our choices in risky situations. Finally, our third point considers the role that the traces of\u00a0Character agents play in shaping the moral quality of our relationships in times of pandemic. The isolation and social distance caused by the pandemic can profoundly affect our moral, political and legal convictions.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

(2021 – )<\/span>\u00a0COVID-19 Pandemic and the Role of Emotions in Normative Behaviors.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Coordinator:<\/strong> Evandro Barbosa (UFPel)<\/p>\n

Contributors: \u00a0<\/strong>Matheus de Mesquita Silveira (UCS),\u00a0Silvio Jos\u00e9 Lemos Vasconcellos (UFSM),\u00a0Heloisa Allgayer (UCS)<\/p>\n

This project aims to establish the role that the physiological constitution of social mammals, especially\u00a0human beings, have in the expression of basic social emotions in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The social relevance\u00a0from emotions to these relationships established in small groups will be investigated both on a conceptual basis,\u00a0as from an empirical-experimental perspective, focusing on the role of expressive movements\u00a0possess in the communication of approval and social censorship in canids and social primates. Recent searches have\u00a0discussed how extreme conditions act as triggers for certain emotions. The problem arises when\u00a0phenomena such as a pandemic produce extreme conditions in which our moral judgments are distorted\u00a0by a series of factors (prejudice, anxieties and concern about their own problems), making it difficult for\u00a0our moral capacity for agency is manifested. These moral flaws add to the limits of our natural condition\u00a0(deficiency of knowledge, reasoning and judgment), making our choices difficult. With regard to the study related to\u00a0emotional expressions, it will be performed by presenting the general principles of emotions performed by\u00a0Darwin (2000) in combination with contemporary analyzes developed by experimental psychology and biology\u00a0behavioral on the topic. Based on the study of basic emotions developed by Ekman\u00a0(1999), studies will be developed to map the expressive movements of social mammals with respect to\u00a0basic emotions. The hypothesis is that, if these principles are homologous in different species, this will aggregate\u00a0strength to the evolutionary explanation of the relationship between emotions and social behavior, offering a key to\u00a0empirically solid reading to understand the relationships of social viscosity in family nuclei raised by the\u00a0pandemic context.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Concluded<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

(2016 – 2019)<\/span> \u00a0<\/strong><\/span>Agente normativo e mind-dependence na tradi\u00e7\u00e3o contrato-construtivista.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

–\u00a0Coordenadores: <\/strong>Evandro Barbosa (UFPel) \/ Keberson Bresolin (UFPel) – Lattes<\/a><\/p>\n

–\u00a0Colaboradoras: <\/strong>Tha\u00eds Alves Costa (UCPel) – Lattes<\/a>\u00a0\/\u00a0<\/span>Roberta Rego Rodrigues (UFPel) – Lattes<\/a><\/p>\n

–\u00a0<\/span>Financiamento: <\/span><\/strong>Fapergs\/CNPq<\/span><\/p>\n

Descri\u00e7\u00e3o:<\/strong> Desde a publica\u00e7\u00e3o de Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory (1980) de John Rawls, muito se tem discutido sobre a met\u00e1fora da constru\u00e7\u00e3o como m\u00e9todo de justifica\u00e7\u00e3o moral a partir de propostas procedimentais, especialmente as contratualistas.1 Neste texto, Rawls faz uma afirma\u00e7\u00e3o que sugere controv\u00e9rsias em diferentes n\u00edveis pr\u00e1ticos, meta\u00e9tico e normativo: \u201c(…) a objetividade moral deve ser compreendida em termos de um ponto de vista social adequadamente constru\u00eddo que todos podem aceitar. Exceto pelo procedimento de constru\u00e7\u00e3o dos princ\u00edpios de justi\u00e7a, n\u00e3o h\u00e1 fatos morais.\u201d2 Esta passagem resume tr\u00eas elementos essenciais para o desenvolvimento de sua teoria: tipo de objetividade, metodologia utilizada e um problema meta\u00e9tico que re\u00fane realistas e antirrealistas. O objetivo deste projeto \u00e9 defender um tipo de objetividade qua mind-dependence a partir do construtivismo procedimental de John Rawls para o problema da normatividade. Como hip\u00f3tese inicial, iremos assumir que seu modelo de objetividade exige um tipo de fato moral enfraquecido e provis\u00f3rio, o que o tornaria um realista moral em um sentido m\u00ednimo. Para a confirma\u00e7\u00e3o desta hip\u00f3tese, o projeto abordar\u00e1 os seguintes pontos:<\/p>\n

i) apresentar uma defini\u00e7\u00e3o geral de construtivismo e seu desmembramento em construtivismo procedimental (ou restritivo) e construtivismo meta\u00e9tico;<\/p>\n

ii) Enquadrar o modelo construtivista como uma vis\u00e3o mind-dependence e discutir o problema de ontologia moral (realismo \u2013 antirrealismo);<\/p>\n

iii) Explicitar a condi\u00e7\u00e3o procedimental de justifica\u00e7\u00e3o para a teoria da justi\u00e7a de Rawls,\u00a0especialmente sua vers\u00e3o contratualista;<\/p>\n

iv) Definir normatividade e o tipo de objetividade moral que podemos alcan\u00e7ar nesta posi\u00e7\u00e3o. Isso permitir\u00e1 explicar porque os fatos morais n\u00e3o existem de forma independente das cren\u00e7as morais dos indiv\u00edduos, o que, no caso de Rawls, implicaria associar sua vis\u00e3o construtivista a uma forma procedimentalista.<\/p>\n

v) Tradu\u00e7\u00e3o para o portugu\u00eas de textos de l\u00edngua inglesa que envolvem o tema (construtivismo, realismo, normatividade, contratualismo), os quais ser\u00e3o apresentados no formato de colet\u00e2nea para a comunidade acad\u00eamica.<\/p>\n

(2015 – 2018)<\/span> <\/strong><\/span>– A natureza normativa dos ju\u00edzos avaliativos no contratualismo contempor\u00e2neo.<\/strong>
\nDescri\u00e7\u00e3o:<\/em><\/strong> Do que interessa para o desenvolvimento desta pesquisa, deter-me-ei no chamado consentimento estrutural (structural consent) do contratualismo de Rawls. Para este, o que vale \u00e9 um contrato hipot\u00e9tico, cuja base \u00e9 uma delibera\u00e7\u00e3o equitativa que leva em considera\u00e7\u00e3o (a) a proposi\u00e7\u00e3o de uma situa\u00e7\u00e3o ideal para a escolha de princ\u00edpios e (b) a determina\u00e7\u00e3o do conjunto de princ\u00edpios que ser\u00e3o acordados nesta situa\u00e7\u00e3o. O problema meta\u00e9tico com o qual nos deparamos exige oferecer uma concep\u00e7\u00e3o alternativa de natureza dos fatos e verdades morais. A proposta de um contratualismo construtivista sustenta a possibilidade de que a objetividade (que deve ser distinta de uma concep\u00e7\u00e3o de verdade moral) pode ser constru\u00edda a partir de uma ordem social ideal, mais do que derivada de uma ordem natural ou n\u00e3o-natural. Nesse caso, a\u00e7\u00f5es corretas ou erradas derivam de uma ordem social proibitiva dada por agentes racionais contratantes sob determinada condi\u00e7\u00e3o idealizada. Rawls faz isso muito bem ao propor que a alegada objetividade dos fatos morais \u00e9, na verdade, produto de um processo de constru\u00e7\u00e3o em que agentes racionais, em uma posi\u00e7\u00e3o ideal (original position), alcan\u00e7am um acordo sobre quais regras ir\u00e3o regular suas rela\u00e7\u00f5es e comportamentos. Consequentemente, a objetividade oriunda deste procedimento de constru\u00e7\u00e3o n\u00e3o parte de uma ordem independente de valores dada extra muros, tendo em vista que o m\u00e9todo construtivista, acoplado a este procedimento heur\u00edstico, leva a um acordo sobre princ\u00edpios morais\/pol\u00edticos racionalmente aceitos a partir de um ponto de vista social imparcial. Com Rawls, podemos seguir pelo caminho da inven\u00e7\u00e3o mais facilmente do que pelo da descoberta. Quando os agente de constru\u00e7\u00e3o (agentes of construction) decidem pelo acordo, fazem-no com vista a escolha a um conjunto de normas (sef of norms) que determinam o tipo de a\u00e7\u00e3o requerida enquanto deveres e obriga\u00e7\u00f5es. Tais normais s\u00e3o vistas enquanto guias de a\u00e7\u00e3o (action guides) e n\u00e3o simplesmente enquanto afirma\u00e7\u00f5es de verdade (truth claims). O que est\u00e1 em jogo, portanto, \u00e9 compreender a natureza dos ju\u00edzos morais enquanto guias de a\u00e7\u00e3o com peso de objetividade. Nesse sentido, tal objetividade colocaria a condi\u00e7\u00e3o realista de fatos morais como algo secund\u00e1rio na teoria, ou seja, verdades pr\u00e1ticas n\u00e3o se referem diretamente a raz\u00f5es de prefer\u00eancia, escolha ou a\u00e7\u00e3o.<\/p>\n

(2015 – 2018)<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Justifica\u00e7\u00e3o e Legitima\u00e7\u00e3o do Estado: Um Di\u00e1logo entre John Rawls e Robert Nozick.<\/strong><\/p>\n

– Coordenadores: <\/strong>Evandro Barbosa (UFPel) \/ Keberson Bresolin (UFPel)<\/span><\/p>\n

– Financiamento:<\/span><\/span><\/strong> CNPq<\/span>\u00a0<\/strong>
\nDescri\u00e7\u00e3o:<\/em><\/strong> Nosso principal objetivo nesta pesquisa \u00e9 verificar, analisar e interpretar o problema da justifica\u00e7\u00e3o e da legitima\u00e7\u00e3o do Estado democr\u00e1tico de direito a partir dos textos A Theory of Justice (TJ), Political Liberalism (PL), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (JFR) de John Rawls e a partir do texto Anarchy, State and Utopia (ASU) de Robert Nozick. Nossa inten\u00e7\u00e3o \u00e9 analisar a proposta s\u00f3cio democrata da ?Justice as Fairness? de John Rawls como um modo de ajuste das desigualdades sociais arbitrariamente estabelecidas. Para isso, Rawls prop\u00f5e os dois princ\u00edpios da justi\u00e7a os quais visam atender a demanda dos conceitos pol\u00edticos de liberdade e igualdade e estabelecer as condi\u00e7\u00f5es de possibilidade da concorr\u00eancia equitativa na coopera\u00e7\u00e3o social. Para dialogar com a proposta ?distributivista? de Rawls, analisaremos o projeto libert\u00e1rio de Robert Nozick, o qual critica duramente em seu livro ASU a fundamenta\u00e7\u00e3o de um Estado distributivista, pois ele lesa profundamente os direitos individuais da liberdade e da propriedade. Nozick busca apoio para parte de sua teoria na proposta liberal de John Locke, no qual encontra sua ?pedra fundamental?, a saber, os direitos individuais. Sua filosofia baseia-se sobre a tese de que indiv\u00edduos possuem direitos inviol\u00e1veis. Nesta medida, colocar estes dois grandes pensadores pol\u00edticos em discuss\u00e3o oferece sem d\u00favida uma grande pesquisa para pensar o sistema de governo, sua fundamenta\u00e7\u00e3o e sua legitima\u00e7\u00e3o. Para nossa pesquisa sempre ser\u00e1 importante a atualiza\u00e7\u00e3o do pensamento dos autores para o contexto de fundamenta\u00e7\u00e3o e legitima\u00e7\u00e3o do Estado democr\u00e1tico de direito brasileiro.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ongoing (2020 – )\u00a0PANDEMIC RELATIONS: [Re]Forging our Moral Bonds in the Time of COVID-19. Coordinator: Evandro Barbosa (UFPel) Contributors: \u00a0Matheus de Mesquita Silveira (UCS),\u00a0Silvio Jos\u00e9 Lemos Vasconcellos… Read more “Projects”<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":551,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-367","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/ebarbosa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/367","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/ebarbosa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/ebarbosa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/ebarbosa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/551"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/ebarbosa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=367"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/ebarbosa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/367\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":949,"href":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/ebarbosa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/367\/revisions\/949"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/wp.ufpel.edu.br\/ebarbosa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=367"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}